Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 21SMCV00789, Date: 2023-02-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21SMCV00789 Hearing Date: February 23, 2023 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Militello,
et al., v. VFARM 1509 Inc., et al.
CASE NO.: 21SMCV00789
MOTION: Motion to Compel Deposition/Motion
for Protective Order
HEARING DATE: 2/23/2023
Legal
Standard
Service of a proper deposition
notice obligates a party or “party-affiliated” witness (officer, director,
managing agent or employee of party) to attend and testify, as well as produce
any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing for inspection
and copying. (CCP § 2025.280(a).) If, after service of a deposition notice, a
party deponent fails to appear, testify, or produce documents or tangible
things for inspection without having served a valid objection under Code of
Civil Procedure § 2025.410, the deposing party may move for an order compelling
attendance, testimony, and production. (CCP § 2025.450(a).) The motion must be
accompanied by a meet and confer declaration, or, when a party deponent fails
to attend the deposition, the motion must also be accompanied by a declaration
stating that the moving party has contacted the party deponent to inquire about
the nonappearance. (CCP § 2025.450(b)(2).)
A motion to compel production
of documents described in a deposition notice must be accompanied by a showing
of good cause. (CCP § 2025.450(b)(1).) In other words, the moving party must
provide evidence (generally in the form of declarations) showing specific facts
justifying inspection of the documents described in the notice. Courts
liberally construe good cause in favor of discovery where facts show the
documents are necessary for trial preparation.
The motion to compel must be
“made no later than 60 days after the completion of the record of the
deposition.” (CCP § 2025.480(b).) This time limit also applies to motions based
on a deposition subpoena for production of documents or a business records
subpoena. The 60-day time limit runs from the date objections are served
because the deposition record is then complete. (Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard
Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1192.)
For discovery purposes, information is
relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case,
preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court
(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) Admissibility is not the test, and
information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to
admissible evidence. (Ibid.) These rules are applied liberally in favor
of discovery and, contrary to popular belief, fishing expeditions are permissible
in some cases. (Ibid.)
Analysis
Plaintiff moves to compel defendant
Joel Athey (“Athey”) to appear for his deposition within 10 days. Plaintiffs
properly served an Amended Notice of Deposition on December 28, 2022.
(Militello Decl. ¶ 8, Exh. H.) Athey objected to the Amended Notice, and
thereafter failed to appear for deposition on January 12, 2023. However, Defendant
failed to provide a “valid objection” under § 2025.410(a). Such objections are
limited to errors and irregularities in the deposition notice, e.g., necessary
contents of the deposition notice, how notice was served, where the deposition
is to take place, etc. When the deposition of a party is properly noticed, the
noticed party must appear. (CCP § 2025.280(a).) Serving objections based on
convenience of counsel or the deponent does not prevent the deposition from
going forward. Moreover, it appears that
Plaintiffs did attempt to accommodate the deponent’s and counsel’s schedule, in
line with their civility obligations. (See Millitello Decl., ¶¶ 4-11, Exs. C-K.)
Athey did not file a motion to quash or request for a protective order until
February 8, 2023, after the noticed deposition. Strictly speaking, Antey was
obligated to appear at the noticed deposition. (CCP § 2025.280(a).)
For the sake of convenience, and
despite its untimeliness to avoid the noticed deposition, the Court will also
consider the merits of Athey’s motion for a protective order regarding this
deposition. Athey claims the production of documents would necessarily include
private and confidential information.
The party asserting a privacy right must establish a
legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.
(Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35-37.) When
a person objects on the grounds of privacy, he or she must demonstrate
disclosure of the requested information would invade a legally protected
privacy interest. (See Alch v. Superior
Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1423.) The party
seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important
countervailing interest disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may
identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective
measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. (Hill,
supra, at 37–40.)
Courts must carefully
balance a right of privacy against the interest in having just litigation. (Pioneer
Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 371.) If
there is a serious invasion of a constitutional right to privacy, the party
seeking the evidence must establish that the information sought is not only
essential and directly relevant, but also that this information could not be
discovered through less intrusive means. (See Williams v. Superior Court
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552; Allen v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d
447, 449.)
Athey’s concerns regard two
categories of documents:
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:
DOCUMENTS sufficient to show (i) YOUR assets and liabilities as of the present
date and (ii) YOUR income and expenses for calendar years 2019, 2020, and 2021.
For purposes of this request, “assets” and “income” include, without
limitation, any beneficial interests YOU hold as a beneficiary of any trust.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: All
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO any complaint filed against YOU from 2015 to the present.
For purposes of this request, “complaint” includes, without limitation, any
State Bar complaint, internal HR complaint, and Arbitration.
(Samani Decl., ¶ 6;
Exh. 5.)
The Court
agrees that Request no. 2 poses a serious intrusion on Athey’s objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. Athey
demonstrates that the request is overbroad, and impermissibly delves into
important financial privacy rights. While some of Athey’s personal finances
might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence relevant to this action,
this does not mean that Plaintiffs may delve into all of his “assets and
liabilities” and all his “income and expenses” from 2019-2021. This broad
category of financial documents is not narrowly tailored. Given this broadness,
the information sought is not essential to the resolution of this action, or
directly relevant. Further, it facially violates Civil Code section 3295(c)’s
prohibition on financial condition discovery. Thus, the Court will not require
Athey to respond to Request no. 2.
As to Request no. 5, disciplinary
proceedings initiated with the State Bar of California are presumptively
confidential and privileged unless they are made public through the filing of
formal charges. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 6094(a).) Accordingly, Athey has a
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the non-public State Bar
complaints. Therefore, the Court will not require Athey to respond to this
category insofar as it seeks non-public State Bar complaints. Athey does not
provide for a privacy right to other responsive documents. Therefore, as to Category 5, it is granted in
part.
Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s motion to compel Athey’s deposition is GRANTED as modified. Athey
is to be deposed within 10 days of this order at a mutually agreeable and
reasonable time and location.
Sanctions
are mandatory, unless the party subject to the sanction acted with substantial
justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction
unjust. (CCP § 2025.480(j).) Athey did not timely file his motion for a
protective order. Therefore, Athey’s conduct necessitated this motion. On
balance, the Court does not find that Athey was substantially justified in
failing to appear at the deposition. As such, sanctions are justified against
Athey and counsel of record.
That said, Plaintiff, in pro per,
failed to notice any particular amount of sanctions in the notice. Instead, the
request is buried in her declaration. Plaintiff declares that she spent 21.5
hours on preparing this motion and on related meet and confer efforts, at a
rate of $300 per hour, and incurred filing and service costs of approximately
$112.25, for a total of $6,562.25. However, “an attorney litigating in propria
persona may not be awarded monetary discovery sanctions based on compensation
for time and effort expended as a result of a misuse of the discovery process.”
(Argaman v. Ratan (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1180.) Moreover, the Court
would find the sanctions excessive, given the relative simplicity of the
motion. Accordingly, the Court will grant costs in the amount of $112.25.