Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 21SMCV01662, Date: 2023-03-15 Tentative Ruling


Case Number: 21SMCV01662    Hearing Date: March 15, 2023    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           Clayton v. Malibu West Swimming Club, et al.

CASE NO.:                21SMCV01662

MOTION:                  Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)

HEARING DATE:   3/15/2023

 

BACKGROUND

 

This case arose out of a neighbor/homeowners association (HOA) dispute. On November 8, 2018, the Woosley Fire destroyed Plaintiffs Samantha and Royce Clayton’s home at 5924 Pasea Canyon Dr., Malibu, CA 90265. This address was subject to certain conditions, covenants and restrictions (CC&Rs) enforced by Defendant Malibu West Swimming Club. Since then, Plaintiffs obtained plans and permits for their replacement home, a modest single-story residence which has been approved by the City of Malibu. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants have prevented the Claytons from rebuilding their home.

 

Legal Standard

 

      Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 permits the Court to strike causes of action arising from an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of free speech or petition, unless the plaintiff establishes that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.  “The anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a defendant’s constitutionally protected conduct from the undue burden of frivolous litigation.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393.) “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.” (Id. at 384.)

 

            “Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 384, citation omitted.) The California Supreme Court has “described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’” (Id. at 384-385 [citations omitted].)

 

Analysis

 

Timeliness

 

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(f) requires that a special motion to strike be filed within 60 days of service of complaint, or later with court permission. Here, the motion was served one day late. Plaintiffs' counsel agreed to an enlargement of time to respond to the Verified Complaint on or before March 10, 2022. (Reicheneder Decl., Ex. 2.) However, Howland filed the motion on March 11, 2022. As such, the Court may deny the motion as untimely.  The Court also has the discretion to consider the motion.

 

Given that the motion was only a single day late, with a notice period of over a year, and the apparent lack of prejudice, the Court will consider the motion.

 

Evidentiary Objections

 

            Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection to the Supplemental Howland Declaration (filed March 7, 2023, are SUSTAINED.

 

The First Amended Complaint

 

Plaintiffs impermissibly filed an amended complaint during the notice period of this anti-SLAPP motion. A plaintiff cannot avoid an anti-SLAPP motion by amending the complaint before the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion. (See Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1280.) Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion in relation to the original pleading.

 

First Prong

 

Defendant Elizabeth Howland moves to strike the entire complaint or each cause of action asserted against her.  Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(e) defines protected acts as the following: 1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; 2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; 3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; or 4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.

 

“ ‘[P]ublic interest’ within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute has been broadly defined to include, in addition to government matters, ‘ “private conduct that impacts a broad segment of society and/or that affects a community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity.” ’  (Ruiz v. Harbor View Community Assn. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1456, quoting Du Charme v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 107, 115.) “[I]n cases where the issue is not of interest to the public at large, but rather to a limited, but definable portion of the public (a private group, organization, or community), the constitutionally protected activity must, at a minimum, occur in the context of an ongoing controversy, dispute or discussion, such that it warrants protection by a statute that embodies the public policy of encouraging participation in matters of public significance.” (Id. at 119.)

 

“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.”  (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062.)  “‘[T]he defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’” (Id. at 1063.) “‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’” (Id.) “Instead, the focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’” (Id.) “‘The only means specified in section 425.16 by which a moving defendant can satisfy that [‘arising from’] requirement is to demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e). . . .’” (Id.) “In short, in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Id.)

 

In this matter, Howland asserts that the only action alleged in the complaint concerning Howland is that, after the Claytons erected story poles which indicated an increase in height, an enlargement in size, and an altered new structural footprint different from the Claytons’ home before the fire, Howland made a complaint to the Board about the Plaintiffs’ proposed construction without first making “a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute” with Plaintiffs in violation of Section 7.9 of the CC&Rs.  The Court agrees that this is the sole basis of the causes of action against Howland. The complaint alleges that Howland and Plaintiffs are neighbors in the planned community of Malibu West, an HOA of 238 separate interests. (Compl., ¶¶ 1, 2, 4, 7.) The community is governed by Defendant Malibu West Swimming Club (referred to as “Association”, “Architectural Committee”, “Committee” or “Board”). Members of the HOA, including Howland and Plaintiffs, are subject to CC&Rs which run with the title of each property, including the Association’s Architectural Guidelines. (Compl., ¶¶ 29-30.) Howland is not alleged to be a Board or Architectural Committee member. Instead, Howland just owns an adjoining property to Plaintiffs’ lot. (¶ 7.)

