Judge Mark A. Young, Case Number: 19SMCV01976, Date: 2024-04-23 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 19SMCV01976, Date: 2024-04-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19SMCV01976 Hearing Date: April 23, 2024 Dept: M

CASE NAME: Siegemund v. Le Lycee Francais De Los Angeles, et al.

CASE NO.: 19SMCV01976

MOTION: Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Post Anti-SLAPP)

HEARING DATE: 4/23/2024

Legal Standard

“Under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c), any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees. The fee-shifting provision was apparently intended to discourage such strategic lawsuits against public participation by imposing the litigation costs on the party seeking to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The fee-shifting provision also encourages private representation in SLAPP cases, including situations when a SLAPP defendant is unable to afford fees or the lack of potential monetary damages precludes a standard contingency fee arrangement.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.)

In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.¿(Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)¿General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Ibid.)

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

Defendants/Cross-Complainant’ objections to the Franklin-Murdock declaration are OVERRULED. In a supplemental declaration, counsel verifies the time entries worksheet (Ex. A) on counsel’s personal knowledge of the work each member of DLG did for the motion and the initial timesheets. (See Supp. Franklin-Murdock ¶¶ 3, 5.)

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant’s objections are OVERRULED.

On October 12, 2022, the Court cautioned Defendant Le Lycee-Francais de Los Angeles that their papers must comply with the Rules of Court, and that future violations would result in the Court striking the entire filing. That violation involved the filing of an over-sized brief. Here, Defendant’s opposition exceeds ten pages and, as such, was required to include a table of contents and authorities. (Cal. R. Court, rule 3.1113(f).) Despite this violation, the Court will consider the opposition, but once again cautions Defendant to comply with the Rules of Court.

Analysis

Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Karen Siegemund moves for a mandatory award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 in the noticed amount of $45,404.16 against Defendant/Cross-Complainant Le Lycee Francais de Los Angeles. This follows a partially-successful anti-SLAPP motion against the cross-complaint filed on July 21, 2023, and heard on September 21, 2023.

The parties argue over Siegemund’s entitlement to fees. Cross-Defendant is entitled to fees as the prevailing party on the anti-SLAPP motion. The Court fully considered whether Cross-Defendant would have been successful on the anti-SLAPP motion. If the motion was not mooted by the dismissal of the trade libel claim, Cross-Defendants would have met their initial burden under prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis for that claim. Cross-Complainant, in turn, did not present any argument or prima facie evidence as to that claim. Furthermore, Cross-Complainant fails to present any prima facie evidence suggesting they would have been successful on the merits. Therefore, based on the record, Cross-Defendant would have prevailed on the anti-SLAPP motion as to the trade libel claim and are entitled to fees.

Siegemund requests $26,501.66 in fees associated with the work related to the Special Motion to Strike; $4,235.18 in costs thereto; $7,602.50 for the fees related to the instant motion; $64.81 in costs thereto; and $4,932.50 fees associated with the reply brief and hearing for the instant motion. (Franklin-Murdock Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5, Ex. 1; Supp. Franklin-Murdock Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.) Counsel states that this represents 66.66% of the fees and costs actually incurred. Siegemund explains that the reduction reflects the mixed success of the motion.

Counsel presents verified time records of counsels’ work on this action, which they contend relates to the anti-SLAPP motion. (Ex. A.) Counsel declares each attorney, law clerk and paralegal’s experience, training and education. (Franklin-Murdock Decl., ¶¶ 7-13.) Through the verified time records, counsel claims the following rates and hours related to the anti-SLAPP motion:

Harmeet Dhillon – 0.5 hour at $1300/hr.;

John-Paul S. Deol – 9 hours, plus 1 hour in reply, at $1000/hr.;

Krista L. Baughman – 1.6 hours at $900/hr.;

Jesse Franklin-Murdock – 28.2 hours, plus 7.7 hours in reply, at $450/hr.; and

Michael Fleming – 8.9 hours at $400/hr.

The Court excluded any hours not associated with the anti-SLAPP motion. Counsel also requests fees for law clerks and paralegals, which are not attorneys’ fees. These fees will be discounted from the award. Using the lodestar method, the total fee request is $31,805.00 before any adjustments. The time record also shows $176.79 in costs related to the anti-SLAPP related motions, which are for e-filing fees and Westlaw legal research costs.

The Court agrees with both parties that a percentage reduction of work performed would be appropriate to reflect the mixed success of the motion. The Court adjusts the fees to reflect fully the success of the motion and its degree of impact on the action as a whole, which is less than the 66.6% proposed by Seigemund. Accordingly, the Court finds that a reasonable fee in this instance would be $21,902.50. This amount fairly compensates Siegemund’s counsel for their efforts in responding to the dismissed trade libel cause of action in the cross-complaint. Therefore, the motion for fees is GRANTED in the reduced total amount of $21,902.50. Costs are awarded in the total amount of $176.79. Fees are payable within 30 days.