Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 23AHCV02364, Date: 2023-12-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23AHCV02364    Hearing Date: December 21, 2023    Dept: P

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

NORTHEAST DISTRICT

 

DEDICATO TREATMENT CENTER, INC., a California corporation,

 

                                            Plaintiff,

vs.

 

SALT RIVER PIMA-MARICOPA INDIAN COMMUNITY, a federally recognized Tribe,

 

                                            Defendants.

 

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Case No.: 23AHCV02364

 

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER QUASHING SERVICE OF SUMMONS

 

Date:  December 21, 2023

Time:  8:30 a.m.

Dept.:  P

 

         

          I.        INTRODUCTION

          This is an action for breach of contract on the allegation that Defendant Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community (Community) failed to pay for services rendered by Plaintiff Dedicato Treatment Center (Dedicato). Dedicato alleges that it provided substance abuse treatment services to Community and has not been paid for the services rendered to one dependent of a Community employee. The verified complaint contains six causes of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied contract, (3) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, (4) promissory estoppel, (5) quantum meruit and (6) unfair competition.

          Dedicato has previously filed suit against AmeriBen, the third-party administrator of Community’s healthcare plan and against Community in federal court. Both complaints were dismissed.

          Defendant Community filed the instant motion to quash service of summons on grounds of lack of jurisdiction on November 16, 2023.  Plaintiff Dedicato filed an opposition on December 8, 2023. Community filed a reply December 13, 2023.

          For the reasons that follow, the motion to quash service of summons is GRANTED.

 

II.       LEGAL STANDARD

          Code Civ. Proc. Section 418.10(a)(1) provides that a defendant, on or before the last day to plead, may file a motion to quash service of the summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. (CCP § 418.10(a)(1).)

          California’s “long-arm” statute provides for jurisdiction “on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” (CCP §410.10.)

          The possible bases for jurisdiction in this state are the following:

          - Physical presence in the forum when served, aka “gotcha” jurisdiction; (Burnham v. Superior Court (1990) 495 U.S. 604, 612);

          - Domicile in the forum state; (Milliken v. Meyer (1940) 311 U.S. 457, 462);

          - General appearance in the action; (CCP. § 410.50(a));

          - Contractual consent/forum selection clause; (National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent (1964) 375 U.S. 311, 315-316);

          - Minimum contacts; (International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316; Burger King v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 475).

See Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023), ¶3:131.

When a non-resident defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must provide facts as to personal jurisdiction over the defendant by a preponderance of evidence. (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 262, 273; BBA Aviation PLC v. Superior Court (2010) 190 Cal. App. 4th 421, 428-429.) In order to do this, plaintiff must provide affidavits and authenticated documents to demonstrate “competent evidence of jurisdictional facts.” (BBA Aviation, supra at 428-429.) If plaintiff meets their initial burden, the burden then shifts to defendant to demonstrate that exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Pavolich, supra at 273.)

           

III.     ANALYSIS

A. General Personal Jurisdiction

          Community urges that it is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in California. (Motion, p.11: 8.) General personal jurisdiction can be asserted over a defendant if its contacts within the forum state (California) are so substantial and continuous and systematic as to render the defendant at home. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 445, citations omitted.) Here, Community urges that it is not at home in California, but rather in Arizona. In support, Community provides the declaration of Patty Powers, the Assistant Director of Human Resources for Community. (Powers Declaration) She declares that the Community is a federally recognized Indian Tribe exclusively located in Maricopa County, Arizona. (Powers Decl. ¶¶ 4,5.) Additionally, the complaint alleges that Community is at home in Arizona. (Complaint ¶ 4.) Consequently, Community is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in California.

          Dedicato does not argue general personal jurisdiction should be asserted.

          B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction

Community urges that it is not subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California because: (1) Community did not purposefully avail itself of the benefits of California, (2) Community does not have any contacts in California and (3) California exercising jurisdiction over Community would be inconsistent with notions of fair play and justice.

i. Purposeful Availment

Dedicato urges that the substance abuse treatment provided to the dependent of a Community employee demonstrates purposeful availment. (Opposition, p. 12: 5-13.) Importantly, the burden of providing personal jurisdiction facts is on Dedicato. (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 262, 273.) However, Dedicato does not provide any affidavits or authenticated documents other than the allegations of its verified Complaint. (BBA Aviation PLC v. Superior Court (2010) 190 Cal. App. 4th 421, 428-429.) For this reason, Dedicato fails to meet its burden to demonstrate California may exercise personal jurisdiction over Community, let alone by a preponderance of the evidence. (See Reply, p. 5: 7-9.)

Community urges it has not purposefully availed itself of California’s benefits. (Motion, p. 12: 1-2.) Purposeful availment centers on the defendant’s intent, and is only satisfied when a defendant voluntarily “directs his activities toward the forum so that he should expect, by virtue of the benefit he receives, to subject to the court’s jurisdiction.” (Pavolich, supra, at 269, citations omitted.) Here, no facts are alleged in the Complaint as to how Community purposefully availed itself of the benefit of California’s laws. The Complaint alleges that one dependent of a Community employee sought substance abuse treatment in California from Dedicato, but not that the Community itself directed any of its activities towards California such that the Community could expect to be subject to personal jurisdiction in a California court. (Complaint ¶¶ 1, 21, 27.) As such, the Complaint fails to demonstrate purposeful availment on part of Community.

In opposition, Dedicato urges that because the treatment was initiated/given on multiple occasions, Community purposefully availed itself of the benefit of California’s laws. (Opposition, p. 12: 14-25.) The Court declines to consider the frequency of the treatment and each initiation as a determinative factor; the fact remains that only one dependent of one employee sought treatment in California. The Court treats this as one discrete instance, at most, of the Community availing itself of the benefits of California. Dedicato cites case law holding an insurer to personal jurisdiction in a forum state, but not the purchaser of the plan. (McGow v. McCurry (2005) 412 F.3d 1207, 1214.) The manager of the healthcare plan, Ameriben, and the Community are not one and the same.

          Dedicato also urges that the Community purposefully derived a benefit from California. (Opposition, p. 12: 5.) But this is not the case. The recipient of the treatment surely purposefully derived a benefit from California; but not the Community, who purchased the plan. Dedicato does not cite a benefit Community itself purposefully sought out and got in California. Indeed, this argument substitutes “Community” in place of Ameriben and alleges that they are one and the same. As discussed, this is incorrect or at minimum, unsupported, as Dedicato does not provide any caselaw or statute holding that a purchaser of an insurance plan and the third-party manager of the plan are one and the same.

ii. Minimum Contacts

          Community urges that it does not have the requisite contacts with California for the exercise of specific jurisdiction. (Motion, p. 12: 18-19.) To exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant, that defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the forum state. (International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.) These contacts must be substantial. Here, the Complaint does not allege any particular contacts between Community and California. Indeed, the Complaint alleges one isolated incident where a dependent of a Community employee used his/her/their insurance card in California. (Complaint ¶ 21.) This is not, on its own, evidence of substantial minimum contacts between Community and California. As discussed above, equating Community and Ameriben is not a viable argument either. (See Reply, p. 7: 5-14.) As such, the Complaint fails to demonstrate minimum contacts between Community and California.

iii. Fair Play and Justice

          Community urges that if California did exercise personal jurisdiction over it, that exercise would not comport with notions of fair play and justice. (Motion, p. 13: 15-16.) In considering fair play and justice, the following factors are examined: (1) defendant’s burden of appearing in California, (2) California’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief in California, (4) judicial economy and lastly, (5) the shared interest of several states in furthering fundamental social policies. (Vons Companies, Inc., supra at 448, referencing Burger King v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 477.) Community urges that the burden on Community of appearing in California  would be “trying on the Community”. Community is exclusively located in Maricopa County, Arizona. (Powers Decl. ¶¶ 4,5.) There is no assertion in the Complaint that California has any interest in adjudicating the case nor that Community has interjected itself into California. Community urges that judicial economy would be impacted as all of Community’s witnesses and documents are in Arizona. (Motion, p. 14: 4-5.) Community urges that there are no fundamental social policies at issue in this lawsuit. (Motion, p. 14: 5-7.) To the extent that Dedicato has not alleged that California has any interest in adjudicating the case, that it has any interest in relief in California (though this may be presumed by Dedicato’s domicile in California), how judicial economy would be served by adjudicating in California nor what if any social policies of California would be served by adjudicating in California, this argument is well-taken. Additionally, Community has sovereign rights as a federally recognized Indian Tribe (Powers Decl. ¶ 4) and is not waiving its rights.

          Lastly, Community advances an argument that Dedicato’s allegation as to AmeriBen, the third-party administrator does not save the service of summons on Community. (Motion, p. 14: 20-21.) This argument is well-taken, as the relevant analysis is purposeful availment, minimum contacts and notions of fair play and justice as to Defendant Community, not AmeriBen. Furthermore, the Third-Part Administrative and Utilization Management Services Agreement attached as Exh. 1 to the Complaint provides that Ameri-Ben is not the agent of Community. (Complaint Exh 1, p. 23 Art 3.3 [AmeriBen to perform its duties under the agreement as an independent contractor not agent, employee or fiduciary of Community.])

In opposition, Dedicato urges that Community has not provided any reasoning as to why personal jurisdiction over it in California would not comport with fair play and justice. This is incorrect. Community has provided evidence that it is exclusively located in Arizona, its potential witnesses are in Arizona, and Community potentially has sovereign rights.

C. Dedicato’s Request for Additional Jurisdictional Discovery

In opposition, Dedicato urges that it should be granted leave to conduct additional jurisdictional discovery. (Opposition p. 16: 10-28.) To the extent that the Court considers this argument, the Court notes that granting additional jurisdictional discovery is predicated on the plaintiff showing that such discovery is likely to lead to evidence of jurisdiction. (In re Auto Antitrust Cases I and II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127.) This threshold has not been met. (See Reply, p. 10: 1-9.) Additionally, such a request must be made by a separately noticed motion. (In re Auto, supra at 127, referencing Beckman v. Thompson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 481, 486–487; see also Reply, p. 9: 17-23.) Accordingly, the Court declines to consider the merits of Dedicato’s request.

 

IV.     CONCLUSION

           The motion to quash service of summons based on a lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED. Moving party Community is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

         

         

         

Dated:                                                              _______________________________

                                                                              MARGARET L. OLDENDORF

                                                                       JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT