Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 21SMCV00021, Date: 2022-09-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21SMCV00021    Hearing Date: September 8, 2022    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           Lighthouse Brooks LLC v. Affinity House Inc.

CASE NO.:                21SMCV00021

MOTION:                  Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

HEARING DATE:   8/18/2022

 

 

Legal Standard

 

With respect to attorney fees and costs, unless they are specifically provided for by statute (e.g., CCP §§ 1032, et seq.), the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.¿(CCP § 1021.) The prevailing party on a contract, which specifically provides for attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the agreement, is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to other costs.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a); CCP §§ 1032, 1033.5(a)(10)(A).)¿The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine the prevailing party and shall fix, as an element of the costs of suit, the reasonable attorney fees.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a), (b).)¿Any notice of motion to claim attorney fees as an element of costs under shall be served and filed before or at the same time the memorandum of costs is served and filed; if only attorney fees are claimed as costs, the notice of motion shall be served and filed within the time specified in CRC 3.1700 for filing a memorandum of costs.¿(CRC 3.1702; Gunlock Corp. v. Walk on Water, Inc. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1303, fn. 1.) 

 

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.) 

 

In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.¿(Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)¿General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Ibid.) 

 

 

Analysis

 

Service and Supplemental Opposition/Reply

 

The motion was validly served on multiple counsel of record via electronic service. (See CRC Rule 2.251(c)(3); CCP §1010.6.) 

 

The Court granted Plaintiff an extension to file a substantive opposition to the motion.  Plaintiff filed such an opposition and Defendants subsequently filed a reply to that opposition.  The Court notes that the majority of Plaintiff’s opposition seeks to relitigate the Court’s granting of Defendants’ summary judgment motion.  That ruling is on appeal, however, and the Court will not address the due process and arguments raised by Plaintiff. 

 

Merits

 

Defendant requests $67,440.00 in attorneys’ fees along with $2,490 in fees spent responding to the supplemental opposition for a total of $69,930.  Defendant is the prevailing party and the operative Lease permits attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party.  Specifically, the Lease provides at paragraph 36: “ATTORNEY FEES: In any action or proceeding arising out of this Agreement, the prevailing party between Landlord and Tenant shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs, collectively not to exceed $1,000 (or $100,000), except as provided in paragraph 35A.” (O’Neill Decl., Ex.A, p. 6, ¶36.)

 

Counsel claims 78.8 hours by Kevin Hermansen at the rate of $450 per hour, 21.4 hours by Eric M. Post at the rate of $450 per hour, and 41.4 hours by Daniel J. Bramzon at the rate of $600 per hour. This would be a total of 141.6 hours. Each counsel verifies these hours and rates. With this evidence, and considering the record of the action, Defendant demonstrates that it incurred reasonable attorneys’ fees in the requested amount of $69,930.00.

 

In their supplemental opposition, Plaintiff argues that the requested fees are outrageous and excessive, were for unrelated matters, and included block billed time.  “Block billing occurs when ‘a block of time [is assigned] to multiple tasks rather than itemizing the time spent on each task.’  (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 26.)” (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 279.)  While Plaintiff identifies a few time entries in support of this argument, the Court finds that the billed matters were all related to this case, and sufficiently clear and compensable. 

   

Finally, based upon the Court’s experience with the case and the litigation involved in bringing this matter to trial readiness, the Court concludes that the requested fees are reasonable and appropriate.  (See East West Bank v. Rio School Dist., (2015) 235 Cal. App. 4th 742, 750 [“[a] trial court may award fees solely on the basis of the experience and knowledge of the trial judge.”]; Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enterprises, Inc., (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 215, 227 [“award for attorney fees may be made in some instances solely on the basis of the experience and knowledge of the trial judge without the need to consider any evidence.”].)  Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED in the requested amount.