 

Plaintiffs allege that their home was destroyed by a fire in 2018. In 2019, Plaintiffs set out to rebuild their home. They obtained plans and permits from the City of Malibu for their replacement home, a single-story residence. (Compl., ¶¶ 24, 31.) Plaintiffs allege that just prior to breaking ground, the Association “inexplicably and inexcusably threatened legal action against the Claytons over minor deviations of the residential plans with respect to the Association’s selectively enforced, arbitrary and unreasonably restrictive ‘Architectural Guidelines’.” (¶¶ 31, 33.) The Committee’s main issues are: 1) concerns of an unidentified neighbor that their view will be obstructed because the height exceeds the 14' limit; 2) the design has a "shed" roof; 3) the total square footage exceeds the allowable square footage by 164 sq. ft.; 4) the design of the home increases the original home's square footage and, as such, increased living space must be added to the rear of the home; and 5) movement of the building's pad approx. one (1) foot forward from the original home's pad. (¶34.) Plaintiffs assert that these issues are arbitrary, unreasonable, not brought in good faith, and would require the plan be non-complaint with local ordinances. (¶¶ 36-84.)

 

As to Howland, the complaint alleges that her concerns are inconsistent with the standard expressed in the Architectural Guidelines, such that they are not material. (Compl., ¶ 54.) Plaintiffs note that the Association has approved other roofs which violate the height requirements and cause a greater impediment than that complained of by Howland. (¶¶ 61, 64, Ex. J.) The complaint claims Howland’s complaints are unreasonable because there is no materially detrimental view obstruction.  (¶ 85.) At worst, the view obstruction is negligible, which cannot be a material detriment as opined by the Association and Howland. (¶¶ 88, 92.) Moreover, Howland’s complaint was unreasonable because she is an “absentee owner” who rents her home and would not be impacted by the new build. (¶ 89.) Plaintiffs have requested copies of Howland’s written complaint, which were all denied. (¶ 90.) The complaint further alleges that Plaintiffs’ new home’s roof line would not block the view more than the prior existing structure. (¶¶ 144-146.) Howland never complained of any view obstruction previously, rendering Howland’s new position incredible. (¶ 146.)

 

Further, the complaint alleges that Howland has not made any attempt to resolve the view-obstruction issue in accordance with Section 7.9 of the CC&Rs. (Compl., ¶117.) This section states:

 

Section 7.9 View Obstructions. No vegetation or other obstruction shall be planted or maintained on a Lot in such location or of such height as to unreasonably obstruct the view of the ocean or mountain from a Lot. If there is a dispute between Owners concerning the obstruction of a view from a Lot, the Owners involved shall make a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute between themselves. If, after a reasonable attempt to resolve the dispute, the Owners cannot reach a mutually agreeable resolution, the dispute shall be submitted to the Board, whose decision in such matter shall be binding. Any such obstruction shall, upon request of the Board, be removed or otherwise altered to the Board's satisfaction, at the cost and expense of the responsible Owner, as determined by the Board.

 

(Compl., ¶ 116.) Howland is therefore “in violation of Section 7.9 of the CC&Rs.” (¶¶ 117, 172, 189, 220, 237.) Plaintiff further alleges that Howland further demonstrates bad faith because she did not first attempt to informally resolve the homeowner dispute in good faith. (¶ 169.) The Board refuses to confirm the identity of the alleged complainant, thus Plaintiffs “speculate” that Howland is the complainant. (¶¶ 169, 217, 265.) Howland failed to cooperate in good faith in this rebuild process, and acted capriciously in their refusal to grant the modest and reasonable variances requested by Plaintiffs. (¶ 195, 243.)

 

Due to these breaches of the CC&Rs and the Davis-Stirling Act, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that that establishes the proposed build “neither materially, detrimentally, nor unreasonably, obstruct Defendant LITTLE's, Defendant HOWLAND's, or any other neighbor's view[.]” (Compl., ¶ 303.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs state four causes of action for: 1) breach of the CC&Rs; 2) breach of the Davis Stirling Common Interest Development Act; 3) declaratory relief; and 4) equitable relief against Howland.

