Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 21SMCV00716, Date: 2023-12-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21SMCV00716    Hearing Date: December 14, 2023    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           SMC Specialty Finance, LLC v. Han Sanping, et al.

CASE NO.:                21SMCV00716

MOTION:                 Motion for Alternative Service or Service by Publication

HEARING DATE:   12/13/2023

 

Legal Standard

 

Alternative Service

 

Where no law exists for the service of summons in a particular action, the court may direct that summons be served in a manner which is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the party to be served and that proof of such service be made as prescribed by the court.” (Code Civ. Pro., §413.30.)

 

Service by Publication

 

“A summons may be served by publication if upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the court in which the action is pending that the party to be served cannot with reasonable diligence be served in another manner specified in this article and that either (1) a cause of action exists against the party upon whom service is to be made or he or she is a necessary or proper party to the action; or (2) the party to be served has or claims an interest in real or personal property in this state that is subject to the jurisdiction of the court or the relief demanded in the action consists wholly or in part in excluding the party from any interest in the property.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.50, subd. (a).)   

  

“If a defendant's address is ascertainable, a method of service superior to publication must be employed, because constitutional principles of due process of law, as well as the authorizing statute, require that service by publication be utilized only as a last resort.” (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 749, fn. 5.) The means of service described in sections 415.10 through 415.40 make service by publication unnecessary except where a defendant's whereabouts and his dwelling house or usual place of abode, etc. cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence.” (Ibid.) The term “reasonable diligence” denotes a thorough, systematic investigation and inquiry conducted in good faith by the party or his agent or attorney. (Ibid.) Several honest attempts to learn defendant's whereabouts or his address by inquiry of relatives, and by investigation of appropriate city and telephone directories, [voter registries, and assessor's office property indices situated near the defendant's last known location], generally are sufficient. (Ibid.) These are the likely sources of information, and consequently must be searched before resorting to service by publication. (Ibid.) Before allowing a plaintiff to resort to service by publication, the courts necessarily require him to show exhaustive attempts to locate the defendant, for it is generally recognized that service by publication rarely results in actual notice.”  (Ibid.)

 

The plaintiff must establish reasonable diligence via the testimony of an individual with personal knowledge of the efforts to serve the defendant.  (Olvera v. Olvera (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 32, 42; Donel, Inc. v. Badalian (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 327, 333 [“the question is simply whether [plaintiff] took those steps which a reasonable person who truly desired to give notice would have taken under the circumstances”].)  Likewise, a plaintiff must establish that a cause of action exists against the defendant via the testimony of an individual with personal knowledge of the underlying facts.  (Harris v. Cavasso¿(1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 723, 726.) 

 

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

 

SMC Specialty Finance requests judicial notice of (1) Declaration of Jianu Han in support of Defendants and Cross-Complainants Zhengfu Pictures Ltd. and Beijing Zhumeng Qiming Culture & Art Co. Ltd.’s Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction; and (2) Joint Status Report re: Service of Process on Defendants and Cross-Defendants Alex Zhang aka Xi Zhang and Golden Title Investments Ltd. and Defendant Han Sanping.  A court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records. (Dwan v. Dixon (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 260, 265.) Thus, the requests are granted.

 

Analysis

 

SMC asserts that a cause of action exists against Zhang because he executed the guarantee by which he agreed to guarantee the debt of defendant Golden Title Investments Limited and that he forged the signature of Zhengfu’s director Han Jianu. In support, SMC submits the declaration of Gary Gaskin, CEO and general counsel of SMC. (Decl. Gaskin, ¶ 3.) SMC also submits the declaration of Han Jiansu. (Request for Judicial Notice 1, Ex. 5, ¶¶ 28-34.) Thus, a cause of action exists against Zhang.

 

On November 2, 2023, SMC moved for alternative service and in the alternate, service by publication to effect service on Alex Zhang (“Zhang”). As a preliminary matter, the Hague Convention applies because the evidence submitted supports that Zhang resides in China, and China is a signatory to the Hague Convention. (Code Civ. Pro., § 413.10, subd. (c); Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638; Decl. Gorham, ¶ 2, Ex. 4.) The Hague Convention has its own service requirements. (Denlinger v. Chinadotcom Corp. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1399.) Thus, a law exists for the service of summons in the instant action, and alternative service cannot be granted.  SMC tried to serve Zhang by submitting the summons and complaint to the Chinese central authority on October 24, 2022, for it to serve Zhang. (Decl. Ingalls, ¶ 10.) Service was attempted, and it was rejected. (Id., ¶ 15, Ex. 2.) The Court notes that the evidence submitted supports that Zhang was the one who rejected service. As the service document states, “The recipient refused to sign documents.” (Ibid.)  Of note, Zhang did accept service of the cross-complaint at the same address.  (RJN, Ex. 6.)

 

The Convention does not apply when parties have agreed to waive formal service of process in favor of a specified type of notification. (Rockefeller Tech. Invs. (Asia) VII v. Changzhou SinoType Tech. Co. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 125, 145.)  Here, as part of the signed Continuing Guarantee Agreement, Zhang waived the Hague Convention service requirements and stipulated to service by an process agent. (Decl. Raskin, ¶ 2, Ex. 3, ¶ 26.) Thus, the Hague convention is not applicable in this situation.  Paragraph 26 states, in relevant part:

 

Guarantor hereby irrevocably designates Jake Seal as the designee and agent of the Guarantor (the “Process Agent”) to receive, for and on behalf of Guarantor, service of process in any legal action or proceeding with respect to this Guaranty Agreement, with service to be effectuated in any manner consistent with California law. Nothing herein shall preclude service of process upon Guarantor’s duly appointed registered agent.

 

            Because no other law exists for the service of summons in the instant action, service must be either on the agreed upon Process Agent or by one of the methods of service authorized under California law. The Court would require that SMC first attempt service through the agreed upon agent, Seal.  If that is unsuccessful or impossible, service by publication would be an authorized method. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.50).

 

SMC also requests authorization to serve Zhang via email.  The Hague Convention does not prohibit service by e-mail in China.  Moreover, numerous courts in other jurisdictions have authorized service via e-mail to parties residing in China.  (See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Pengyu Bldg. Materials, 2023 WL 4131609 at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 22, 2023)(“this Court and other courts have concluded that email service on individuals located in China is not prohibited by the Hague Convention or by any other international agreement”); Dolls Kill, Inc. v. Yunye Apparel Retail Ltd., 2023 WL 6192699, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2023)(permitting service by e-mail on Chinese defendant and holding “The Hague Service Convention does not prohibit service by email.”)

 

Federal courts have interpreted Code of Civil Procedure section 413.30 as authorizing service by e-mail where e-mail service “is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the party to be served, particularly where there is evidence that the defendant is evading service.”  (Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Shaitor, 2018 WL 3109398, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2018).  There is evidence that Zhang is evading service.  Hague Convention service was rejected because Zhang rejected service of the documents – even though he earlier accepted service of the cross-complaint at the same address.  Moreover, the evidence demonstrates that Zhang has responded to e-mails at the identified e-mail address.  Thus, service at this address is reasonably likely to provide notice to Zhang of the complaint. 

 

For these reasons, the Court orders the following.  Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, SMC may first attempt service through the Process Agent, Jake Seal.  If that is unsuccessful, the Court authorizes service via email.  The Court will also discuss the potential for email service with the parties at the hearing.

 

For these reasons, the motion is GRANTED.  SMC may serve Zhang by the Process Agent, and if that is unsuccessful, through publication.