Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 19SMCV01861, Date: 2023-02-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19SMCV01861    Hearing Date: February 10, 2023    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           Murrey v. Lee

CASE NO.:                19SMCV01861

MOTION:                  Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production

HEARING DATE:   2/10/2023

 

Legal Standard

 

            In the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant’s right to discovery is broad. “[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (CCP § 2017.010; see Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 301.)

 

            If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling response to the demand. (CCP § 2031.300(b); see Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 403-404.) However, when responses are served, the proper motion is a motion to compel further responses, which is governed by CCP §§ 2030.300 and 2031.310. A motion to compel further responses must set forth specific facts showing “good cause” justifying the discovery sought by the demand and must be accompanied by a declaration showing a “reasonable and good faith attempt” to resolve the issues outside of court. (CCP §§ 2016.040, 2031.310(b)(2).)

 

            A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections. (CCP, § 2031.310(c).) A motion for order compelling further responses “shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (CCP § 2031.310(b)(1).) Absent a claim of privilege or attorney work product, the moving party meets its burden of showing good cause by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) If the moving party has shown good cause for the RPDs, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Ibid.) 

 

PROCEDURAL DEFECTS

 

Separate Statement

 

Motions to compel further responses must always be accompanied by a separate statement containing the requests and the responses, verbatim, as well as reasons why a further response is warranted. (CRC, Rule 3.1345(a).) The separate statement must also be complete in itself; no extrinsic materials may be incorporated by reference. (CRC, Rule 3.1345(c).)

 

            Here, Murrey failed to serve a separate statement. Instead, a statement was appended to his declaration in support of the motion. Thus, Murrey has failed to comply with the procedural requirements of his motion.  Murrey is reminded to comply with this requirement in any future filings.

 

Notice

 

Murrey also failed to properly notice this motion. Murrey noticed this motion for February 9, 2023. The motion was set for February 10, 2023. Thus, Murrey did not meet the notice requirements. This defect alone would not require denial of the motion since Lee has not been prejudiced. 

 

Analysis

 

Substantively, Murrey requests further responses as to RPDs, set 2, nos. 3-13, 15, and 17-22. Murrey contends that these requests concern critical evidence, including comments and private Facebook groups of Lee’s and Lee’s “many anonymous identities” (e.g., Chase Hern).

 

A demand under Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.010 may be used to obtain inspection, copying, testing or sampling of “documents, tangible things, land or other property, and electronically stored information” (ESI) in the possession, custody or control of a party. (CCP § 2031.010(a).) Many of the cited RPDs are hopelessly vague to support the demands. Most of the RPDs are more akin to interrogatories than requests for production, since they do not seek cognizable categories of documents, ESI, or tangible things  For example:

 

RPD no. 3 request that Lee “Identify the name(s), address(es), telephone number(s), email address(es) and any and all other contact information of all the persons identified as users of the anonymous “Chase Herran” email account…”

 

A request for Lee to identify such information is not a request for documents, tangible things, land or other property, or ESI. RPD nos. 4, and 20-22 also requests Lee to “Identify” certain people or information. Thus, these RPDs each fail to meet the basic requirement of section 2031.010(a).

 

RPD no. 5 requests “Any and all evidence of private Facebook groups wherein plaintiff is a topic of discussion.”

 

This request likewise does not request any documents, ESI, etc. Instead, it vaguely refers to evidence generally, which could mean anything. RPDs nos. 7-8, 11-13, 15 and 19 all share this defect. Similarly, RPD no. 9 vaguely requests “comments about Plaintiff’s behavior in public places.” This does not apparently target any documents, ESI, etc. (Cf. RPD no. 10: “Any and all comments about plaintiff’s behavior in public places as mentioned in private Facebook groups.” Emphasis added.) Thus, these RPDs also fail to meet the basic requirement of section 2031.010(a).

 

Only four RPDs seek concrete categories of documents, ESI, etc.: RPDs nos. 6, 10, 17 and 18.  As to RPD no. 10, the Court would not require a further response. RPD no. 10 requests “Any and all comments about plaintiff’s behavior in public places as mentioned in private Facebook groups.” However, in response, Lee provided that “Without waiving objections, Defendant will produce the documents as they come.” Murrey does not explain why this response is not code compliant. Thus, no further response is necessary.

 

RPD no. 6 requests “Any and all comments about plaintiff in private Facebook groups.” (Emphasis added.)

 

RPD no. 17 requests “Any and all comments about plaintiff you have obtained from social media.” (Emphasis added.)

 

RPD no. 18 requests “Any and all images of plaintiff you have obtained from social media.” (Emphasis added.)

 

Comments (within the context of Facebook/social media) are ESI and properly sought via RPDs. Images are also documents, tangible things, or ESI, and thus properly sought via these RPDs. These requests could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence concerning Murrey’s defamation claims against Lee. Thus, further responses are required as to RPDs nos. 6, 17 and 18.

 

Relevantly, in opposition, Lee states that she “has already responded. Defendant has produced any and all comments and images of Plaintiff that she can find, anywhere, that relates to this case.” Lee does not provide a declaration indicating that new responses were served as to these RPDs. In reply, Murrey does not seem to take issue with responses to RPDs 17-18. Instead, Murrey focuses on RPDs nos. 3, 4-7, 13, 15, and 19-22. Thus, the Court is uncertain whether documents were produced as to nos. 17-18. If Lee has made production as to those requests, then Lee should provide a code-compliant statement indicating as such.  That statement will be due within 10 days.

 

Additionally, Lee contends that she is not a member of unspecified Facebook groups. Of course, Lee would only have an obligation to produce ESI that she has access to (i.e., “possession, custody or control”). If Lee cannot access certain comments or images, then Lee does not have custody or control of that ESI. The Code accounts for such a possibility. (See CCP § 2031.210(a)(1)-(2).) As such, Lee may respond as required the code.

 

Accordingly, the Court requires further responses as to RPDs no. 6, 17 and 18.

 

SANCTIONS

 

Sanctions are mandatory. The Court must sanction any party that unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response, “unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (See, e.g., CCP, § 2030.300(d).)

 

Given the mixed success of the motion, the vagueness of most of the requests, and that Lee has apparently produced the images/comments sought, the Court finds that the imposition of sanctions would be unjust.