 

Extensively reviewing the pleadings, Howland’s alleged complaint to the Board forms the basis of the claims against her. Plaintiffs cite her failure to attempt to informally resolve the dispute in good faith prior to making the complaint as a violation of the CC&Rs. Thus, Howland’s complaint forms the basis of the CC&Rs violation. Plaintiffs cite paragraphs 88-97, and 116, which provide that no views are unreasonably obstructed by the proposed plans (Compl., ¶¶ 88, 92); Plaintiffs requested to see Howland’s written complaints (¶ 90); the Association/Board’s requirements violate Malibu’s setback requirements or other ordinances (¶¶91, 93-97); and the Association’s demands conflict with CC&R §7.9 (¶116). These allegations only solidify the fact that the complaint is based on Howland’s complaints to the Board.

 

The Court concludes that Howland’s alleged conduct is in furtherance of her constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. Several courts have found protected conduct in the context of disputes within a homeowners’ association. In Ruiz, for example, a homeowner sued his homeowners association alleging letters written by association counsel defamed him. (Ruiz, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at 1463-1465.) The letters concerned a dispute over the association's rejection of Ruiz's building plans, and Ruiz's complaints that the association was not applying its architectural guidelines evenhandedly—almost identical allegations as levied here. (Ibid.) The court concluded the complaints fell within section 425.16(e)(4), noting that the letters were written during an ongoing dispute between Ruiz and the association over denial of Ruiz's plans and the application of the association's architectural guidelines, and the dispute was of interest to a definable portion of the public, i.e., residents of the HOA, because they “would be affected by the outcome of those disputes and would have a stake in [association] governance.” (Id. at 1467-1469.) Moreover, the attorney's letters “were part of the ongoing discussion over those disputes and ‘contribute[d] to the public debate’ on the issues presented by those disputes. [Citation.]” (Id. at 1469.)

 

In Country Side Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Ivie (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1110, the homeowner raised objections with her homeowners association over a change in practices regarding whether individual homeowners or the association had responsibility to pay for maintaining balconies and siding on individual units. (Id. at 1113.) The association filed suit against Ivie, seeking declaratory relief in interpreting the association's governing documents regarding maintenance obligations. (Ibid.) The court found that Ivie's complaints to the board were a matter of public interest, because her statements concerned issues “that affected all members of the association,” including whether all members would have to pay for maintenance costs assumed by the association. (Id. at 1118.)

           

In Colyear, a homeowner (Liu) submitted an application to the homeowners association seeking to invoke dispute resolution process against neighbor (Colyear) who refused to trim trees blocking homeowner's view. Colyear brought an action against Liu and the association, alleging that they were wrongfully clouding his title by seeking to apply tree-trimming covenant in the CC&Rs to his property. Colyear sought a declaration, among other things, that Colyear's lot was not subject to the tree-trimming covenant. As to Liu, Colyear alleged that some of the offending trees designated by Liu on the photos attached to his application were on Colyear's lot, thus Liu “sought to apply the Liu Application to cut back trees and plantings on Colyear's lot.” Although Liu had withdrawn his application from the HOA, Colyear alleged that Liu refused to agree to not seek to enforce the “Trees and Plantings Covenant” against Colyear's lot in the future.

 

The Second District in Colyear agreed with the trial court that this was protected activity that was of public concern under section 425.16(e)(4). (Id. at 130-131.) Regarding Liu’s application, the court stated:

 

the record presents sufficient evidence to sustain Liu's burden that at the time he submitted his application, there was an ongoing controversy, dispute, or discussion regarding the applicability of tree-trimming covenants to lots not expressly burdened by them, and the HOA's authority to enforce such covenants. While the evidence in the record is somewhat sparse, it is sufficient to show that the issue was an ongoing topic of debate between the board and homeowners, resulting in multiple hearings, letters, and several changes to the board's policy on the matter starting as early as 2002 and continuing up to the current dispute. In this context, Liu's application sought to invoke the HOA process at the center of that dispute, as he invoked the process under Resolution 220 to request authority from the board to trim trees on a neighbor's property that admittedly was not expressly burdened by Declaration 150. Indeed, this is the crux of Colyear's argument for injecting himself into this dispute—that Liu's conduct in submitting the application unleashed a process unfair to Colyear and all other homeowners not subject to a tree-trimming covenant and thereby clouded his title with an improper encumbrance. As such, Colyear's current suggestion that Liu's application involves nothing more than a private tree-trimming dispute between two neighbors is unavailing.

 

…the issue of the board's authority to apply tree-trimming covenants to all lots in the community is a subject of interest to the entire membership of the community, and therefore meets the definition of “public interest” under section 425.16(e)(4). [Citations.]

 

(Id. at 132-133.)  Further, the Second District found that the claim arose from a protected activity. Colyear argued that the applications to enforce the CC&Rs was “simply the trigger for Colyear's suit to resolve that question.” (Id. at 135.) The court disagreed:

 

Liu's application did not simply “trigger” Colyear's lawsuit, as Colyear claims. Rather, the gravamen of Colyear's claims against Liu was the allegation that by submitting an application to the HOA concerning property unencumbered by Declaration 150, Liu invoked an invalid HOA process and clouded Colyear's title. As such, the only injury-producing conduct Colyear alleges Liu committed was Liu's petitioning act.

 

(Id.)

 

These cases are on all fours with the allegations in this matter. Here, Howland allegedly brought complaints to the Board regarding Plaintiffs’ proposed new construction, which she contended violated the Architectural Guidelines. As in the above caselaw, these communications with the Board fall squarely within section 425.16(e)(4) as protected speech, because the application of the Architectural Guidelines’ view ordinance concern a matter of “public interest” touching each member of the HOA. There is a clearly defined group of 238 separate, single-family residences. Consistent with caselaw, the enforcement of CC&R provisions are matters of public interest protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Furthermore, the only injury producing event alleged by the complaint concerning Howland are her alleged complaints to the HOA which sought to enforce the view restrictions present in the CC&Rs. Whether or not the complaints were reasonable, or whether the Board properly applied the CC&Rs, does not take away from the fact that this action against Howland arises from Howland’s protected activity. Plaintiffs fail to cite any other substantive allegations against Howland that differ.

 

            Furthermore, as an alternative basis for ruling on this issue, the Court determines

that the cause of action arises out of a “written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law”. (CCP § 425.16(e)(2); see also Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 479 [protecting allegedly defamatory statements about the competence of a manager of a homeowners association]; Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 540 [protecting complaints by homeowners association board members against other board members regarding board's decision making process in approving a large roofing project and a management company contract, as affecting “a broad segment, if not all,” association members]; Grenier, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 483 [defamatory statements accusing church pastor of theft and misuse of church funds, and of abuse, are of interest to the church's 500 or more members, and therefore are of “public interest”].

 

            Fort these reasons, Howland meets the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute.

 

Second Prong

 

If the defendant meets this initial burden, the plaintiff then has the burden of demonstrating a probability of prevailing on the claim. ¿(Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 728, 741.) ¿A plaintiff satisfies this burden by demonstrating that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. (Id.)¿Under CCP section 425.16(b)(2), a plaintiff may use affidavits to meet the plaintiff’s burden.

 

Plaintiffs do not demonstrate minimal merits against Howland. Plaintiffs ultimately ignore the call of the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Plaintiffs repeatedly argue that they have not attacked any speech rights or protected activity. Plaintiffs are incorrect. As discussed in the first prong of the Court’s analysis, the complaint arises from Howland’s protected activity. Plaintiffs’ first cause of action seeks to hold Howland liable for the breach of the CC&Rs, namely her purported failure to make a good faith attempt to resolve informally the potential view obstruction dispute before complaining to the Board.

 

Plaintiffs do not submit any declarations in support of their causes of action. Plaintiffs apparently only rely on the allegations of their verified complaint. Of course, critical allegations against Howland, such as that she actually made a complaint to the Board (without first attempting to resolve the issue informally) are made on information and belief, and thus not properly verified. (Compl., ¶¶ 169, 217, 265, 317.) Thus, Plaintiffs do not properly support their prima facie showing.

 

Turning to the merits, the Court also finds the complaint lacking against Howland. As noted, Howland is not a Board member. As a matter of law, Plaintiffs cannot show any legal causation. First, Howland’s action of complaining to the Board did not cause any of Plaintiffs’ harms. Under the pled facts, the Board, not Howland, has the duty and allegedly rejected Plaintiff’s plans. Thus, it is the Board, not Howland, who is subject to an order of this Court requiring Plaintiffs’ plans to be approved. The declaration against Howland would be legally and practically meaningless.

 

Second, the Complaint contends that Howland violated the CC&Rs by failing to make a good faith attempt to resolve a dispute with Plaintiffs prior to making her complaint to the Board, in violation of Section 7.9 of the CC&Rs. However, none of the requested relief appears tailored to this violation. Nor has Plaintiff pled any damages connected thereto, in light of the fact that Howland is not a member of the Board.

 

As to the second cause of action, Plaintiffs seek liability under the Davis-Stirling Act. The complaint cites Civil Code section 4765, which relevantly states:

 

(a) This section applies if the governing documents require association approval before a member may make a physical change to the member’s separate interest or to the common area. In reviewing and approving or disapproving a proposed change, the association shall satisfy the following requirements:

 

(1) The association shall provide a fair, reasonable, and expeditious procedure for making its decision. The procedure shall be included in the association’s governing documents. The procedure shall provide for prompt deadlines. The procedure shall state the maximum time for response to an application or a request for reconsideration by the board.

