Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 23AHCV01020, Date: 2024-03-04 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 23AHCV01020    Hearing Date: March 4, 2024    Dept: P

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

NORTHEAST DISTRICT

 

DEBRA K. ROBINSON, an individual,

                                 Plaintiff,

 

         vs.

 

JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company and DOE 1, an entity unknown form, d/b/a LAND ROVER PASADENA, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

                               Defendants.

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Case No.: 23AHCV01020

 

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES, WITHOUT PREJUDICE

 

Date: March 4, 2024

Time:  8:30 a.m.

Dept.:  P

 

          I.        INTRODUCTION

          This is a lemon law case. Plaintiff Debra K. Robinson (Robinson) alleges that she purchased a new 2019 Land Rover Range Rover Evoque VIN No.  SALVR2RX2KH341534  on or about November 23, 2020. She alleges that her vehicle developed defects. She sues the manufacturer of the car, Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (Jaguar) as well as the dealership, Land Rover Pasadena (Pasadena) for not fixing the issues or otherwise repurchasing the vehicle.

Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel further response on October 11, 2023. Jaguar filed an opposition on February 20, 2024. Plaintiff filed a reply on February 26, 2024.

At issue is the sufficiency of compliance with Requests for Production Nos. 1-32, propounded and served on Defendant Jaguar as Requests for Production, Set One on July 24, 2023. For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.  

 

II.       LEGAL STANDARD

          A party responding to requests for inspection must either provide a statement of compliance, represent that it lacks the ability to comply, or object. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210.) When a party propounding demands for inspection deems responses to the responses to be incomplete or evasive, or deems objections to be without merit, the propounding party may move for an order compelling further responses. Such motion must set forth facts showing good cause for the discovery, be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration, and include a separate statement. Such motion must also be made within 45 days of verified responses or supplemental responses, or on or before any specific later date the parties have agreed to in writing. (Code Civ. Proc. §2031.310(a)-(c).)

          Code Civ. Proc. Section 2031.310(h) provides for the imposition of monetary sanctions against any party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes such a motion unless the court finds that the one subject to sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of sanctions unjust.

 

IV.     ANALYSIS

          A. Meet and Confer

Code Civ. Proc. §2031.310(b) mandates that a motion to compel further responses be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. Code Civ. Proc. §2016.040 details what this requirement entails: “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.”

Counsel for Plaintiff, Joshua Kohanoff, declares that he sent a meet and confer letter regarding the allegedly deficient responses on August 30, 2023. (Kohanoff Decl. ¶ 20, referencing Exh. 6.) On September 14, 2023, Jaguar responded that it would not be withdrawing its objections. (Kohanoff Decl. ¶ 23, see Exh. 7.) He then sent a second follow-up meet and confer letter on September 20, 2023. (Kohanoff Decl. ¶ 25.) Parties did not reach a resolution. (Kohanoff Decl. ¶ 29.)

In opposition, Jaguar urges that the telephonic meet and confer on September 23, 2023 was only with respect to RFPs 31 and 32. (Wong Decl. ¶ 4.) Jaguar also notes that it served additional production, on February 20, 2024. (Wong Decl. ¶ 3, see Exh. 1.)

Kohanoff’s declaration is sufficient for meet and confer purposes.

 

          B. Discovery Requests at Issue

At issue in this motion are Requests for Production Nos. 1-32, the entirety of the discovery requests served on Defendant Jaguar as Requests for Production Set One.  

 

          C. Analysis

          In response to all of the discovery requests at issue, Defendant Jaguar refused to produce or identify any documents in their possession. The Requests for Production Set One was served by electronic mail on Jaguar on July 24, 2023. Consequently, Jaguar had until August 25, 2023 to serve responses. (CCP § 1010.6(a)(4)(B).) Jaguar did not serve verifications to its responses until August 29, 2023. (Exh. 5 to Kohanoff Decl.) As unverified responses are tantamount to no responses at all, the Court holds that Jaguar did not timely respond to the Requests for Production Set One and in doing so, waived its right to objection. (Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636.)  

          However, Jaguar served additional responses to the requests on February 20, 2024. The issue of sufficiency of the August 29, 2023 responses is no longer at issue, as further responses were served February 20, 2024. The additional responses are not attached to the opposition or before the Court. If Plaintiff Robinson finds the further responses deficient, she may file a motion with the Court and argue accordingly.

          Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to compel further discovery responses. 

          To the extent that it appears that the February 20, 2024 additional production was, per the opposition, only responsive to Request for Production No. 32, the Court offers the below analysis to the parties in anticipation of the same arguments being made on a subsequent motion to compel:

          i. Relevance

Code Civ. Proc. Section 2017.010 permits a party to “obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter . . . if the matter is either itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (CCP § 2017.010.) According to a leading treatise, “For discovery purposes, information should be regarded as ‘relevant’ to the subject matter if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Sup.Ct.  (1995) 33 CA4th 1539, 1546 (citing text); Lipton v. Sup.Ct. (1996) 48 CA4th 1599, 1611 (citing text); Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 CA4th 1006, 1013 (citing text)]” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2022), ¶8:66.1.) 

