Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 23STCV01717, Date: 2024-02-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV01717 Hearing Date: February 16, 2024 Dept: P
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
NORTHEAST DISTRICT
CITY OF MONROVIA, )
Cross-Complainant, )
vs.
)
STEPHEN HAYES GROLLNEK; )
DORIS LUDWIG; and ROES 1 TO 50, )
inclusive,
)
Cross-Defendants.
)
)
I. INTRODUCTION
This action concerns the death of
pedestrian Denise Eginton, who died while crossing the street at the intersection
of Myrtle Avenue and Foothill Boulevard in the City of Monrovia. Decedent was
struck by a vehicle owned by Doris Ludwig and driven by Stephen Grollnek.
Plaintiffs are the husband and adult children of Decedent. They sue Defendant
City of Monrovia for wrongful death on a dangerous condition of public property
theory; and include a survival cause of action for Decedent’s pain and
suffering.
Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, Plaintiffs
settled with Grollnek and Ludwig. At the time of answering, Defendant City
filed a cross-complaint against Grollnek and Ludwig for indemnification,
apportionment of fault, negligent entrustment (against Ludwig), and
contribution.
Cross-Defendants filed a motion for
protective order as to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One on
November 6, 2023. Cross-Complainant City filed an opposition on November 27,
2023. Cross-Defendants filed a reply on December 1, 2023, and December 6, 2023.
This motion was continued from December 8, 2023, to its current date of
February 16, 2024. Cross-Defendants seek
an order that they need not respond to the Request for Production of Documents,
Set One, served on them by the City.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES
the motion for a protective order.[1]
II. MEET AND CONFER
Cross-Defendant’s Counsel, Paul V. Ash, declares that he
has met and conferred with Cross-Complainant City’s counsel. (Ash Declaration ¶
12.) On August 16, 2023, Ash emailed City’s counsel indicating that he would be
seeking a protective order due to the perceived intrusiveness of the Requests
for Production, Set One. (Ash Decl., Exh. D.) Counsel for City responded with
an offer to enter into a stipulation for a protective order. (Id.) Ash
responded that he would still be filing the motion. The parties were unable to
reach a resolution. Based upon this
record, the Court finds that the meet and confer requirements were satisfied.
III. LEGAL
STANDARD
Code Civ. Proc. Section 2031.060 (a) provides that when an
inspection demand has been made the party to whom the demand has been directed
may promptly move for a protective order. Subdivision (b) provides that the
court for good cause shown “may make any order that justice requires to protect
any party or other person from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or
oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (CCP § 2031.060.)
This
protective order may include an order that all or some of the items or
categories of items in demand need not be produced or made available at all.
(CCP § 2031.060(b)(1)).
B.
Law Governing Privacy Objections
Case
law has established that several areas of an individual’s life are entitled to
privacy, among them are privacy in one’s financial records, medical records,
and employment records. This privacy interest is not absolute, and must
sometimes yield if a balancing of interests so requires. Hill v. National
Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 sets forth the process. First,
a legally protected privacy right must be identified, in which the party has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and there is a serious threatened invasion. Courts
then must balance the invasion of that privacy with the competing interests.
“Invasion of a privacy interest is not a violation of the state constitutional
right to privacy if the invasion is justified by a competing interest.
Legitimate interests derive from the legally authorized and socially beneficial
activities of government and private entities.” (Hill v. National Collegiate
Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 37-38.)
IV. ANALYSIS
Cross-Defendants, as the moving parties, have the burden of
establishing unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden
and expense. They offer evidence on the point of unwarranted annoyance most
concretely. The issue that Cross-Defendants’ counsel, Paul Ash, met and
conferred about initially is that he believed that the discovery requests were
“intrusive” to his clients. (Motion,
Exh. D, p.89-91.) In the motion, it appears that the primary objection is with
respect to the request for Cross-Defendant’s financial information dating back
to 2000. Cross-Defendants urge that the request for 23 years of their financial
information is (1) intrusive and burdensome, (2) disregards work-product
privilege, (3) violates their rights to privacy, and (4) is not fundamental to Cross-Complainant
Monrovia’s case.
i. Burdensome
Cross-Defendants also urge that the requests for production
of documents are unduly burdensome. (Motion p.7: 15-16.) In support, Cross-Defendants
refer to the fact that Grollnek has already provided a declaration that he has
no assets over $10,000. (Exh. C to Motion.) Cross-Defendant Ludwig has provided
information regarding her insurance policy, which is the only other asset
Cross-Defendants assert that they have. (Exh. E to Ash Decl.) As a result,
Cross-Defendants urge that providing responses would be unduly burdensome, as
the information sought is duplicative of the information already provided, and
that each of the 35 requests for production seeks the same information. (Motion,
p. 7:23-28.)
In opposition, Cross-Complainant City argues that the
information sought by the discovery request is not unduly burdensome. The City argues that Cross-Defendants have
not provided sufficient evidence of their financial status. (Opposition, p. 6:
26-28.) The City urges that “[c]ommon sense has taught those of us who practice
law is that people who have big umbrella policies usually have lots of big
pricey things they want to insure.” (Opposition, p.7:5-7.)
Although
the Court takes issue with the tenor of the City’s language, it agrees that the
City is entitled to additional information.
The Grollnek declaration does not provide a complete picture of his financial
status; and there is insufficient evidence as to the complete financial status
of Ludwig.
The City
further points out that it is not seeking 23 years of financial information in
any of the requests for production. (Opposition, p. 10:24-26.) The City also argues
that the 35 discovery requests do not seek the same information. (Opposition,
p. 10: 26-27.) These arguments are also well taken. The discovery requests, at most, go back approximately
10 years (2013 to present); and they seek information as to different aspects
of Cross-Defendant’s financial status.
ii. Privacy
Cross-Defendants
also urge that the discovery requests invade protected privacy interests.
(Motion, p. 8: 11-12.) In support, Cross-Defendants cite Cobb v. Superior
Ct. and Fortunato v. Superior Ct. for the proposition that financial
information is considered a legally protectable privacy interest. (Cobb v.
Superior Ct. (1979) 99 Cal. 3d 543, 550; Fortunato v. Superior Ct.
(2003)114 Cal.4th 475, 481.) Cross-Defendants then urge that the competing
interest is at most minimal, as the financial status of Cross-Defendants has already
been provided (Exh. E and C) and “Tech Bilt does not call for an
individual’s total financial history; rather, a defendant’s current financial
conditions is merely a relevant consideration.” (Motion, p. 9: 16-17,
referencing Tech Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38
Cal.3d 489, 499.)
The City argues that the Cross-Defendants fail to properly
balance their privacy interest in the financial information versus the City’s
interest in obtaining disclosure. (Opposition, p. 9: 9-10.) The City cites Valley
Bank of Nevada v. Sup. Ct. for the proposition that considerations in
balancing the discovery interest versus the privacy right in financial
information include: "the purpose of the information sought, the effect
the disclosure will have on the parties and on the trial, the nature of the
objection urged by the party resisting disclosure, and the ability of the court
to make an alternative order which may grant partial disclosure.”(Valley
Bank of Nevada v. Sup. Court (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 652, 657-658.) The City argues
that “[discovery is ] the only means that the City may use to gather the
documentary evidence from the Cross-Defendants regarding their financial
condition.” (Opposition, p.10:17-19.) This argument is well-taken.
The City
cites to the Motion for Good Faith Settlement in this case, in which the Court is
required to balance various factors. (Opposition, p. 11: 8-11, referencing 7/12/23
Minute Order p. 4 [“it may be an abuse of discretion to deny the City the right
to conduct discovery on this topic (of financial information)”].)
iii. Work-Product Privilege
Cross-Defendants also argue that the requests for documents
seek information protected by the work-product privilege. (Motion, p. 9:
22-23.) Cross-Defendants cite CCP Section 2018.030 in support of their
position. Section 2018.030 provides that
attorney work product is protected from discovery, including attorney’s
impressions, conclusions, and opinions. (CCP § 2018.030.) Here, the City does seek
drafts of written agreements, declarations, and information regarding negotiations
between Cross-Defendants and Plaintiffs. (RFP Nos. 3,4,5.)
The City does not directly address the work product
argument in its opposition. However, to the extent that certain requests may
seek privileged attorney work product, Cross-Defendants should provide a
privilege log. (See, e.g., RFPs # 3, 4,
5.)
V. ORDER
Cross-Defendants’ motion for a protective order as to the
document demands is denied. Verified responses are due within 15 days of today’s
date.
The City is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Dated: _______________________________
MARGARET L. OLDENDORF
JUDGE
OF THE SUPERIOR COURT