Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 23AHCV00960, Date: 2023-10-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23AHCV00960    Hearing Date: October 30, 2023    Dept: P

 

 

 

 

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

NORTHEAST DISTRICT

 

GLENN D. CUNANAN, an individual; GLENN E. CUNANAN, an individual; Roseanne Orello as guardian ad litem for GABRIELLA M. CUNANAN, a minor,

 

                      Plaintiffs,

 

             v.

SHOUSHAN MOVSESIAN, as SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE OF THE GREEN TREES TRUST, and DOES 1-15,

 

                     Defendants.

 

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Case No.: 23AHCV00960

 

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT, AND GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE, IN PART

 

Date: October 30, 2023

Time:  8:30 a.m.

Dept.:  P

 

 

 

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an action for injuries arising from a landlord-tenant dispute. In the complaint, Glenn D. Cunanan, Glenn E. Cunanan, and Gabriella M. Cunanan (collectively Plaintiffs) allege that they rented a residence from landlord Green Trees Trust (Defendant). Plaintiffs allege that they had to perform repairs themselves upon move-in to make the residence habitable, and when they complained to the landlord about subsequent issues, repairs were not performed. Plaintiffs also allege intimidation tactics by landlord to recoup the rent.

Before the Court is a demurrer and motion to strike filed by Defendant to the complaint. Defendant argues that (1) the negligence claim fails for failure to state a cause of action, (2) the CC section 789.3 claims fail for failure to state a cause of action, (3) the violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 cause of action fails for failure to state a cause of action and (4) the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action fails for failure to state a cause of action.

For the reasons set forth below, the demurrer is granted in part, and the motion to strike is granted in part.  

IV. MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or motion to strike, the moving party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading. (CCP §§ 430.41, 435.5.) 

Counsel for Defendant declares she met and conferred with counsel for Plaintiffs. (Chun Decl. ¶ 2.) She details that she communicated with Plaintiffs’ counsel over the phone on June 20, 2023. (Id.) She declares that parties discussed all issues raised on the demurrer. She also sent an email to plaintiff’s counsel on June 8, 2023. She declares that parties were unable to reach a resolution. (Id. at ¶3.) Counsel’s declaration satisfies CCP section¿430.41(a).

 

VI. DEMURRER

A. Legal Standard

Code Civ. Proc. §430.10(e) provides for a demurrer on the basis that a complaint fails to state a cause of action. A demurrer admits, provisionally for purposes of testing the pleading, all material facts properly pleaded. (Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1247.) A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)  Pleadings are to be broadly construed (CCP § 452), and demurrers are to be overruled where the facts are sufficient to state any cause of action. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

 

B. Third Cause of Action for Nuisance

“Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.” (CC § 3479.) Nuisance is a type of tort liability, not a type of tortious conduct. (Van Zyl v. Spiegelberg (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 367, 373.)

Here, Defendant urges that plaintiffs cannot allege both nuisance and negligence. (Motion p. 6: 24-25.) Citing El Escorial Owners' Ass'n v. DLC Plastering, Inc., Movsesian urges that if the causes of action for negligence and nuisance depend on the same underlying facts, the nuisance claim is really one for negligence. (El Escorial Owners’ Ass’n v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.1337, 1349.) El Escorial notes that courts have allowed plaintiffs to pursue nuisance claims for housing conditions. (Id. at 1348.) The analysis of whether the nuisance claim is really a second claim for negligence depends on whether the nuisance claim is viable, evaluated on a case-by-case basis. (Id.) In concluding that the cause of action for nuisance was duplicative of the negligence cause of action, the Court noted “Escorial neither alleged facts to describe the nuisance nor did it show how this cause of action differed from the first cause of action. A cause of action alleging a continuing nuisance is usually accompanied by a request for an injunction. But Escorial only sought the same monetary relief that it requested in its first cause of action.” (Id. at 1349.)

Here, the cause of action for nuisance describes the nuisance in detail. (Complaint ¶ 58.) However, the description of the nuisance relies on the same underlying facts as the negligence claim. (Complaint ¶ 49.) Defendant urges that the “[the plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence] and their nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts and seek the same recovery.” (Demurrer, p.7: 5-6.) However, the cause of action for nuisance seeks a different recovery. The cause of action for nuisance pleads for punitive damages, whereas the cause of action for negligence requests general and special damages. (Complaint ¶¶¶ 52, 53, 64.) Pleadings are broadly construed on demurrer, so the fact that the nuisance cause of action requests different damages than the negligence cause of action might be enough to distinguish it. (See CCP § 452.)