As Plaintiff notes, the scope of discovery is broad by design. (Motion p.13: 12, p. 15: 3-4, see e.g., Separate Statement p. 23: 1-14.) The discovery requests seek information as to repairs performed on Plaintiff’s vehicle, Jaguar’s investigation regarding the make and model of Plaintiff’s vehicle and Jaguar’s lemon law procedures, among others. This information is relevant to Plaintiff’s lemon law claim as to her 2019 Range Rover Evoque, under the broad definition of relevance.

In opposition, Jaguar urges that the information sought by the discovery requests is not relevant as “Plaintiff’s litigation may essentially be reduced to the whether a product, in this case, the Vehicle, met specifications” and “[t]hese issues may be determined without reference to everything in JLRNA’s possession having anything to do with how it responded to repurchase demands of other purchasers (Requests Nos. 16 to 30) or complaints about other JLRNA vehicles (Request Nos. 31-32).” (Opposition p. 10: 17-23, see also Opposition p. 13.) However, as discovery is broad, the information as to other vehicles might be relevant as to the defects Plaintiff’s vehicle presented or its component parts or indeed the repurchase process at Jaguar.

Accordingly, the information sought by the 32 discovery requests at issue is relevant.

          ii. Impropriety of Jaguar’s Responses

          Plaintiff argues in her motion that Jaguar’s responses are improper. (Motion p. 14: 4-5.) Specifically, she urges that boilerplate objections are not proper and that statements of compliance are required. (Id.) These arguments are well taken. (See CCP § 2031.240(b); CCP § 2023.210(a); Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1517; West Pico Furniture Co. of L.A. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) Jaguar’s responses fail to list the documents in its possession that meet the discovery request criteria. To the extent that Jaguar objects based on attorney-client privilege, attorney work product privilege or trade secret/privacy, Jaguar must produce a privilege log.

            Plaintiff also presented arguments regarding undue burden.  However, the Court notes that Jaguar did not object to any of the requests on this basis.

          Plaintiff also urges that the discovery she seeks is necessary to support her claims. (Motion p. 16: 10.) Because this is a lemon law case, information as to the repairs on Plaintiff’s specific vehicle, Jaguar’s procedures for dealing with lemon law vehicles, Jaguar’s internal communications, and knowledge of the issues Plaintiff’s vehicle presented etc. are necessary to prove a lemon law claim. This argument is well taken.

          Lastly, Plaintiff urges that the documents similar to those she seeks to have compelled are routinely compelled/are deemed relevant to lemon law claims. (Motion p. 18: 14.) This argument is also well taken. (Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 143-144, 153; Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009)174 Cal.App.4th 967, 973, 978-979, 986; Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal. App. 5th 344, 270.)

          iii. Overbreadth, Vagueness and Ambiguity Objections

          To the extent that the Court considers this objection, the Court notes that the standard for overbreadth is to be ambiguous to the point of being unintelligible, which is not met here. (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)

          iv. Privacy/Proprietary Information Objection

          Though not addressed by the motion, the privacy/proprietary information objection to the discovery requests is renewed in Jaguar’s opposition. In its opposition, Jaguar urges  that “the responsive documents would include repair orders which contain the personal addresses, cell phone and home landline numbers of individuals who have nothing to do with Plaintiff’s lawsuit.” (Opposition p. 15: 4-6.) The Court notes that as Jaguar is an entity defendant, it cannot assert the privacy rights of others as an objection to its refusal to comply with a discovery request. Additionally, the proper test for a privacy objection is set forth in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, which provides that even private information can be provided in discovery, if there is a compelling reason for doing so. At this time, the Court cannot evaluate whether or not the privacy objections will be sustained or overruled. To the extent that Jaguar is still asserting an objection based on proprietary information, there is no support for the claim that the information sought implicates Jaguar’s proprietary information. (The Court notes that Jaguar seems to abandon the proprietary information objection on opposition.)

 

D. Sanctions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (h) and 2030.300 subdivision (d), requires the imposition of sanctions against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response unless the court finds the imposition of a sanction to be unjust or that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification. 

In her reply, Plaintiff confirms that she is not seeking sanctions. (Reply p. 2: 17-18- bolded text.)

 

V.       CONCLUSION AND ORDER

           Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to her Requests for Production, Set One is DENIED. The denial is without prejudice to a later, timely motion to compel furthers based upon Jaguars February 20th  supplemental production.   

Counsel for Jaguar is ordered to give notice.

 

 

         

Dated:                                                              _______________________________

                                                                              MARGARET L. OLDENDORF

                                                                       JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT