Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 21SMCV01514, Date: 2023-08-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21SMCV01514 Hearing Date: November 22, 2023 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Rainey, v.
Taylor, et al.
CASE NO.: 21SMCV01514
MOTION: Motion
to Compel Compliance
HEARING DATE: 11/22/2023
Legal
Standard
In
the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant’s right to discovery is
broad. “[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if
the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (CCP § 2017.010;
see Davies v. Superior Court
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 301.) “For discovery purposes, information is relevant if
it ‘might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for
trial, or facilitating settlement.’ [Citation] Admissibility is not the test
and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead
to admissible evidence. [Citation] These rules are applied liberally in favor
of discovery.” (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539,
1546.)
If a party
filing a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling
under Sections 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230, 2031.240, and 2031.280 thereafter
fails to permit the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling in accordance
with that party's statement of compliance, the demanding party may move for an
order compelling compliance. (CCP § 2031.320(a).) The court shall impose a
monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully
makes or opposes a motion to compel compliance with a demand, unless it finds
that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or
that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP §
2031.320(b).)
If a timely motion to compel has
been filed, the¿burden is on the responding party¿to justify any objection or
failure fully to answer.¿(Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210,
220–221 [addressing a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories]; Fairmont
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)
Analysis
On September 1, 2023, Defendant
served Requests for Production of Documents (“RPDs”), Set One on Plaintiff,
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2031.010 et seq. (Fisher Decl., ¶ 2, Ex.
A.) These inspection demands comprised RPD Nos. 1 through 20 and called for the
production of documents referenced in, or supporting the allegations of,
Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff served written responses on October 10, 2023.
(Id., ¶ 4, Ex. C.) Simultaneously, Plaintiff produced documents comprising
Bates Nos. PR00001 through PR00703. (Id., ¶ 5.) At issue in this motion is production
for RPD no. 3. This request and response states as follows:
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: All DOCUMENTS identified or
referenced in YOUR COMPLAINT, including but not limited to all deposition
testimony, all DOCUMENTS RELATED TO allegations of payments or transfers of
money, and all DOCUMENTS RELATED TO allegations of transfers of property.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Responding party
objects to this request on the basis that it is overbroad and not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Responding Party
objects to this request on the basis that it fails to reasonably particularize
the category of documents requested. Responding party objects to this request
on the basis that it is vague and ambiguous, as internally inconsistent. As to
documents identified or referenced in the Complaint, Responding party will
produce those responsive documents in her possession, custody or control.
(Id., Ex. C.)
Defense counsel notes that certain
deposition transcripts from the underlying federal case should
have been produced, as the deposition testimony is expressly referenced in the
Complaint. (Compl., ¶¶ 18-20, 25, 28.) This includes the depositions of Cash M.
Jones and Andrew Williams. (Id.) During meet and confer efforts on the instant
motion, Plaintiff indicated that they objected to producing deposition
transcripts and that her agreement to comply only referred to “documents.” Plaintiff
reasoned the request referred to only “deposition testimony” and not
“deposition transcripts,” and the request therefore did seek such transcripts. Plaintiff
reiterates this objection in opposition to this motion. The Court finds this
strained logic unpersuasive.
The requests give a very broad
definition to documents, namely, “used in its customary broad sense and
includes, but is not limited to, any kind of material written, typed,
typewritten, electronic, printed, reproduced, recorded, fixed, or stored in any
medium whatsoever . . ..” Further, RPD no. 3 expressly includes documents that
comprise “all deposition testimony.” It is indisputable that deposition transcripts
are “documents” which comprise “deposition testimony.” The complaint expressly
references the deposition testimony. (Compl., ¶¶ 18-20, 25, 28.) Given the
definitions and the express terms of RPD no. 3, the fact that Plaintiff
referenced specific deposition testimony in her complaint, and that Plaintiff
agreed to produce “responsive documents in her possession, custody or control,”
the subject deposition transcripts should have been produced.
Plaintiff also opposes the motion on
the grounds that Government Code § 69954(d) prohibits a party who has purchased
a transcript from providing or selling a copy or copies to any other party or
person. However, Government Code section 69954 only applies to superior court
transcripts. This section of the California Government Code is
part of Title 8, The Organization of Government and Courts, Chapter 5, The
Superior Courts, Article 9, Official Reporters. This is a statutory scheme that
regulates state court reporters in California superior court. (Gov. Code, §
69941 [“A¿superior court may appoint¿as many¿competent
phonographic¿reporters,¿to be known as official¿reporters of such court, and
such¿official reporters¿pro tempore, as are deemed necessary for the
performance of the duties and the exercise of the powers conferred by law upon
the court and its members.”]; see Burd v. Barkley Court Reporters, Inc.
(2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1042-1050.) Further, the other subdivisions of
section 69954 also reference to transcripts of superior court proceedings. For
instance, subsection (f) refers to a copy of a “transcript on appeal” which
would be a transcript of a superior court proceeding. The underlying action in
which the depositions were taken is Priscilla Rainey v. Jayceon Terrell
Taylor a/k/a “The Game,” Case No. 15 C 6844, D.E. 140 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18,
2016). This is not a California case. Thus, this section would not apply to the
transcripts at hand.
Plaintiff also argues that this
inspection demand improperly seeks information which is equally available to
Defendants. Plaintiff cites no authority that this is a proper objection to an
inspection demand. Further, Plaintiff did not proffer this objection to the
RPD. Plaintiff only objected that the RPD was 1) overbroad; 2) not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; 3) not reasonably
particularized; and 4) vague and ambiguous. Therefore, this objection, to the
extent it could even apply, was waived.
Plaintiff contends that this motion
is moot since Plaintiff produced a “portion” of the deposition transcript. (Dease
Decl., ¶ 10.) However, the request did not ask for a portion of the transcript.
It asked for the entirety of the transcript. Plaintiff fails to explain whether
the entirety of the transcript is under her possession, custody or control. Thus,
the motion is not moot.
Plaintiff must also comply with the
requirements of Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.280(a) by identifying each
document produced with the specific request number to which it responds. Plaintiff
represents that she intends on complying with this request by bookmarking the
request numbers prior to the hearing on this matter. Therefore, it is
undisputed that Plaintiff must also comply with this request.
Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff must produce the deposition transcripts of Cash M. Jones and Andrew
Williams within 5 days.
Defendants also off-handedly
request a trial continuance. Defendants have not met the procedural
requirements for such a motion. (CRC Rule 3.1332.) For instance, the motion
does not even notice any trial continuance. The request placed at the back of
the memorandum for this motion to compel is insufficient. Defendants otherwise do
not substantiate any of the required factors for a continuance. For instance,
Defendants do not show that the belated production would require additional
preparation for trial, justifying a continuance. (Fisher Decl., ¶ 12.) Thus,
this request is not considered further.
SANCTIONS
Here, sanctions are mandatory, as
plaintiff has not justified her failure to produce the sought deposition
transcripts. Defendants request sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel of
record, Janelle Dease, Edward Davis, Jr., and Caroline Herter, in the sum of
$9,450.00. (Fisher Decl., ¶ 13.) Counsel states that they have spent 2.5 hours
attempting to informally resolve the instant motion, 10.5 hours drafting this
motion, and an anticipated 5 hours drafting any reply and appearing at the
hearing of this motion. Counsel has a billing rate of $525 per hour.
The Court finds the requested
sanctions to be inflated and unreasonable in light of the record. The Court
will award sanctions in the reduced, reasonable amount of $2,735.00, inclusive
of costs, against Plaintiff and her counsel of record, jointly and severally.
Sanctions are to be paid to Defendants’ counsel within 30 days.