However, the crux of the analysis rests on whether the negligence and nuisance claims rely on the same facts, for “where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim.” (El Escorial, supra, at 1349, citing City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum Co., supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 587, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 876; Martinez v. Pacific Bell (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1565; Atherton Condominium Apartment–Owners Assn. Bd. of Directors v. Blume Development Co. (Wash.1990) 115 Wash.2d 506, 527 [“where the alleged nuisance is the result of the defendant's alleged negligent conduct, rules of negligence are applied”].) As this is the case in the operative complaint, the cause of action for nuisance is essentially one for negligence.

In sum, Defendant meets his burden on demurrer.

In opposition, Plaintiffs try to distinguish their complaint from El Escorial. Plaintiffs argue that their complaint is more robust than the one analyzed in El Escorial. (Opposition to Demurrer, p. 3: 22-23.) Plaintiffs also assert that they request different damages for nuisance as compared to their negligence cause of action. (Opposition to Demurrer, p. 5:17-26.) Plaintiffs do not distinguish on the ultimate dispositive point of El Escorial, however; whether the negligence and nuisance claim rely on the same underlying facts. As such, plaintiffs have not shown that the facts are sufficient to state a nuisance cause of action.

 

 

D.  Fifth and Seventh Cause of Action for Violation of CC Section 789.3

Civil Code section 789.3 provides that “A landlord shall not with intent to terminate the occupancy under any lease … of property used by a tenant as his residence willfully cause, directly or indirectly, the interruption or termination of any utility service furnished the tenant, including, but not limited to, water, heat, light, electricity, gas, telephone, elevator, or refrigeration, whether or not the utility service is under the control of the landlord.” (CC § 789.3(a).) To allege constructive eviction, a plaintiff must allege a disturbance of their possession by the lessor, which “has the effect of “depriving the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises, provided the tenant vacates the premises within a reasonable time.” (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 292 [citations omitted].)

Here, Defendant urges that the fifth and seventh causes of action fail as Plaintiffs  fail to state facts sufficient for a cause of action. (Demurrer, p.7: 13-15.) Defendant then urges that “Plaintiff’s third cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) fails to state a cause of action as a matter of law because the Complaint lacks facts regarding abandon the premises after a reasonable time after the discovery of the alleged condition.” (Demurrer, p.7: 16-18.) To the extent that this is a typo, the Court considers the argument with respect to the seventh cause of action. The fifth cause of action does not allege constructive eviction but rather alleges the elements of Civ. Code section 789.3, so Defendant has not met his burden to demonstrate that the fifth cause of action fails for lack of facts demonstrating constructive eviction.

However, the seventh cause of action for violation of Civ. Code Section 789.3 does allege constructive eviction. (Complaint ¶ 89.) The complaint alleges “LANDLORD and DOES 1-15 willful and intentional interference with PLAINTIFFS’ access to PREMISES constitutes constructive eviction.” (Id.) As stated, this is not enough to plead constructive eviction, as constructive eviction requires tenants to quit the premises within a reasonable time. The complaint does not allege this. In fact, the complaint alleges that plaintiffs are still in possession of the premises. (Complaint ¶ 87.)

Therefore, Defendant has not met its burden demonstrating that facts are not sufficient to demonstrate a cause of action for violation of 789.3 as to the fifth cause of action.

In opposition, Plaintiffs assert that they remain in “legal” possession of the subject property but have actually vacated and live elsewhere. (Opposition to Demurrer, p.7: 7-10.) As such, facts exist to state a cause of action, and the demurrer should be overruled as to both the fifth and seventh causes of action.

 

E. Eighth Cause of Action for Violation of B and P Code 17200 et seq.

Business and Professions Code section 17200 prohibits unfair competition, including the use of unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices. (BPC § 17200 et seq.) Unlawful business practices under BPC section 17200 are “violations of other laws…and makes those unlawful practices actionable under the UCL." (Lazar v. Hertz Corp. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1505). Therefore, to allege a violation of section 17200, a violation of another law must be alleged. (Berryman v. Merit Property Management, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1554). The complaint must allege facts showing that the practice violates the law. (People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626, 635). Without supporting facts demonstrating the illegality of a rule or regulation, an allegation that the practice is in violation of a specific statute is purely conclusory and insufficient to withstand demurrer. (Id.)

