Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 23AHCV00045, Date: 2023-05-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23AHCV00045 Hearing Date: May 23, 2023 Dept: P
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
NORTHEAST DISTRICT
I. INTRODUCTION
In this action, Plaintiff Pinnacle Real Estate Group
alleges it entered into a commission agreement with Defendant Liping Huang for
the sale real property owned by her in Monrovia. The agreement was for a fixed
commission to Pinnacle in the amount of $316,350. Pinnacle alleges it performed
its part of the agreement, but that Huang failed to pay the commission as she
was convinced by Defendants Jack Wei Chao and Lina Ta not to go through with
the transaction.
The complaint alleges breach of contract against Huang and
intentional interference with contractual relations against Chao and Ta. Before
the Court are motions by Huang and Ta to set aside the defaults entered against
them. Because the motions fail to comply with the requirement that they be
accompanied by a proposed answer or other responsive pleading, the motions are
denied.
II. LEGAL
STANDARD
Code Civ. Proc. §473(b) provides that the court “may,
upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal
representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken
against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a
copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise
the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no
case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding
was taken.” (Bolding added.)
“The policy of the law favors a hearing on the
merits. (Citation.) Therefore, when a party in default moves promptly to
request relief, ‘very slight evidence is required to justify a trial court's
order setting aside a default. [Citation.]’ (Ibid.)” Purdum v. Holmes
(2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 916, 922.
In addition to Section 473(b), the motions contain
citations to a variety of other code sections, none of which appear to apply
here. Code Civ. Proc. §473.5 applies where lack of actual notice has resulted
in entry of default judgment. Likewise, Section 473(d) only applies to
judgments or orders. Civ. Code §1788.61 applies to debt collection actions.
III. DISCUSSION
Default was
entered against Huang and Ta on March 8, 2023. The motions for relief from
default, though they have been timely filed within six months of entry of
default, are defective because they are not accompanied by a proposed answer or
other responsive pleading. For this reason, the motions are denied without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
The motions by Defendants Liping Huang and Lina Ta to set
aside the defaults entered against them are denied for failure to include a
proposed answer or proposed responsive pleading. This order is made without prejudice to these motions being renewed.
The motion to quash service of the summons and complaint
filed by Huang and set for hearing June 20, 2023, is taken off calendar. It may
be re-filed if and when the default is set aside. This is because the entry of
default terminates a defendant’s right to take any action until the default is
set aside. Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc. (1984) 155
Cal.App.3d 381, 385-386.
Plaintiff Pinnacle is ordered to give notice of this ruling
on all parties.
Dated: _______________________________
MARGARET L. OLDENDORF
JUDGE
OF THE SUPERIOR COURT