Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 22GDCV01128, Date: 2024-03-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22GDCV01128 Hearing Date: March 19, 2024 Dept: P
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
NORTHEAST DISTRICT
I.
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case concerns allegations of
childhood sexual abuse and childhood sexual assault. The two plaintiffs, Jane
Doe KC 1 (KC) and Jane Doe AH 2 (AH) (collectively Plaintiffs) allege that they
suffered childhood sexual abuse at the hands of Defendants Gloria De Los
Angeles Trevino Ruiz aka Gloria Trevi (Trevi); Sergio Gustavo Andrade Sanchez
aka Sergio Andrade (Andrade); and Maria Raquenel Portillo Jimenez aka Mary
Boquitas and Mary Raquenel (Raquenel). The alleged abuse took place in 1991-1992,
when KC was 15 and AH was 13. The abuse allegedly occurred in both Mexico and
California, while the Doe plaintiffs were backup singers and dancers for
Defendant Trevi, who is a well-known Mexican pop star.
There are two cross-complaints in this
action, as well as a related case filed by a third Jane Doe.
On September 26, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their motion
to permit them to litigate using pseudonyms. Trevi filed an opposition on
December 29, 2023. Plaintiffs filed a reply on January 5, 2024. In addition,
amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of Plaintiffs’ motion. On February
26, 2024, Trevi filed a response to the amicus briefs. On March 1, 2024,
Plaintiffs filed a reply in support of the amicus briefs. Trevi then filed an
objection to Plaintiff’s “amicus” reply. (The Court declines to strike
Plaintiff’s reply in support of the amici briefs).
For the reasons set forth below, the motion is
granted.
II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Defendant
Gloria Trevi’s evidentiary objections to the Declaration of AH (70):
The
following objections are overruled: 1, 2, 3 (relevant), 4 (relevant), 5
(relevant), 6 (relevant), 7 (relevant), 8 (relevant), 9 (not hearsay), 10 (not
hearsay), 11 (relevant), 12 (relevant), 13 (relevant), 14 (relevant), 15
(relevant), 16 (relevant), 17 (relevant), 18 (relevant), 19 (relevant), 20
(relevant), 21 (relevant), 22 (relevant), 23 (not hearsay), 24 (relevant), 25
(relevant), 26 (relevant), 27 (relevant), 28 (not hearsay), 29 (relevant), 30
(relevant), 31 (relevant), 32 (relevant), 33 (relevant), 34 (relevant), 35
(relevant), 36 (relevant), 37 (relevant), 38 (relevant), 39 (relevant), 40
(relevant), 41 (relevant), 42 (relevant), 43 (relevant), 44 (relevant), 45
(relevant), 46 (relevant), 47 (relevant), 48 (relevant), 49 (relevant), 50
(relevant), 51 (relevant), 52 (relevant), 53 (relevant), 54 (relevant), 55
(relevant), 56 (relevant), 57 (relevant), 58 (relevant), 59 (relevant), 60
(relevant), 61 (relevant), 62 (relevant), 63 (has foundation), 64 (has
foundation), 65 (has foundation), 66, 67 (relevant), 68 (has foundation), 69 (relevant),
70 (has foundation).
The
following objections are sustained: none.
Defendant
Gloria Trevi’s evidentiary objections to Declaration of KC (57):
The
following objections are overruled: 1, 2, 3 (has personal knowledge), 4 (relevant),
5 (relevant), 6 (not hearsay), 7 (not hearsay), 8 (not hearsay), 9 (relevant),
10 (not hearsay), 11 (relevant), 12 (not hearsay), 13 (relevant), 14
(relevant), 15 (has foundation), 16 (relevant), 17 (relevant), 18 (relevant),
19 (relevant), 20 (relevant), 21 (relevant), 22 (has foundation), 23 (not
hearsay), 24 (relevant), 25 (relevant), 26 (relevant), 27 (relevant), 28, 29
(relevant), 30 (relevant), 31
(relevant), 32 (relevant), 33 (relevant), 34 (relevant), 35 (relevant), 36
(relevant), 37 (relevant), 38 (relevant), 39 (relevant), 40 (relevant), 41
(relevant), 42 (relevant) 43 (relevant), 44 (relevant), 45 (relevant), 46
(relevant), 47 (relevant), 48 (relevant), 49 (has foundation), 50 (relevant),
51 (relevant), 52 (relevant), 53 (relevant), 54 (relevant), 55 (relevant), 56
(has foundation), 57 (has foundation).