Defendant argues that plaintiffs have “failed to sufficiently allege that the conduct engaged in by Defendants constitutes a ‘business practice’ for purposes of Section 17200.” (Demurrer, p.8: 22-23.) However, residential leases give rise to a business relationship and thus practices alleged with respect to the residential lease are business practices. (People ex rel. City of Santa Monica v. Gabriel (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 882, 888.) The complaint alleges defendant’s conduct and then alleges that defendant’s conduct is in violation of section 17200 because it is in violation of Civil Code sections 1940.2, 1946, 3491, and 3493. (Complaint ¶¶ 94, 98.) The complaint then alleges that defendant’s practices are unlawful business practices based on the violation of these statutes. (Complaint ¶¶ 99, 100.)

As such, the defendant did not meet his burden on demurrer with respect to the eighth cause of action for violation of BPC section 17200.

 

F. Ninth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

“The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, citation and ellipses omitted.) 

Defendant urges that the cause of action for IIED fails because plaintiffs failed to allege any intent to cause emotional distress. (Demurrer p. 9: 16-18.) However, the complaint alleges that “Defendants’ acts and omissions as set forth above were intentional or were committed in reckless disregard for the resulting emotional strain and anxiety suffered by each Plaintiff.” (Complaint ¶ 106.) This is enough to allege intent.

Secondly, defendant urges that the complaint fails to allege extreme and outrageous conduct. (Demurrer, p. 9: 16-18.) This point is not well-taken. The complaint does allege extreme and outrageous conduct on defendant’s part. (Complaint ¶¶ 22, 24, 25, 29 and 30.)

Accordingly, the defendant did not meet its burden on demurrer with respect to the ninth cause of action for IIED.

 

 

 

 

VII. MOTION TO STRIKE

          A. Legal Standard

Code Civ. Proc. § 436: “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: 

(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. 

(b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (CCP § 436.)

 

Code Civ. Proc. §431.10: 

“(a) A material allegation in a pleading is one essential to the claim or defense and which could not be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient as to that claim or defense. 

(b) An immaterial allegation in a pleading is any of the following: 

(1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense. 

(2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense. 

(3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint. 

(c) An ‘immaterial allegation’ means irrelevant matter’ as that term is used in Section 436.” (CCP § 431.10.)

Civ. Code §3294: “(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” 

“(c) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply: 

(1) ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. 

(2) ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. 

(3) ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”  (CC § 3294.)

 

B. Portions of the Complaint at Issue

Defendant seeks to strike the following lines from the operative Complaint as not supported by a sufficient claim:

(1) Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 4, ¶ 12, Lines 25-26;

(2) Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 12-13, ¶ 44, Lines 26-5;

(3) Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 13, ¶ 47, Lines 16-21;

(4) Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 16, ¶ 64, Lines 6-10;

(5) Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 18, ¶ 73, Lines 7-12;

(6) Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 20, ¶ 89, Lines 16-19;

(7)  Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 21, ¶ 93, Lines 2-5;

(8) Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 23, ¶ 106, Lines 4-6;

(9) Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 23 Line 24;

(10) Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 24 Line 14;

(11) Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 24 Line 23-24;

(12) Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 25 Line 17;

(13) Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 25 Line 28;

(14) Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 26 Line 12;

(15)  Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 27 Line 4.

The language sought to be stricken relates to the prayer for punitive damages and attorney fees.

 

          C. Attorney Fees

Defendant argues that plaintiffs fail to provide any statutory or contractual basis for their seeking attorney fees as to all causes of action. However, plaintiffs aver that they are seeking attorney fees with respect to the first cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. (Opposition, p. 6: 3-8.) Plaintiffs cite Civil Code section 1942.4(b)(2) as the basis for their request for attorney fees under the first cause of action. Civil Code section 1942.4(b)(2) properly provides a statutory basis for attorney fees for the first cause of action.