 

(2) A decision on a proposed change shall be made in good faith and may not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.

 

(See Compl., ¶ 248.) Further, the complaint alleges that Howland violated Civil Code section 5925, which requires dispute resolution.

Howland cannot violate either section. The Act only applies to the association itself by its plain terms. There is no indication that section 4765 governs the actions of individual members. Further, the dispute resolution provision simply defines alternative dispute resolution, without any prescription. (Compl., ¶ 251.) Specifically: "Alternative dispute resolution " means mediation, arbitration, conciliation, or other nonjudicial procedure that involves a neutral party in the decision making process. The form of alternative dispute resolution chosen pursuant to this article may be binding or nonbinding, with the voluntary consent of the parties.” More relevantly, section 5930 states that “(a) An association or a member may not file an enforcement action in the superior court unless the parties have endeavored to submit their dispute to alternative dispute resolution pursuant to this article.” An “enforcement action” means a civil action or proceeding, other than a cross-complaint. (Civ. Code § 5930(b).) Howland’s complaints were not a civil action or proceeding. Thus, Howland has not violated this section.

 

Plaintiffs likewise fail to provide any prima facie facts in support of the declaratory and equitable relief sought against Howland. The declaratory relief cause of action restates the breach of CC&R cause of action as to Howland:

 

“such a concern must first attempt to be informally resolved by the respective homeowners in good faith. In the instant dispute, the Board refuses to confirm who the alleged complainant is and the renter refused to provide the Claytons with contact information of the Owner (HOWLAND) for the neighboring two-story home or any other neighbor allegedly complaining. As such, the Claytons are having to speculate what the complaint, if it actually exists, what it may actually state, or is based on. On information and belief, the Claytons have learned that the neighbor below (LITTLE), and the next door neighbor (HOWLAND), are the complaining neighbors.”

 

[…]

 

“no neighbor, including neither LITTLE, nor HOWLAND, has made any 3 attempt to resolve any so-called unreasonable view obstruction of the hillside in 4 accordance with Section 7.9, and therefor, LITTLE and HOWLAND, despite having 5 a duty to follow the provisions of Section 7 .9, they did not and are, therefor, in 6 violation of Section 7.9 of the CC&Rs.”

 

(Compl., ¶¶ 265, 269, see also ¶¶ 287, 293.) Thus, Plaintiffs seek the following declaration against Howland: “[¶] 1. Defendants and each of them, have acted unreasonably in denying the Claytons' proposed new build (Plans Set # 2); [¶] 2. The Association is to approve Claytons' proposed new build (Plans Set# 2); [¶] 3. The Claytons' proposed new build (Plans Set # 2), neither materially, detrimentally, nor unreasonably, obstruct Defendant LITTLE's, Defendant HOWLAND's, or any other neighbor's view; [¶] 4. The Claytons are allowed to immediately commence the rebuild of their proposed new home (Plans Set # 2), in accordance with the City of Malibu's permitting approvals. [¶] 5. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover all reasonable attorney fees and costs, pursuant to the Association's CC&Rs and the California Civil Code, consistent with allegations herein.”

 

The equitable relief cause of action seeks the same exact relief. (¶ 352.)  Both of these causes of action essentially restate the causes of action for violations of the CC&Rs and the Act against Howland. Thus, this cause of action fails for the same reasons.

 

Accordingly, the special motion to strike is GRANTED.

 

Fees

 

As the prevailing party, Howland is entitled to all attorneys’ fees and costs she incurred in bringing this motion.  Defendant respectfully requests an order requiring Plaintiffs to reimburse her in the amount of $40,555.00. Counsel declares that Howland has incurred $36,055 in attorneys’ fees and costs to date and will incur an additional $4500 by the time this motion is resolved, for a total of $40,555. (DeJute Decl., ¶¶ 4–8.) Counsel declares that he is charging $500.00 per hour for himself, and $150.00 per hour for Matt Dillon. Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are true and correct copies of the invoices for attorneys’ fees from Matthew Dillon and

 

The Court finds that a reasonable fee would for this motion would be $9,910.00.  This total would include 13.5 hours at $500/hour for Mr. DeJute and 20 hours at $150 an hour for Mr. Dillon. 

 

            Defendant to prepare a proposed judgment.