Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 23AHCV01617, Date: 2024-02-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23AHCV01617    Hearing Date: February 5, 2024    Dept: P

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

NORTHEAST DISTRICT

          I.        INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Angel Ceballos (Ceballos) alleges that he was injured in a motor vehicle accident involving a municipal bus. He sued the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, the State of California, and the Los County Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA) for this injury. Plaintiff has since dismissed County of Los Angeles, City of Los Angeles, and State of California.

This motion to strike involves two issues: (1) whether the second cause of action properly contains a negligence per se claim; and (2) whether plaintiff’s claims provide a basis upon which to grant punitive damages against LACMTA.

For the reasons that follow, defendant’s motion to strike is granted.

          II. MEET AND CONFER
           Defendant’s counsel, Mariana Ortega, attorney at Gutierrez, Preciado & House, LLP, declares that on August 25, 2023, an attorney at her firm, Art Preciado, emailed Plaintiff’s counsel to discuss whether Plaintiff would amend the complaint to avoid the need for a motion to strike. (Ortega Decl. ¶ 3, referencing Exh. 1.) She further declares that on September 7, 2023, Preciado sent a follow-up email, to which Plaintiff’s counsel responded. (Ortega Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5.) Parties then met and conferred by telephone on September 15, 2023. However, the parties were unable to reach an agreement resolving the objections raised by this Motion. (Ortega Decl., ¶ 11.)

          Counsel’s declaration satisfies the meet and confer requirements. (CCP § 435.5(a).)

III.     LEGAL STANDARD

          Code Civ. Proc. Section 436 permits trial courts to strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in a pleading:

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper:

(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.

(b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (CCP § 436.)

IV.     ANALYSIS

          A. Portions of the Complaint at Issue

Defendant seeks to strike the following portions of the Complaint:

p. 5, GN-1, ¶ 2: “Defendants' violated the California Vehicle Code. Since the Vehicle Code establishes the standard of care required to operate a motor vehicle, conduct which falls below this statutory standard is negligence per se, or negligence as a matter of law. (Aldrid v. Vanier (1958) 50 Cal.2d 617, 621; Shehtadian v. Kenny (1958) 156 Cal. App.2d 576).”

p. 3, line 14(a)(2): “punitive damages”

          B. Negligence Per Se Allegations

          Defendant LACMTA first urges that in order to assert a cause of action for negligence based on negligence per se, plaintiff must identify the law or ordinance alleged to have been violated, and also assert that plaintiff was part of the class of persons that the ordinance was intended to protect. (Evid. Code § 669.) LACMTA cites Rosales v. City of L.A. for the proposition that in order to assert a cause of action for negligence per se against a public entity, either the legislature or the courts must have created a duty of care. (Rosales v. City of L.A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 419, 430.) LACMTA also cites Van Kempen v. Hayward Area Park etc. Dist. for the proposition that a common law negligence claim cannot be brought against a public entity, only a negligence claim based on statutory violations. (Van Kempen v. Hayward Area Park etc. Dist. (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 822, 825.)

           The complaint does not allege what specific statute was violated, just that “Defendants' violated the California Vehicle Code.” (Complaint p.5, GN-1 ¶ 2.) This is insufficient.  The Complaint also does not allege that Plaintiff was in the class of persons intended to be protected by the Vehicle Code.

          Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to strike as p. 5, GN-1, ¶ 2of the Complaint. 

C. Punitive Damages

          Government Code Section 818 bars the recovery of punitive damages against public entities. (CGC § 818.) It provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (CGC § 818.) Defendant LACMTA is a public entity. (See also City of Glendale v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1271.)

Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to strike as to p. 3, ¶ 14(a)(2).

V.       CONCLUSION

          Defendant LACMTA’s motion to strike is granted with respect to these portions of the complaint: p. 5, GN-1, ¶ 2; and P. 3, ¶ 14(a)(2).

          LACMTA is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Dated:                                                              _______________________________

                                                                              MARGARET L. OLDENDORF

                                                                       JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT