Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 21SMCV00021, Date: 2024-08-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21SMCV00021 Hearing Date: August 9, 2024 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Lighthouse
Brooks LLC v. Affinity House Inc.
CASE NO.: 21SMCV00021
MOTION: Motion
for Attorneys’ Fees
HEARING DATE: 8/9/2024
Legal
Standard
With respect to attorney fees
and costs, unless they are specifically provided for by statute (e.g., CCP §§
1032, et seq.), the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and
counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.¿(CCP
§ 1021.) The prevailing party on a contract, which specifically provides for
attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the agreement, is entitled to
reasonable attorney fees in addition to other costs.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a); CCP
§§ 1032, 1033.5(a)(10)(A).)¿The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall
determine the prevailing party and shall fix, as an element of the costs of
suit, the reasonable attorney fees.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a), (b).)¿Any notice of
motion to claim attorney fees as an element of costs under shall be served and
filed before or at the same time the memorandum of costs is served and filed;
if only attorney fees are claimed as costs, the notice of motion shall be
served and filed within the time specified in CRC 3.1700 for filing a
memorandum of costs.¿(CRC 3.1702; Gunlock Corp. v. Walk on Water, Inc.
(1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1303, fn. 1.)
“It is well established that
the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to
the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the
absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo
(1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California
ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours
reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v.
Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[A]
computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is
fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin
v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar
figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the
case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services
provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing
factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors
the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s
services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48,
fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar
include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the
skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the
litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent
nature of the fee award.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 266, 271.)
In challenging attorney fees as
excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the
challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient
argument and citations to the evidence.¿(Premier Medical Management Systems,
Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550,
564.)¿General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or
unrelated do not suffice. (Ibid.)
Analysis
Defendant Affinity House Inc. moves
for an award attorneys’ fees against Plaintiff Lighthouse Brooks LLC incurred
on appeal in the amount of $74,502.75.
In this unlawful detainer action, the
Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in Defendant’s
favor on December 22, 2021. Lighthouse appealed the judgment. The appellate
court affirmed the judgment, finding that Affinity established its affirmative
defense as a matter of law. Following the appeal, Affinity moved for attorney
fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717. The Court granted the motion, finding
that Affinity was entitled to $69,930.00 in fees under the lease agreement. The
Court amended the judgment on September 14, 2022. Lighthouse appealed again,
which was also denied in an unpublished decision. Defendant is the prevailing
party on the second appeal, and now seeks fees associated with the second appeal.
Defendant demonstrates an initial lodestar amount of $49,668.50 and requests a
multiplier of 1.5.
The fee request is subject to a
contractual cap. The lease provides: “ATTORNEY FEES: In any action or
proceeding arising out of this Agreement, the prevailing party between
Landlord and Tenant shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs, collectively
not to exceed $1,000 (or $100,000), except as provided in paragraph 35A.” (Lease,
at p. 6, ¶ 36, emphasis added.) The fee cap would facially apply to the instant
request. As defined by Defendant’s authorities below, the term “action or
proceeding” would include the entirety of this lawsuit, including the subject
appeal.
Defendant argues that an appeal
should be considered a separate “action or proceeding” from an underlying
unlawful detainer lawsuit. The Court is not persuaded that an appeal would be a
separate “action or proceeding” arising out of the agreement. Defendant’s
authorities suggest that an appeal should be included in the definition of “action
or proceeding.” (See American Corporate Security, Inc. v. Su (2013) 220
Cal.App.4th 38, 46 [Courts generally view “action” as synonymous with
“lawsuit.”]; People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. Speedee Oil Change
Systems, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 424, 430 [“We agree with interveners
this is a broad provision which includes the contractual right to attorney fees
incurred on appeal.”]; PROCEEDING, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)
[proceeding defined as “1. The regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit,
including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of
judgment. 2. Any procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or
agency. 3. An act or step that is part of a larger action. 4. The business
conducted by a court or other official body; a hearing…]; see also Edwin E.
Bryant, The Law of Pleading Under the Codes of Civil Procedure 3–4 (2d ed.
1899) [“‘Proceeding’ is a word much used to express the business done in courts…[i]t
is more comprehensive than the word ‘action,’ but it may include in its general
sense all the steps taken or measures adopted in the prosecution or defense of
an action, including the pleadings and judgment. As applied to actions, the
term ‘proceeding’ may include — (1) the institution of the action; (2) the
appearance of the defendant; (3) all ancillary or provisional steps, such as
arrest, attachment of property, garnishment, injunction, writ of ne exeat; (4)
the pleadings; (5) the taking of testimony before trial; (6) all motions made
in the action; (7) the trial; (8) the judgment; (9) the execution; (10)
proceedings supplementary to execution, in code practice; (11) the taking of
the appeal or writ of error; (12) the remittitur, or sending back of the record
to the lower court from the appellate or reviewing court; (13) the
enforcement of the judgment, or a new trial, as may be directed by the court of
last resort”, emphasis added]; but see Nash v. Aprea (2023) 96 Cal. App.
5th 21 [$1,000 cap applied to underlying default judgment against residential
landlord but did not bar tenants' recovery of postjudgment costs for $27,721.00
in attorney fees associated with enforcing the judgment under CCP section 685.040].)
The Court finds no ambiguity on the
meaning of “action or proceeding” as necessarily including any appeal of a judgment
to an action. The plain meaning of the above clause is clear: a prevailing
party may collectively recover up to $100,000.00 in an action or proceeding arising
out of the Lease. Defendant’s proffered interpretation would require the Court
to ignore the term “collectively.” Thus, the Court can only award Defendant,
who is the prevailing party, up to $100,000.00 “collectively” in this “action
or proceeding.”
As noted, Defendant has recovered $69,930.00
in fees from this “action or proceeding”. Defendant may therefore only recover $30,070.00
in fees. Defendant demonstrates that it incurred at least that amount of
reasonable attorneys’ fees. As to any
potential fees recovered by Plaintiff in a separate unlawful detainer action,
that would not be a basis to offset this award.
Furthermore, whether the lease was later forfeited in that action has no
bearing on the lease’s validity for the purpose of this motion.
Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED
in the reduced amount of $30,070.00.