Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 23AHCV00239, Date: 2023-04-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23AHCV00239 Hearing Date: April 18, 2023 Dept: P
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
NORTHEAST DISTRICT
I. INTRODUCTION
This is an auto accident case. It is alleged that Defendant
Asia Lee Griffith (Griffith), then 19, caused the accident by driving while
intoxicated; she was driving a vehicle registered to Defendant Lyena Lee
Griffith. Plaintiff Norman Wagner Abejon was driving his vehicle and
transporting rideshare passenger Plaintiff Valeria Pallares-Villa.
Plaintiffs not only allege negligence but Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), for which they seek punitive damages.
Before the Court is Griffith’s demurrer to the second
cause of action and motion to strike punitive damages. For the reasons that
follow the demurrer is sustained and the motion to strike is denied.
II. LEGAL
STANDARD
Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 has
provided the rule governing punitive damages in drunk driving cases for over
forty years. It is this:
“[O]ne who voluntarily commences, and thereafter
continues, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing
from the outset that he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates,
in the words of Dean Prosser, ‘such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the
interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton.’ (Prosser,
supra, s 2, at pp. 9-10.)” Id. at 899.
In other words, it is the defendant’s state of mind
before he or she commences drinking that it important. If, prior to drinking
alcoholic beverages, a person knows that he or she will drink to the point of
intoxication and thereafter drive, conscious and deliberate disregard for the
safety of others is shown and this supports the recovery of punitive damages.
III. DEMURRER
Code
Civ. Proc. §430.10(e) provides for a demurrer on the basis that a complaint
fails to state a cause of action. A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint. Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co.
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.
A. Elements
The elements of an IIED cause of action are: (1)
outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing
or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the
plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and
proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous
conduct. To be “outrageous,” conduct must be “so extreme as to exceed all
bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.” Vasquez v.
Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 224 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.
“In order to meet the first requirement of the tort, the
alleged conduct ‘... must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually
tolerated in a civilized community.’ [Citation.] Generally, conduct will be
found to be actionable where the ‘recitation of the facts to an average member
of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to
exclaim, “Outrageous!” (Rest.2d Torts, § 46, com. d.)’ (KOVR–TV, supra,
31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1028, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 431.) . . .
“There is no bright line standard for judging outrageous
conduct and ‘... its generality hazards a case-by-case appraisal of conduct
filtered through the prism of the appraiser’s values, sensitivity threshold,
and standards of civility. The process evoked by the test appears to be more
intuitive than analytical....’ [Citation.]” (KOVR–TV, supra, 31
Cal.App.4th at p. 1028, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 431.) Even so, the appellate courts have
affirmed orders which sustained demurrers on the ground that the defendant’s
alleged conduct was not sufficiently outrageous. (See, e.g., Ankeny v. Lockheed
Missiles & Space Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 531, 536–537, 151 Cal.Rptr. 828.)”
Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 494.
“Whether a defendant’s conduct can reasonably be found to
be outrageous is a question of law that must initially be determined by the
court; if reasonable persons may differ, it is for the jury to determine
whether the conduct was, in fact, outrageous.” Berkley v. Dowds (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 518, 534.
B. Facts Alleged
The essential facts of the pleading are that on November
19, 2021, at 10:36 p.m., Griffith sideswiped
the vehicle Abejon was driving and in which Pallares-Villa was a passenger. The
collision is alleged to have caused major damage to both vehicles and personal
injuries to Abejon and Pallares-Villa. Plaintiffs also allege that Griffith was
driving under the influence of alcohol, that she had blood alcohol content
measuring higher than 0.08%. It is alleged that Griffith violated Vehicle Code §23152(a)
(driving under the influence) and (b) (driving with blood alcohol above 0.08%),
and was convicted of Section 23152(a).
In the second cause of action for IIED it is alleged that
at the time of the accident Griffith violated Vehicle Code §§ 23152(a)(b),
23153(b) (driving with blood alcohol over 0.08% and causing bodily harm), and
22107 (unsafe lane change).
Plaintiffs also allege facts Taylor-type facts in
¶¶26-29. Specifically, ¶27 contains the necessary language for punitive damages
found in Taylor and then alleges, “Griffiths did so voluntarily commence
consumption of alcohol to impairment and intoxication and then drove on the
public roads where she knew that others, including [Plaintiffs] would be.”
C. Demurrer is Sustained
These facts do not demonstrate extreme or outrageous
conduct that is outside the bounds of what is usually tolerated in civilized
society. These are not the kind of facts that would cause an average member of
society to cry, “Outrageous!”
Additionally, the facts do not demonstrate any conduct aimed
at Plaintiffs. There is no allegation that Griffiths knew Plaintiffs and
therefore had reason to know they would be particularly vulnerable to suffering
severe emotional distress from a car accident. Rather, the facts demonstrate
reckless disregard for the probability of causing harm to some member of the
public. Absent some facts supporting the conclusory allegation in ¶ 25 that
Griffiths intended to cause Plaintiffs emotional distress, insufficient facts
are stated to constitute a causes of action for IIED.
IV. MOTION
TO STRIKE
Code
Civ. Proc. §436: “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or
at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper:
(a) Strike out any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.
(b) Strike out all or any
part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this
state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”
Civ.
Code §3294:
“(a)
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where
it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the
actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of
punishing the defendant.”
“(c)
As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) ‘Malice’
means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the
plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a
willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
(2) ‘Oppression’
means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person's rights.
(3) ‘Fraud’’
means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material
fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of
thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing
injury.”
A.
Motion to Strike is Denied
The
factual allegations demonstrate the allegation that Griffith’s conduct was carried
out with a willful and conscious disregard for the safety of others, as
required by Civ. Code §3294(c)(1) to show malice. Further, the allegations at ¶¶26-29
satisfy the Taylor standard. Even without the IIED cause of action, the
prayer for punitive damages is not improper. The motion to strike is therefore
denied.
Whether
Plaintiffs will be able to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
Griffiths knew before she began drinking that she would drink to intoxication
and then drive a vehicle on public streets is a question for another day.
V. CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
Defendant
Griffith’s demurrer to the second cause of action for IIED is sustained for the
reasons stated in the moving and reply papers and as discussed herein. The
pleading does not contain facts demonstrating intentional conduct on the part
of Griffiths aimed at causing Plaintiffs severe emotional distress, nor does it
allege extreme or outrageous conduct that exceeds the bounds of what ought to
be tolerated in civilized society. This order is without prejudice to a later
motion for leave to amend if Plaintiffs are able to develop facts that would
support an IIED cause of action.
The allegations in the second cause of action are not
stricken, however. They remain part of the pleading and are read into the first
cause of action as they include allegations supporting the prayer for punitive
damages. The motion to strike is denied as the pleading contains allegations
sufficient to demonstrate that Griffiths acted with willful and reckless
disregard for the safety of others.
Defendant is to answer within 10 days.
Dated: _______________________________
MARGARET OLDENDORF
JUDGE
OF THE SUPERIOR COURT