Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 21SMCV00021, Date: 2022-08-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21SMCV00021    Hearing Date: August 18, 2022    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           Lighthouse Brooks LLC v. Affinity House Inc.

CASE NO.:                21SMCV00021

MOTION:                  Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

HEARING DATE:   8/18/2022

Legal Standard

With respect to attorney fees and costs, unless they are specifically provided for by statute (e.g., CCP §§ 1032, et seq.), the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.¿(CCP § 1021.) The prevailing party on a contract, which specifically provides for attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the agreement, is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to other costs.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a); CCP §§ 1032, 1033.5(a)(10)(A).)¿The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine the prevailing party and shall fix, as an element of the costs of suit, the reasonable attorney fees.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a), (b).)¿Any notice of motion to claim attorney fees as an element of costs under shall be served and filed before or at the same time the memorandum of costs is served and filed; if only attorney fees are claimed as costs, the notice of motion shall be served and filed within the time specified in CRC 3.1700 for filing a memorandum of costs.¿(CRC 3.1702; Gunlock Corp. v. Walk on Water, Inc. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1303, fn. 1.) 

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.) 

In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.¿(Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)¿General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Ibid.) 

Analysis

Service

The motion was validly served on multiple counsel of record via electronic service. (See CRC Rule 2.251(c)(3); CCP §1010.6.)

Continuance Request

Plaintiff requests a 45-day continuance. Plaintiff does not provide specific facts demonstrating good cause. Mr. Richards declares that one of Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Perry, passed away and that he was appointed to cover for Mr. Perry. (Richards Decl., ¶ 3.)  Mr. Richards further “recently” learned that co-counsel of record have not been responsive, and not filed an opposition to this motion. (Id., ¶ 4.) Counsel also declares that co-counsel’s offices are non-responsive to his requests for the client file, and that he cannot represent Plaintiff effectively without the client file. (Id., ¶¶ 5-6.) Plaintiff thus acknowledges that they were effectively served with the notice of this motion yet failed to file a substantive opposition. This general declaration -- silent on the critical dates and critical information -- fails to show reasonable diligence on the part of Plaintiff’s counsel of record or Plaintiff.   For instance, the declaration fails to explain why counsel of record Wayne Abb, Caroline Gill, or Isaac Aba did not file a timely opposition, or when Mr. Richards first began to “cover” for Mr. Perry. Without this information, the Court cannot assess the reasonableness of Mr. Richards’ request for a continuance.

Merits

Defendant requests $67,440.00 in attorneys’ fees.  Defendant is the prevailing party and the operative Lease permits attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party.  Specifically, the Lease provides at paragraph 36: “ATTORNEY FEES: In any action or proceeding arising out of this Agreement, the prevailing party between Landlord and Tenant shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs, collectively not to exceed $1,000 (or $100,000), except as provided in paragraph 35A.” (O’Neill Decl., Ex.A, p. 6, ¶36.)

Counsel claims 74.6 hours by Kevin Hermansen at the rate of $450 per hour, 21.4 hours by Eric M. Post at the rate of $450 per hour, and 40.4 hours by Daniel J. Bramzon at the rate of $600 per hour. This would be a total of 136.4 hours. Each counsel verifies these hours and rates. With this evidence, and considering the record of the action, Defendant demonstrates that it incurred reasonable attorneys’ fees in the requested amount of $67,440.00. The burden is therefore on Plaintiff to make specific objections. As noted, Plaintiff did not provide a substantive opposition.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED in the requested amount.