Judge Mark A. Young, Case Number: 20SMCV01638, Date: 2023-10-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 20SMCV01638, Date: 2023-10-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20SMCV01638 Hearing Date: December 8, 2023 Dept: M

CASE NAME: Culver City BBT LLC v. Safavi

CASE NO.: 20SMCV01638

MOTION: Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

HEARING DATE: 12/8/2023

Legal Standard

With respect to attorney fees and costs, unless they are specifically provided for by statute (e.g., CCP §§ 1032, et seq.), the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.¿(CCP § 1021.) The prevailing party on a contract, which specifically provides for attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the agreement, is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to other costs.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a); CCP §§ 1032, 1033.5(a)(10)(A).)¿The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine the prevailing party and shall fix, as an element of the costs of suit, the reasonable attorney fees.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a), (b).)¿Any notice of motion to claim attorney fees as an element of costs under shall be served and filed before or at the same time the memorandum of costs is served and filed; if only attorney fees are claimed as costs, the notice of motion shall be served and filed within the time specified in CRC 3.1700 for filing a memorandum of costs.¿(CRC 3.1702; Gunlock Corp. v. Walk on Water, Inc. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1303, fn. 1.)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.)

In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.¿(Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)¿General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Ibid.)

Analysis

Plaintiff requests $19,570.00 in attorneys’ fees. There is no dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action. Furthermore, there is no dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to contractual attorneys’ fees. This action relates to a breach of a lease agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant. (See Ex. B.) The Lease states in Paragraph 36 that in the event of a lawsuit regarding enforcement of the lease agreement, the parties agree the losing party shall pay to the prevailing party its costs and attorney’s fees.

Plaintiff’s counsel claims 52.2 hours spent pursuing this action at rates of $450.00 and $350.00 per hour. (See Nussbaum Decl., Ex. C.) Nussbaum performed 13.7 hours of work in this matter at $450 per hour. Uss performed 1.2 hours of work in this matter at $350 per hour. Stillman performed 29 hours of work in this matter at $350 per hour. Gina Nalbandian presumably spent 3.5 hours at $350 per hour. Nussbaum anticipates an additional 5.5 hours of work to respond to any opposition to this motion and appear for hearing on the motion.

The Court previously found that the initially submitted declarations did not provide substantial evidence. The Court continued the hearing to allow the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the issue. In response to this request, Plaintiff provided supplemental declarations from counsel Uss, Nussbaum and Stillman. The supplemental declarations provide substantial evidence of counsels’ background, education and experience. Thus, the Court now has substantive evidence of the reasonable and fair value of their services. Based on the declarations, the Court concurs that counsel Uss, Nussbaum and Stillman’s reduced rates of $350.00 are reasonable in light of their experience and the prevailing rates for attorneys with similar experience and qualifications in the Los Angeles area.

However, Plaintiff did not provide any declaration from Nalbandian. Instead, Nussbaum provides that her billing rate is $350.00 and was admitted to the California bar in 2019. (Supp. Nussbaum Decl., ¶ 4.) In light of this information, the Court will set her rate to a reasonable rate for an attorney with less than three years’ experience.

Using the lodestar method, the Court finds that a reasonable fee in this case would be $17,820.00. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED in the reduced total amount of $17,820.00.