The
following objections are sustained: none.
Defendant
Gloria Trevi’s evidentiary objections to Declaration of Karen Barth Menzies (13):
The
following objections are overruled: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (has personal knowledge), 6
(does not implicate secondary evidence rule), 7 (has foundation), 8, 9, 10 (has
foundation), 11 (has foundation), 12 (has foundation), 13 (has foundation).
The
following objections are sustained: none.
Defendant
Gloria Trevi’s evidentiary objections to Declaration of Caroline M. Whitlock
submitted with reply (11):
The
following objections are overruled: none.
The
following objections are sustained: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.
As
this declaration was first submitted with the reply, all objections are
sustained.
Defendant
Gloria Trevi’s evidentiary objections to Declaration of Ari Micha Wilkenfeld
submitted with reply (8):
The
following objections are overruled: none.
The
following objections are sustained: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
As
this declaration was first submitted with the reply, all objections are
sustained.
III.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendant Gloria Trevi’s Request
for Judicial Notice
Defendant Trevi requests that the
Court take judicial notice of various Google searches, internet articles and other
internet sources under Evidence Code Section 452(h). Evidence Code 452(h)
provides that judicial notice can be taken of “Facts and propositions that are
not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate
determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (EC §
452(h).)
The Court declines to take judicial
notice of the content of the various internet sources, as the information
contained within them are subject to interpretation and may be changed at any
time. Accordingly, the Court refuses to take judicial notice of Exhs. 1-3 and 5-18.
The Court grants judicial notice of Exh. 4, which is a copy of two book pages.
IV. LEGAL
STANDARD
“‘[A] party may preserve his or her anonymity in judicial
proceedings in special circumstances when the party’s need for anonymity
outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing
the party’s identity.’” (Doe v.
Lincoln Unified School Dist. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 758, 767, quoting Does
I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 214 F.3d 1058,
1068.) A court may permit plaintiffs to use pseudonyms in three situations:
“(1) when identification creates a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm
[Citation]; (2) when anonymity is necessary ‘to preserve privacy in a matter of
sensitive and highly personal nature’ [Citation]; and (3) when the anonymous
party is ‘compelled to admit [his or her] intention to engage in illegal
conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution.’ “ (Does I thru XXIII v.
Advanced Textile Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 214 F.3d 1058, 1068.) Where the
request for anonymity is based on the purported need “to preserve privacy in a
matter of sensitive and highly personal nature,” the proper test is whether
“the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and
the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity.” (Id.; Doe v.
Lincoln Unified School District (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 758, 767.)
“[F]ictitious names are allowed when necessary
to protect the privacy of children, rape victims, and other particularly
vulnerable parties or witnesses.” (Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
United of Wisconsin (7th Cir. 1997) 112 F.3d 869, 872.)
The decision whether or not to allow a party to proceed by
pseudonym is a constitutional question that courts of appeal review under an
independent judgment standard. (Department
of Fair Employment and Housing v. Superior Court (2022) 82 Cal. App. 5th
105, 112.)
V. DISCUSSION
a. General Nature of This Case
This
is a case involving childhood sexual abuse/assault. Plaintiffs cite numerous
cases involving childhood sexual assault victims being allowed to proceed
anonymously due to the sensitive nature of the case. (See, e.g., Doe No. 2
v. Kolko 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 242 F.R.D. 193; Doe v. Evans (E.D. Pa.