          Plaintiffs assert that “in the Fourth Cause of Action they allege a Violation of Rent Stabilization Ordinance.” (Opposition, p. 6: 3-5.) To that point, plaintiffs urge that they have a statutory basis for seeking attorney fees under their fourth cause of action. (Opposition, p.6: 19-21.) Plaintiffs cite Los Angeles County Ordinance section 8.52.170.  However, in their complaint, plaintiffs plead violation of the COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act, not the Rent Stabilization ordinance. (Complaint, p. 16:17-19.) Plaintiffs do not cite authority or argue that the attorney fees due under the Rent Stabilization Act also apply to violations of the COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act. Plaintiffs do recharacterize the fourth cause of action as pursuant to the Rent Stabilization Ordinance in their prayer, however. (Complaint, p. 24: 18-20.) Therefore, as plaintiffs did not adequately allege a basis for attorney’s fees as to the fourth cause of action as pleaded, the motion to strike is granted with respect to attorney’s fees requested as to the fourth cause of action. 

As such, the Court GRANTS the motion to strike attorney fees as to the following sections of Plaintiffs’ complaint: p.25, line 7.

 

           

D. Punitive Damages

Defendant argues that plaintiffs have not adequately supported their claim for punitive damages as (1) the complaint alleges negligent conduct, not malicious conduct, (2) punitive damages are not allowed for breach of contract and (3) the complaint lacks the specificity a claim for punitive damages require. The Court will address each argument in turn.

Defendant urges that punitive damages should be stricken as its behavior at worst was negligent, but not malicious. (Motion to Strike, p.7: 3.) This point is well-taken. The complaint does not allege malice or oppression. The complaint alleges negligent conduct on the part of Defendant, but that is not enough. (Ebaugh v. Rabkin (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 891, 894-95.) Even if the Court found that Defendant was grossly negligent, that alone is not sufficient for punitive damages. (Id.)

Punitive damages cannot be sought for breach of contract unless there is an independent tort in addition. (CC §§ 3294, 3300.) However, plaintiffs do not seek punitive damages under a breach of contract cause of action. Indeed, plaintiffs do not plead a cause of action for breach of contract at all. Defendant urges that “the allegation of an implicit agreement is incorporated by reference into every cause of action in the Complaint” and that therefore, punitive damages should not be allowed. (Motion to Strike, p.8:15-16.) To the extent that defendant is trying to strike punitive damages from the complaint, this argument is not sufficient, as Defendant cites no authority or case law as to why the fact the parties are in a contractual relationship prevents plaintiffs from suing on matters outside the contract and seeking punitive damages as to those claims.

Defendant also urges that punitive damages should be stricken as the complaint lacks the requisite specificity for such relief. (Motion to Strike, p. 8: 22-24, see Lehto v. Underground Construction Co. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 933, 944.) “The plaintiff must plead the ultimate facts which give rise to liability,” from which the Court can understand malice. (Blegen v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 959, 963.) Recitation of legal conclusions is not sufficient. (Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 306, 317.) This argument is also well-taken. In the complaint, it is alleged that defendant’s conduct meets the 3294 threshold definition simply by way of recitation of the definition. (Complaint ¶¶¶ 9, 47,64.) This is not sufficient for punitive damages under Blegen or Cyrus. As such, the Court GRANTS the motion to strike punitive damages as to the following sections of Plaintiffs’ complaint: ¶12, line 25-26; ¶ 44, line 4-5; ¶ 47, line 16-17; ¶ 64, line 13-15; ¶ 89, line 16; ¶ 93, line 5-7; line ¶ 106, line 5-6; p. 23 line 24; p. 24 line 14; p. 24 line 23-24; p. 25 line 17; p. 25 line 28; p.26, line 12; p. 27, line 3. The Court DENIES the motion to strike with respect to ¶ 73 line 7-12.

Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted in part and denied in part.

 

VIII. CONCLUSION

Defendant’s demurrer is GRANTED IN PART as to the cause of action for nuisance. The motion to strike is GRANTED and DENIED in part, as set forth above. 

          Plaintiffs have ten days’ leave to file an amended complaint.    

Defendant Movsesian, as trustee for Green Trees Trust, is ordered to give notice of ruling.

 

         

Dated:                                                              _______________________________

                                                                              MARGARET L. OLDENDORF

                                                                       JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT