Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 21SMCV01032, Date: 2023-06-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21SMCV01032 Hearing Date: January 24, 2024 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Haim, et al.,
v. Laaly, et al.
CASE NO.: 21SMCV01032
MOTION: Motion
for Summary Judgment & Adjudication
HEARING DATE: 1/24/2024
Legal
Standard
A party may move for summary
judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit
or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (CCP, § 437c(a).) “The
purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to
cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their
allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)
“A party may move for summary adjudication as
to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative
defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the
party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no
affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an
affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a
claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that
one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or
plaintiffs.” (CCP, § 437c(f)(1).) If a party seeks summary
adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request
must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior
Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.) “[A] party may move for
summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than
punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action,
affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to” subdivision (t).
(CCP, § 437c(t).)
To
prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. (CCP, § 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the
evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the
court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other
evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th
833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of
material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of
fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…”
(Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other
words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment
and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson
v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if
adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of
credibility,” except when a material fact is the witness’s state of
mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s]
affirmation thereof.” (CCP, § 437c(e).)
Once
the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party
“to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that
cause of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish
anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated
facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his
favor.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)
“The pleadings play a key role in a summary
judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment
is to delimit the scope of the issues and to frame the outer measure
of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity
National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations
and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for
summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of
liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need
not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the
pleadings.” (Ibid.)
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.
(Evid. Code § 452.)
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants’ objections are immaterial to
the resolution of the motion and therefore will not be ruled upon. (CCP §437c(q).)
Analysis
Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants Jason
Haim and Amy Goldsmith make two motions for summary adjudication of the first
and second of the causes of action asserted in their Complaint, and each cause
of action (except for the ninth) asserted in Defendants/Cross-Complainants
Noushin Abrishami Laaly and Koroush Cyrus Laaly’s cross-complaint.
Plaintiffs’ MSJ/MSA
Plaintiffs seek adjudication of the
interrelated quiet title and injunctive relief causes of action because they
contend that there is no dispute that Plaintiffs have an exclusive easement for
yard and landscaping purpose, and Defendants actions were inconsistent with
Plaintiffs’ easement, and unreasonably interfered with Plaintiffs’ use and
enjoyment of the easement.
“An easement is a restricted right to
specific, limited, definable use or activity upon another's property, which
right must be less than the right of ownership.” (Mesnick v. Caton
(1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1248, 1261, italics omitted). “An easement
may be created by (1) an express grant, (2) an express reservation, (3) an
implied grant, (4) an implied reservation, (5) necessity, (6) prescription, (7)
a recorded covenant, (8) dedication, (9) condemnation, (10) estoppel, or (11) a
court decision . . ..” (Main Street
Plaza v. Cartwright & Main, LLC (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1053-54.)
“The extent of a servitude is
determined by the terms of the grant.” (Civ. Code § 806.) “It is fundamental
that the language of a grant of an easement determines the scope of the
easement.” (Schmidt v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 223 Cal. App.4th
1489, 1499 [internal citations and punctuation omitted].) “An easement
agreement is subject to the rules of interpretation that apply to contracts. As
with all contracts, the paramount goal of interpreting the writing creating an
easement is to determine the intent of the parties[.]” (Hill v. San Jose
Family Housing Partners, LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 764, 777) [internal
citations and punctuation omitted].) It is “essentially a judicial function to be exercised
according to the generally accepted cannons of interpretation so that the
purposes of the instrument may be given effect[.]” (Parsons v. Bristol
Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2nd 861, 865.)
Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks to quiet title on the grounds that
Defendants claim adverse interests in the Haim Easement. (Compl., ¶¶ 20-22.)
The Complaint also seeks injunctive relief against Defendants wrongful
interference with Plaintiffs’ “exclusive use” of the Haim easement by
threatening litigation against Plaintiffs for using the Haim Easement, and
constructing a fence within the Haim easement to prohibit Plaintiffs from
utilizing the easement for yard and landscaping purposes. (Compl., ¶¶ 24-28.)