2001) 202 F.R.D. 173, 17; Doe v. Superior Ct. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th
750, 752-753; Doe v. Epic Games, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2020) 453 F.Supp.3d
1024, 1045.) Courts in other
jurisdictions have recognized that the risk of retaliatory physical or mental
harm may justify anonymity of the plaintiffs in certain circumstances. (See,
e.g., Southern Methodist Univ. Assoc. of Women Law Students v. Wynne &
Jaffe (5th Cir. 1979) 599 F.2d 707, 713; Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced
Textile Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 214 F.3d 1058, 1068.)
b.
Did Plaintiffs Insert Themselves into the Public Eye?
In
her opposition, Defendant Trevi urges that public access to the courts is
constitutionally required, citing CRC 2.550(c). CRC 2.550(c) provides that
courts are presumed to be open unless confidentiality is required by law. (CRC
2.550(c).) Trevi goes on to argue that because Plaintiffs’ names were already
in the public sphere as individuals accusing Andrade of assault, they are not
entitled to privacy. (See Opposition p. 13: 21-28, citing Sipple v.
Chronicle Publishing Co. (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1047.) Further, Trevi cites
case law for the proposition that a pseudonym is not warranted when a
Plaintiff’s name is already known to the public in connection with the issues
in the case. (See e.g., Doe v. Megless (3d Cir. 2011) 654 F.3d 404,
410.)
Trevi
requested judicial notice of several webpages, but the Court has declined to
take judicial notice of their content. However,
the Court does take judicial notice of Exhibit 4, where Plaintiff KC’s full
name appears. (Trevi RJN Exh. 4 p. 44 [ “[Jane Doe KC Name]… she accused Sergio
of inflicting her with ‘punishments, humiliation and torture.’”])
Plaintiff
KC 1 admits that she gave public interviews in 2002 and earlier about the
alleged abuse. (Menzies Decl. Exh. 1: KC Declaration ¶¶ 27, 28.) Plaintiff KC
urges that she is not on social media now, but the fact that she did indeed
make public statements about the abuse is noted. (Id.)
In
their reply, Plaintiffs urge that though their names are known in the public
sphere, the potential for social media backlash (and indeed, the backlash that
has already assertedly occurred) supports their request to proceed with pseudonyms.
(Reply p. 4: 12-13.)
c.
Social Media
In their motion, Plaintiffs assert that Trevi, Trevi’s spouse,
and fans of Trevi have already started posting messages about the case
harassing Plaintiffs and threatening them. (Motion p. 12: 6- p.14:18.)
Specifically,
Plaintiffs attach tweets made by Trevi’s husband, Armando Gomez. These tweets
concern the case and the two Plaintiffs. (See (1/4/23 Tweet) “Everything in due
time at least they continue to feed what they have been so scared of for
years...”; (6/30/23 Tweet) “Let what has to burn burn and whoever has to burn
….” (Motion p. 13-14.)
Additionally,
Plaintiffs assert that another survivor of Andrade’s abuse has received death
threats from Trevi’s fans over social media app Instagram. Specifically, the
woman posted a photo of her family attending a soccer game and in response,
someone posted in a comment “This one [the woman’s son] will die soon, you will
pay for what you did to Gloria’s daughter.” (KC Decl. ¶ 55.)
Plaintiffs
also note calls for support Defendant Trevi has made at her concerts (KC Decl.
¶¶ 43-48) and the fact that Defendant Raquenel has started a podcast and made
reference to the abuse allegations at the heart of this case. (KC Decl. ¶ 49,
AH Decl. ¶¶ 51-56.)
In
support of their motions, Plaintiffs also provide their own declarations.
(Exhs. 1 and 2 to Menzie Decl.) The declarations provide “I am extremely
fearful that, if forced to use my name rather than a pseudonym in this lawsuit,
nothing will prevent the defendants, their fans, the media, people on social media
and anyone else from identifying me as one of the victims who brought this
action, and I will be personally targeted and attacked by name.” (See Exh.1 to
Menzies Decl. ¶ 30.) KC details that she has been re-traumatized by Defendants’
comments and fears further re-traumatization. (Id. at ¶ 53.) Jane Doe AH
makes the same assertion. (Exh. 2 to Menzies Decl. ¶ 50; see also Exhs. 3-6.)
