Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 20SMCV01611, Date: 2022-10-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20SMCV01611    Hearing Date: October 27, 2022    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           Diamond Capital Advisors LLC, et al., v. Platt, et al.

CASE NO.:                20SMCV01611

MOTION:                  Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

HEARING DATE:   10/27/2022

BACKGROUND

The matter came before the Court for trial on April 18, 2022 and April 19, 2022.  After trial, the Court found in favor of Plaintiffs and on June 21, 2022, entered judgment.  The judgment awarded Plaintiffs’ damages plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

On July 26, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking an award of prevailing party attorney’s fees in the amount of $100,458.50 and costs in the amount of $1,600.15, which were costs that were excluded from the Memorandum of Costs. No opposition was filed.

Legal Standard

With respect to attorney fees and costs, unless they are specifically provided for by statute (e.g., CCP §§ 1032, et seq.), the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.¿(CCP § 1021.) The prevailing party on a contract, which specifically provides for attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the agreement, is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to other costs.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a); CCP §§ 1032, 1033.5(a)(10)(A).)¿The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine the prevailing party and shall fix, as an element of the costs of suit, the reasonable attorney fees.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a), (b).)¿Any notice of motion to claim attorney fees as an element of costs shall be served and filed before or at the same time the memorandum of costs is served and filed; if only attorney fees are claimed as costs, the notice of motion shall be served and filed within the time specified in CRC 3.1700 for filing a memorandum of costs.¿(CRC 3.1702; Gunlock Corp. v. Walk on Water, Inc. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1303, fn. 1.) 

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.) 

In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.¿(Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)¿General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Ibid.) 

Analysis

Plaintiffs meet their initial burden of establishing the reasonableness of their fees by producing verified time records from counsel. Plaintiffs provide that their counsel, Lurie Zepeda Schmalz Hogan & Martin (“LZSHM”) spent a total of 270.20 hours working on this matter from September 30, 2020, through April 30, 2022. (Hogan Decl. ¶ 14.) Counsel breakdown the hours as follows:

Hogan spent a total of 62.9 hours on this matter at an hourly rate of $695 and $715 (post Jan. 2022). Victoria V. Tsylina spent a total of 22.3 hours on this matter at an hourly rate of $350 and $390 (post August 2021). Jimmy Chang spent a total of 19.3 hours on this matter at an hourly rate of $285 and $295 (post January 2021). Aya Z. Elalami spent a total of 92.4 hours on this matter at an hourly rate of $235 and $265 (post December 2021). Meigan Everett spent 21.0 hours on this matter at an hourly rate of $190. Christopher Kellett spent 48.6 hours on this matter at an hourly rate of $195. Ashely Cowall spent 3.7 hours on this matter at an hourly rate of $75. This brings the total fee requested to $94,895.50 prior to this motion.

Plaintiff further incurred $5,563.00 in preparation of the Proposed Statement of Decision, Memorandum of Costs, and this Motion for Attorney’s Fees. (Hogan Decl., ¶ 23.) Hogan spent 4.0 hours and Elalami spent 10.2 hours in preparing such documents.

This request is unopposed. Given that the amount claimed is supported by verified records and is facially reasonable, the Court grants the motion in the requested amount.

Costs

Plaintiff requests costs that were not included in the memorandum of costs.  In general, the “prevailing party” is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs for suit in any action or proceeding. (CCP § 1032(b); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606.) “Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (CCP § 1033.5(c)(2); see Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal. App. 4th 761, 774 [“If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary.”].)

            Plaintiffs request repayment of the following $1,600.15 in costs: a) Postage - $2.34; b) Summitt Reprographics- Outside Photocopy Charges- Endorse, Copy, Tab & Bind 6 Sets of Color trial binder $240.92; c) Westlaw – Legal Research $919.82; d)

Retrieving Court Documents via Online $51.80; e) Lodging, Delivery and Costs to Prepare Trial Binder $335.75; and f) Parking, mileage $49.52.

The Court finds that the cost request is mostly supported. The postage, photocopying, retrieving documents, preparing binders, and parking claims are reasonably necessary for the conduct of the litigation. Westlaw expenses, however, are specifically prohibited pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(b)(2).  (See Ladas v. California State Auto. Ass’n (1993) 19 Cal. App. 4th 761, 776.)  Thus, the Court will not include this cost in the award.

Accordingly, costs are granted in the reduced amount of $680.33.