Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 20SMCV01190, Date: 2025-04-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20SMCV01190 Hearing Date: April 2, 2025 Dept: M
CASE NAME: City of Culver
City v. Los Angeles School of Gymnastics, et al.
CASE NO.: 20SMCV01190
MOTION: Motion
for Attorneys’ Fees
HEARING DATE: 4/2/2025
Legal
Standard
With respect to attorney fees and
costs, unless they are specifically provided for by statute (e.g., CCP §§ 1032,
et seq.), the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at
law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.¿(CCP § 1021.)
The prevailing party on a contract, which specifically provides for attorney
fees and costs incurred to enforce the agreement, is entitled to reasonable
attorney fees in addition to other costs.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a); CCP §§ 1032,
1033.5(a)(10)(A).)¿The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall
determine the prevailing party and shall fix, as an element of the costs of
suit, the reasonable attorney fees.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a), (b).)¿Any notice of
motion to claim attorney fees as an element of costs under shall be served and
filed before or at the same time the memorandum of costs is served and filed;
if only attorney fees are claimed as costs, the notice of motion shall be
served and filed within the time specified in CRC 3.1700 for filing a
memorandum of costs.¿(CRC 3.1702; Gunlock Corp. v. Walk on Water, Inc.
(1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1303, fn. 1.)
“It is well established that the
determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the
discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence
of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64
Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily
“begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably
expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson
Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[A] computation of time
spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a
determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Reg’l
Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar
figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the
case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services
provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing
factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors
the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the
attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id.
at 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the
lodestar include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2)
the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of
the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent
nature of the fee award.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 266, 271.)
In challenging attorney fees as
excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the
challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient
argument and citations to the evidence.¿(Premier Medical Management Systems,
Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550,
564.)¿General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or
unrelated do not suffice. (Ibid.)
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff City of Culver City moves
for an order awarding the City’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs against
Defendants Los Angeles School of Gymnastics and Tanya Berenson. Plaintiff claims
that this action is moot because the City has obtained the relief requested in
its Complaint and abated the nuisance conditions at Defendants’ property
located at 8450 Higuera Street, Culver City. On that basis, the City requests
that the court determine it to be the prevailing party and accordingly award
fees per Culver City Municipal Code section 9.04.145.
Plaintiff is not a prevailing party
defined by statute. Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(a)(4) defines a
“prevailing party” as: “[a] the party with a net monetary recovery, [b] a
defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, [c] a defendant where neither
plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and [d] a defendant as against
those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. If
any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as
specified, the “prevailing party” shall be as determined by the court, and
under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not
and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse
sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.” (Emphasis added.)
The Court has previously determined
that Plaintiff is not yet the prevailing party in this action. (See 2/15/24
Minute Order.) The instant motion adds no new information to alter the court’s
analysis. Thus, it is denied for the same reasons previously articulated: Plaintiff
has not demonstrated the catalytic effect to be a successful party entitled to
fees without a favorable judgment or net monetary recovery. (Graham v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 553; 2/25/24 Minute Order, pp. 4-6.)
Furthermore, the motion violates Code of Civil Procedure section 1008’s
requirements that any renewed motions be made on new or different facts or
circumstances.
Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.