Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 19SMCV01631, Date: 2022-07-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19SMCV01631 Hearing Date: July 26, 2022 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Pena Construction Services Inc., v. Dyne, et al.
CASE NO.: 19SMCV01631
MOTION: Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
HEARING DATE: 7/26/2022
BACKGROUND
On September 17, 2019, Plaintiff Pena Construction Services, Inc. dba Pena Demolition brought this action against Defendants Colin Dyne and Shari Dyne. Plaintiff sought payment for labor, services, equipment, and materials utilized on the private work of improvement at 6205 Busch Drive, Malibu, CA 90265. Defendants approved a total amount of $192,892.50 under the contract. Ultimately, Defendants failed to perform according to the contract.
The parties represent that the dispute was resolved via binding arbitration, held on July 14, 2021. Defendants failed to appear at the arbitration and the hearing proceeded in their absence. The arbitrator awarded $73,007.10 in favor of Plaintiff. The arbitration award was confirmed by this Court on January 28, 2022.
Legal Standard
“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.)
In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.¿(Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)¿General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Ibid.)
Analysis
The motion is timely. Defendants do not demonstrate that the Court’s ruling on the award would trigger California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b)’s timing requirements. (See also CRC Rule 8.104(c), 8.108.)
The contract provision provides for fee-shifting, even post-arbitration. The contract provides for fees as follows. “In any dispute resolution between the parties, the prevailing party shall be entitled, in addition to any other relief granted, to recover its costs of participation, including attorney’s and expert’s fees. An award rendered by an arbitrator(s) shall be final and judgment may be entered upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court having jurisdiction.” (Woo Decl., Ex. A, at 2.) The contract further states: “Legal Fees: In the event of arbitration or litigation relating to this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from the other party it's [sic] reasonable attorney [sic] fees and costs.” (Id. at 5.)
Further, Defendants fail to show that the contract was terminated by a judgment. (See Globalist Internet Techs., Inc. v. Reda (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4th 1267, 1273–74 (2008) (holding that C.C.P. §685.040, not contracts’ fee-shifting provision, controls requests for attorneys’ fees after judgment such that only fees incurred to enforce judgment could be recovered)
There is no reasonable dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action and therefore entitled to its fees. Plaintiff obtained its litigation objectives, which included a “net monetary recovery” through the arbitrator's award and the confirmation of that award.
Plaintiff provides for the following verified fees:
Laurence Lubka, Esq. 5.10 hours at $490.00/hr. $2,499.00
John H. Woo, Esq.: 19.30 hours at $340.00/hr. $6,562.00
John H. Woo, Esq.: 22.40 hours at $350.00/hr. $7,840.00
Stephen P. Watkins 0.80 hours at $185.00/hr. $148.00
Total Hours: 47.60 Total Fees: $17,049.00
For the instant motion, counsel has spent at least 5 hours preparing the moving papers, 4 hours reviewing the opposition and drafting a reply, and 1 hour attending the hearing. Accordingly, counsel anticipates an additional 10 hours at $350/hr., or $3,500.00. Thus, Plaintiff requests a total amount of $20,549.00 ($17,049.00 + $2,450.00).
Defendants also argue that the above hours are excessive. Defendants point to 10.2 hours for time spent writing emails or making telephone calls, accounting for $3,648.00. Defendants also object to the 9.7 hours ($3,686.00) for time spent on “review.” The only unaccounted “review” time, however, is for redacted activities. (See, e.g., 9/8/21, 11/1/21, 12/1/21 entries.)
The Court does not find that Defendants meet their burden to show that the objected-to time was unreasonably spent, or not connected to this litigation. The only portions that would potentially require further justification would be for the redacted activities. That said, Plaintiff’s counsel’s verification demonstrates that these activities were litigation related. Defendants, for their part, do not provide why time spent writing emails, making phone calls or reviewing litigation material would not be compensable. Therefore, Defendants do not meet their burden to show that the time spent on the activities were unreasonable. Moreover, based upon the Court’s review, the requested fees are reasonable.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED,