Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 23AHCV00457, Date: 2023-11-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23AHCV00457 Hearing Date: November 28, 2023 Dept: P
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
NORTHEAST DISTRICT
| 
  
                                              
  Plaintiff, vs. JPJS
  INC., dba FOREMOST LIQUOR MARKET, a California corporation; PRITPAL SIDHU, an
  individual; DOES 1-50, inclusive,                                            
  Defendants. And
  related cross-action.  | 
  
   ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )  | 
  
  
     [TENTATIVE]
  ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER IN PART TO THE FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT; AND
  GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE Date:   November
  28, 2023 Time:  8:30 a.m. Dept.:  P  | 
 
          I.        INTRODUCTION
          In the main action, Plaintiff Bishnu Neupane (Neupane) sues
his former employers, Defendants JPJS Inc. dba Foremost Liquor Market (Foremost)
and Pritpal Sidhu (Sidhu), for claims stemming from alleged violations of the
Labor Code. Sidhu has since been dismissed from the action.
          Defendant Foremost filed a cross-complaint alleging that
Neupane, a long-term employee, embezzled from the business for many years by failing
to ring up transactions on the register; and instead keying a “no sale”
transaction and keeping the money.
          Before the Court are Neupane’s challenges to the operative
First Amended Cross-Complaint (FAXC). For the reasons that follow, the demurrer
is sustained in part. The motion to strike is granted.
II.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Foremost
seeks judicial notice of the First Amended Cross-Complaint and the Complaint in
this action, pursuant to Evidence Code Section 452. 
Though
it is not necessary to take judicial notice of papers already in the court
file, the request is granted. (See Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d), Evid. Code §
453; Scott v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743,
754-755.)
Accordingly,
judicial notice is taken of Exhibits 1 and 2 to the Opposition. 
III.     SUMMARY OF FACTS ALLEGED IN THE FIRST
AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT
¶2       Neupane was at all relevant times an
employee of Foremost.
¶6       In this action, Foremost seeks recovery
of Neupane’s allegedly ill-gotten gains from his employment at Foremost.
¶7       Neupane was employed by Foremost for 15
years. Foremost owns and operates a convenience store. As a long-term employee,
Neupane had unfettered access to the books and records, the cash register and
cash drawer, and the safe.
¶8       While employed, and without the knowledge
or consent of Foremost and/or its principal, Neupane allegedly embezzled money
from Foremost and manipulated the records to present a façade that Foremost was
generating money all the while eating into the inventory by recording cash
transactions as a “no sale.”
¶9       Based on the inaccurate accounting
records and the store’s surveillance footage, Foremost is informed and believes
that Neupane embezzled from Foremost for several years. 
¶10     Neupane engaged in a systematic practice of
embezzling funds from Foremost by failing to ring up transactions on the
register and instead keying the transaction as a “no sale” and ultimately
pocketing the cash.
          On these facts, Foremost alleges the
following causes of action:
1.
Unjust Enrichment
2. Conversion
3.
Fraud
4.
Improper Disposition of Money.
IV.     DEMURRER
A. Legal Standard
Code
Civ. Proc. Section 430.10(e) provides for a demurrer on the basis that a
complaint fails to state a cause of action. (CCP § 430.10(e).) A demurrer tests
the legal sufficiency of a complaint. (Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)  
Code
Civ. Proc. Section 430.10(f) provides for a demurrer where a pleading is
uncertain. (CCP § 430.10(f).) Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are
only sustained where a pleading is so incomprehensible a defendant cannot
reasonably respond. (A.J. Fistes v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38
Cal.App.5th 677, 695; Khoury v.
Maly’s of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)
          B. Meet and Confer Requirement Not Met
          The Declaration of David Greene is offered in support of
counsel’s compliance with the meet and confer requirements of Code Civ. Proc. Section
430.41. However, Greene does not state either (a) the means by which the
parties met and conferred or (b) that the party who filed the pleading subject
to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request. (CCP §
430.31(a)(3).) Consequently, there is an insufficient showing that the meet and
confer requirement has been met. This, in and of itself however, is not a
sufficient basis for overruling the demurrer. (CCP § 430.41(a)(4).)
          C. The Demurrer To The First and Second Causes of Action Are
Overruled
          Neupane demurs to
each of the four causes of action on the ground that the claims lack sufficient
facts and are ambiguous. 
          With regard to the 1st cause of action for unjust
enrichment, the only argument raised is that the alleged conduct is not defined
by “time, scope, or any other matter,” by which anyone can determine “how,
when, or in what manner” the conduct allegedly occurred. This argument is
unpersuasive as to this claim. There is no requirement that the time of the
events be alleged. Neupane may believe that portions of the claim are time-barred,
but if so that defense is not apparent on the face of the pleading. “A demurrer
based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is
not necessarily, barred. In order for the bar ... to be raised by demurrer, the
defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it
is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.” (Stueve
Bros. Farms, LLC v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 303, 321, internal
quotation marks and citations omitted.) As to the argument that the pleading
has not alleged in what manner the conduct occurred, this argument is also
unpersuasive.  Neupane is directed to ¶¶6-10
of the FAXC. (See Opposition p.4: 5-8.)
          The same arguments are raised regarding the 2nd cause of
action for conversion, and they lack merit for the same reasons. One additional
argument Neupane interposed here is here is that conversion is the wrongful
exercise of dominion over the personal property of another (with legal
citations). But the legal argument is made in a conclusory fashion, and is not
tied to the facts alleged. The pleading does allege Neupane’s wrongful
dominion over the personal property of Foremost.  This is sufficient.
          
D.
The Demurrer to The Third and Fourth Causes of Action Are Sustained
          Neupane is correct that fraud is subject to a heightened
pleading standard. Each element must be pleaded with particularity. (Glaski
v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1090.) That particularity is
missing here. Foremost fails to allege specific facts supporting a claim for
fraud.    
As
for the fourth cause of action, a claim for improper disposition of property is
sometimes used in other civil actions; but its applicability here is unclear.  In both the 3rd and 4th causes of action,
Foremost alleges that Neupane owed a “duty of loyalty” to it as an employee. however,
there are insufficient facts alleged here to support a separate claim for
improper disposition of property.    
V.       MOTION
TO STRIKE
          A. Legal Standard
          Code Civ. Proc. Section 436: “The court may, upon a
motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon
terms it deems proper:
(a) Strike out any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.
(b) Strike out all or any
part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this
state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (CCP § 436.) 
          B. The Motion to Strike is Granted in Part
Neupane
seeks to strike the prayer for damages pursuant to Penal Code Section 496(c).
This statute does provide for heightened remedies in a private action for,
inter alia, theft.  These remedies do
appear to be available to Foremost under its second cause of action for
conversion.  However, they are not
available under the other causes of action. 
Therefore, the motion to strike the prayer for attorney’s fees and
treble damages is granted in part, as to the First, Third, and Fourth Causes of
Action of the First Amended Cross-Complaint. 
VI.     CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
           The demurrer is
sustained as to the 3rd and 4th causes of action, with leave to amend. The
demurrer is overruled as to the 1st and 2nd causes of action. The motion to
strike is granted in part and denied in part.
          Foremost is given 20 days’ leave to amend. 
Neupane
is ordered to provide notice of ruling.
          
Dated:                                                              _______________________________
                                                                              MARGARET L. OLDENDORF
                                                                       JUDGE
OF THE SUPERIOR COURT