The separate statement of
undisputed material facts in support of Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
adjudication (“PUMF”) cite the following material facts: Plaintiffs, by way of
a Grant Deed, are the owners of an exclusive easement for yard and landscaping
purposes (“Haim Easement”). (PUMF 3.) Specifically, the grant sets forth the
terms of the easement as follows: “AN EXCLUSIVE EASEMENT FOR YARD AND
LANDSCAPING PURPOSES OVER [DESCRIPTION OF LOCATION.]” (Compl., ¶ 5.) It is
undisputed that Defendants’ property is currently subject to the Haim Easement.
(PUMF 5.) Plaintiffs assert they have done nothing to forfeit their rights
under the Haim Easement. (PUMF 6.) Plaintiffs state that Defendants have no
superior lien rights. (PUMF 7.) Lastly, Defendants interfered with the Haim
Easement when they placed a lattice fence and barrier and planted three
Bougainvillea plants within the planter in the Haim Easement. (PUMF 9.)
The resolution of
this issue turns on the interpretation of the easement’s terms. Generally, an easement does not
create an exclusive (i.e., possessory or fee simple interest), as it only gives
a nonpossessory and restricted use interest. (McBride v.
Smith (2018) 18
Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173-1174.) “‘An easement is a
restricted right to specific, limited, definable use or activity upon another’s
property which right must be less than the right of ownership.’
[Citation.]” (Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th
697, 702.) “Every incident of ownership not inconsistent with the
easement and the enjoyment of the same is reserved to the owner of the servient
estate.” (Id.) Thus, the owner of a servient estate may make continued
use of the area the easement covers so long as the use does not ‘interfere
unreasonably’ with the easement's purpose. (Id., at 702-703; Inzana v. Turlock Irrigation Dist. Bd. of Directors (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 429, 445.)
Caselaw holds that so-called
“exclusive easements” are disfavored and rare since such easements run against the general definition of easements, and effectively
convey fee simple ownership over the easement land. “[A]n ‘exclusive easement’
is an unusual interest in land; it has been said to amount almost to a
conveyance of the fee. [Citation.] No intention to convey such a complete
interest can be imputed to the owner of the servient tenement in the absence of
a clear indication of such an intention. (Pasadena v. California-Michigan
etc. Co., (1941) 17 Cal.2d 576; Hirshfield v. Schwartz (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 749, 769, fn. 11 [referring to exclusive easements as “rare”].) In contrast to a non-exclusive easement, an exclusive
easement only permits the dominant owner to use the easement area. (Romero
v. Shih, (2022) 78 Cal. App. 5th 326, 349.) Courts have upheld exclusive
easements in situations where the express language of the granting instrument
either uses the phrase “exclusive easement” paired with language which
demonstrated a clear intent to convey an exclusive easement or that the
dominant owner's use necessarily must be exclusive (e.g., an easement for
parking and garage purposes). (Id., citing Gray v. McCormick
(2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1025–1026; Blackmore v. Powell (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 1593, 1599–1600.) Accordingly, an easement is nonexclusive unless it
has been made exclusive by the express terms of the instrument creating it or
the parties have evidenced their clear intent that it is exclusive. (Romero,
supra, 78 Cal. App. 5th at 350.)
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the easement’s terms give rise
to an exclusive easement. This matter is not as clear as in Gray, where
the easement was an “exclusive easement of access, ingress and egress”
which specifically stated “[t]he Easement is created for the benefit of the
Owner of Lot 6” and emphasized that the “[u]se of the Easement by the Owner of
Lot 6 and such Owner's family, guests, tenants and invitees shall be exclusive
. . ..” (Gray, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1025-1026.) “In other words,
the provision repeatedly uses language of exclusivity.” (Id.) Here,
there is no repeated use of exclusivity language or any other
circumstance that would suggest exclusivity.
At a minimum, there is an ambiguity in the Haim Easement as to
whether the instrument provides Plaintiffs with an exclusive easement. Language of an
instrument would be considered ambiguous where the language is “‘“capable of
two or more constructions both of which are reasonable.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Courts
“will not adopt a strained or absurd interpretation in order to create an
ambiguity where none exists[.]”’” (Baldwin v. AAA Northern California,
Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 545, 553.) Where an instrument is ambiguous in its construction, courts must receive
proffered extrinsic evidence that is relevant to show whether the contractual
language is reasonably susceptible to a particular meaning. (Pacific Gas
& E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 39–40.) Such
extrinsic evidence might expose a latent ambiguity when the contract appears
unambiguous on its face. (Id. at 40 & fn. 8.) If no extrinsic evidence is presented, or if the extrinsic
evidence was not in conflict, then the resolution of the ambiguity is a
question of law. (Scheenstra
v. California Dairies, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 370, 389-390.)
Here, the easement provides, in the most generic terms, for an
“exclusive easement for yard and landscaping purposes.” Such language could
mean an easement exclusively in favor of Plaintiffs, or an easement exclusively
for landscaping purposes. If the former interpretation was the intent of the
drafting parties, then they did not convey this intent with a “clear
indication” of their intention. Plaintiffs fail to submit any evidence which
would support their proffered interpretation, beyond the single use of the term
“exclusive.” The easement language does not
express exclusivity in favor of Cross-Defendants, as it did in Gray. In light of the above caselaw, and without any further evidence on
the issue, the Court is not inclined to find a disfavored exclusive easement in
favor of Plaintiffs, which would effectively grant Plaintiffs the property in
fee simple. Thus, the Court will treat the
easement under the traditional, non-exclusive easement rules.
Again, “[w]hether a particular use of [an easement] . . . is an
unreasonable interference is a question of fact for the jury. [Citations.]” (Red
Mountain, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at 354.) Plaintiffs’ evidence of Defendants’
use of their property could be consistent with Plaintiffs’ easement, depending
on the extent of the interference. Plaintiff presents only discovery responses
that Defendants placed a “partial lattice fence and partial barrier” and
planted three Bougainvillea plants within the Haim Easement.” (PUMF 11.)
Plaintiffs do not explain or argue how the partial lattice fence, partial
barriers or three plants within the Haim Easement unreasonably interfered with
Plaintiffs’ use of the easement. (Plt. COE, Exs. E-F.) Notably, Defendants’
responses did not concede the issue of reasonableness. These admissions,
liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party, do not tend to show that
the elements of interference with the easement at issue. Plaintiff
adduces no further evidence to show that Defendants unreasonably interfered
with their use of the landscaping easement. Thus, the Court cannot find that
the presented evidence meets Plaintiffs’ initial burden of proof on this issue.
Cross-Complaints
Cross-Defendants argue that each of
the Cross Complaints’ causes of action fail because the plain language of the
exclusive easement (“an exclusive easement for yard and landscaping purposes”)
provided them with the right to do what they allegedly did wrong: take down and
erect a fence; paint/color a fence/wall gray; remove a small palm tree; and
remove planters and portions of a brick wall. (SACC ¶¶ 18-23.)
Cross-Defendants rely on the same
evidence discussed above. The separate statement of undisputed material facts
in support of Cross-Defendants motion for summary adjudication (“CDUMF”) cite
the following pertinent facts: Cross-Defendants’ property is subject to the
Haim Easement. (CDUMF 3.) Each of the complained-of acts took place on or
within the Haim easement. (CDUMF 4-8.) The Parties do not dispute the language
or ownership of the Haim Easement. (CDUMF 9-11.) Plaintiffs did nothing to
forfeit their right under the Haim Easement. (CDUMF 12.) Cross-Complainants
have no superior lien rights with respect to the Haim Easement. (CDUMF 13.)
Cross-Defendants’ arguments depend
on their categorization of the easement as “exclusive.” As discussed above,
Cross-Defendants do not meet their burden of proof to show that the terms of
the Haim Easement provided for an exclusive easement. Cross-Defendants present no evidence to establish that their acts were reasonable in
light of the easement’s non-exclusive scope. For instance, the
unrebutted allegations hold that Cross-Defendants’ activities within the
easement area were “unreasonable and resulted in destruction of the Easement and
surrounding areas” and wrongfully interfered with Cross-Complainants’ use and
enjoyment of their property. (SACC ¶¶ 34-36.) Cross-Defendants
do not present evidence that the manner in which they removed the fences,
trees or planters was done reasonably and did not create unnecessary damage. Instead,
Cross-Defendants only rely on the fact that their acts are generally related to
landscaping. However, as discussed, Cross-Complainants’ fences, trees or
planters could be permitted under the Cross-Defendant’s easement, so long as
those fences, trees or planters did not “interfere unreasonably” with the
easement's purpose. (Scruby, supra, 37
Cal.App.4th at 702-703.) Thus, Cross-Defendants’ proffered evidence is
insufficient to meet their initial burden of proof.
Accordingly, the
motions are DENIED.