In
her opposition, Trevi urges that Plaintiffs’ assertions about harm they would
suffer if not allowed to proceed anonymously are “dishonest, unsupported by
competent evidence, and provide no basis for pseudonyms.” (Opposition p. 16:
27.) The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs’
declarations are important evidence regarding their subjective experience of
the social media backlash and the future harm they fear.
d. The Amicus Briefs
Two
amicus briefs have been filed in support of the Plaintiff’s motion. The amicus
brief of non-party Voices in Action, a nonprofit supporting survivors of sexual
assault in the entertainment industry, urges that “Unmasking survivors in such
instances often transforms their ordeal into a public platform for abuse and
victim-shaming; their trauma is exacerbated by media attention and community
scrutiny.” (Voices in Action Amicus Brief
p. 4: 9-11.) Further, “the employment of pseudonyms ensures a survivor’s
dignity and privacy are upheld, and it minimizes potential emotional harm
induced by public exposure.” (Id. at p. 4: 11-12.)
The
amicus brief of Stand with Survivors, a national network of sexual assault
survivors and advocates who attend high-profile trials on sexual violence in
support of other survivors, urges anonymity on four bases: “(1)To reduce
incidents of harassment and intimidation; (2) to ensure they receive a fair
trial; (3) to encourage more survivors of sexual violence to come forward; and (4)
to address the power differential in celebrity trials.” (Stand with Survivors
Amicus Brief p. 2: 10-12, numbering added.) This amicus argues that
high-profile sexual assault cases or those involving celebrities, are subject
to increased scrutiny and the plaintiffs to associated increased harassment and
ridicule by fans of the celebrity. (Id. at p. 2: 13-21.)
The
Court finds that the amicus briefs are helpful to elucidate the nature of the
case and the effect of pursuing a sexual assault case against a public figure. (Contra
2/26/24 Trevi Response to Amici Briefs p. 5.)
e. Potential Prejudice to Defendant Trevi
Lastly, Trevi urges that she will suffer severe
prejudice if the motion is granted. (Opposition p. 19:15.) She urges that “it
would dramatically increase the challenges and costs of third-party discovery.”
However, Trevi does not provide any specific basis for this assertion.
(Opposition p. 19: 26.) Her attorney’s declaration merely recites the same
language in the opposition. (Vasquez Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs point out that the parties
have been in discussions in an attempt to finalize a stipulated protective
order to facilitate, inter alia, pretrial discovery. (Reply p. 3:
10-15.) The Court is not persuaded that
the use of pseudonyms would greatly
increase the cost of discovery.
Trevi also cites to the negative press she has
received as a result of the lawsuit, implying Plaintiffs should be exposed to
similar scrutiny. (See Opposition p. 20:
1-19.) This is not a valid argument in this context. This case involves the alleged
sexual assault of minors.
f. The Circumstances Weigh In Favor Of Using Pseudonyms
The Court declines to find a lack of severe harm, as
this case is highly sensitive, concerns allegations about sexual assault and
inappropriate treatment of minors. The fact that these Plaintiffs are now adult
women does not negate the fact that the case is about events that occurred when
they were minors. Accordingly, the Court does not agree with Trevi that there
is a lack of severe harm or vulnerability.
While this motion involves very legitimate and
important considerations on both sides, the Court finds that the circumstances
as a whole weigh in favor of permitting the Plaintiffs to proceed using
pseudonyms. The risk of harm to the
Plaintiffs -- physical as well as emotional -- compels this conclusion. This is especially so in the current time,
where the use of social media is so ubiquitous.
This ruling is without prejudice to being reconsidered at
some later date, however, if changed circumstances warrant.
VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The Plaintiffs’ motion to proceed by using pseudonyms is granted.
Counsel
for Plaintiffs is ordered to give notice.
Dated: _______________________________
MARGARET L. OLDENDORF
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT