Judge Mark A. Young, Case 21SMCV01535 2023-04-04 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 21SMCV01535, Date: 2023-04-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21SMCV01535 Hearing Date: April 4, 2023 Dept: M

CASE NO.: 21SMCV01535

MOTION: Motion for Leave to Amend

HEARING DATE: 4/4/2023

Legal Standard

If a party wishes to amend a pleading after an answer has been filed, or after a demurrer has been filed and after the hearing on the demurrer, or if he or she has already amended the pleading as a matter of course, the party must obtain permission from the court before amendment. (CCP §§ 473(a)(1), 576.)

Motions for leave to amend the pleadings are directed to the sound discretion of the court. “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading . . . .” (CCP § 473(a)(1); see CCP § 576.) Policy favors liberally granting leave to amend so that all disputed matters between the parties may be resolved. (See Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) Absent prejudice to the adverse party, the court may permit amendments to the complaint “at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial.” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761 [internal quotes omitted].) Where leave is sought to add entirely new claims, the court may grant leave to amend if the new claims are based on the same general set of facts, and the amendment will not prejudice the opposing party. (Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 600-602; Glaser v. Meyers (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 770, 777 [holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting amendment of complaint, which originally alleged constructive eviction, to allege retaliatory eviction where the new claim was based on the same general set of facts].)

Although denial is rarely justified, a judge has discretion to deny leave to amend if the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party. (Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490). An opposing party is prejudiced where the amendment would necessitate a trial delay along with a loss of critical evidence, added preparation expense, increased burden of discovery, etc. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488 [leave properly denied where plaintiff sought leave on the eve of trial, nearly two years after the complaint was originally filed and gave no explanation for the delay which prejudiced defendant who did not discover or depose many of the witnesses who would support the new allegations and had not marshaled evidence in opposition of the new allegations].)

Procedurally, a motion for leave to amend must state with particularity what allegations are to be amended. Namely, it must state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted and/or added, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(a)(2)-(3).) The motion must be accompanied by a declaration specifying: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(b).) The motion must also be accompanied by the proposed amended pleading, numbered to differentiate it from the prior pleadings or amendments. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(a)(1).) It is within the court’s discretion to require compliance with Rule 3.1324 before granting leave to amend. (Hataishi v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1469.)

Analysis

Plaintiffs Yvette Cinthya Anaya and Robert Ames Zielinski move for leave to file a proposed Second Amended Complaint (SAC). (Seltzer Decl., Ex. 1.) Plaintiffs met the procedural requirements of the motion. Plaintiff provides a copy of the proposed SAC and the effects of the proposed amendments. The proposed SAC (1) corrects the name of Defendant Mahnaz Farzinpour Kamran, individually and as Trustee of the Mahnaz Farzinpour Trust; (2) adds new causes of actions and supporting allegations for the Ninth Cause of Action for Fraud and Deceit, Tenth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Transfer-Actual Fraud, Eleventh Cause of Action for Fraudulent Transfer Constructive Fraud, Twelfth Cause of Action for Negligent Hiring, Training and Supervision, and Thirteenth Cause of Action for Recission; and (3) adds Defendant Jonathan Kamran as a party as to the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth causes of action.

Plaintiffs argue that they acted diligently to bring these amendments based on discovery which occurred in late 2022. In October 2022 through December 2022, Plaintiffs state that the parties took the depositions of Plaintiffs Cinthya Anaya and Robert Zielinksi, along with Defendants Mahnaz Kamran and Jonathan Kamran. In these depositions, Plaintiffs discovered new facts regarding the proposed fraud claims and adding Defendant’s son, Jonathan Kamran, as a party to this case. (Seltzer Decl., ¶2.) Based on the new discovery, Plaintiffs argue that Jonathan Kamran had personal involvement in the maintenance of the property and the purported misrepresentations alleged in the SAC. Plaintiffs also contend that there was a fraudulent transfer of property to Kamran.

Plaintiff also brought this amendment to Defendant’s attention earlier than the filing of this motion. Plaintiffs state that they coordinated with defense counsel and brought this issue to the Court’s attention at the February 9, 2023, Informal Discovery Conference (IDC). (Seltzer Decl., ¶¶5-11.) More specifically, on February 3, 2023, Plaintiffs’ counsel emailed defense counsel regarding amending the operative complaint to add the new causes of action and allegations set forth in Exhibit 1 attached to this motion. (Seltzer Decl., ¶5, Ex. B). According to Plaintiff, defense counsel refused to meet-and-confer regarding the issues for amending the operative Complaint. (Id. ¶ 6.)

On February 9, 2023, the Parties attended the IDC with the Court. (Seltzer Decl., ¶7) Defense counsel stated that Defendant wanted a trial continuance to file a motion for summary judgement. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ counsel also raised issues regarding continuing the trial date so Plaintiffs could file a motion for punitive damages discovery and this instant motion to amend the complaint. (Id.) The Court instructed the parties that they could file a stipulation and order to continue the trial date. (Id.) On February 17, 2023, plaintiffs’ counsel emailed defense counsel a proposed stipulation and order to continue the trial date, which included the fact that Plaintiffs intended to bring this instant motion to amend the complaint. (Seltzer Decl., ¶8, Ex. C). However, defense counsel never responded to the proposed stipulation and order. (Id.)

Plaintiffs argue that they acted diligently as soon as they discovered the new facts to amend the complaint, tried coordinating with defense counsel to resolve the issue without bringing the instant motion, and brought the issue to the Court’s attention as soon as possible at the IDC on February 9, 2023. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs were aware of Kamran, generally, since the inception of this case. However, Plaintiffs claim that they were unaware of his liability in this action until his deposition in November 2022. Thus, at worst, the Plaintiffs’ delay was approximately four months between the discovery of the facts, and the request for leave to amend.

Critically, this delay appears non-prejudicial to Defendant. Defendant does not explain how this four-month delay would have substantively prejudiced herself or the newly proposed defendant. While Plaintiffs could have acted more quickly, this period does not warrant cutting off Plaintiffs from pleading potentially viable causes of action. Defendant argues that this will delay trial and require additional discovery. Notably, the trial date is set for November 27, 2023. Thus, the inclusion of a new defendant would likely delay trial, though this is not certain. Whether another continuance would be necessary from the parties to conduct further discovery may be addressed later. On that note, the Court also agrees that this would likely require additional discovery. However, there is no indication of any substantive prejudice stemming from either the delay of trial or such additional discovery. Thus, in accordance with liberal policy on amendments, the Court is inclined to grant leave to amend.

Defendant argues that the new allegations are generally without merit. Whether or not the substantive allegations fail would need to be addressed in a procedurally proper attack on the SAC, such as a demurrer.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.