Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 22SMCV00677, Date: 2023-01-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22SMCV00677 Hearing Date: January 12, 2023 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Krupp, et al., v. Norris, et al.
CASE NO.: 22SMCV00677
MOTION: Motion for a Stay of Proceedings
HEARING DATE: 1/12/2023
Legal Standard
“Trial courts generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.” (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1484, 1489.) The trial court has the authority to control litigation before it in order to ensure the orderly administration of justice. (CCP §§ 128, 187; Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [“It is also well established that courts have fundamental inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power to control litigation before them.”].) Moving Defendant does not notice any particular authority for this stay request.
Analysis
Defendant Michael K. Norris, co-Trustee of Norris Family Living Trust, Dated June 13, 2003, as Amended (the “Norris Family Trust” or “NFT”) moves for a stay of this Partition action until the Family Law Department of the Superior Court of Orange County and the Probate Department of this Court, have ruled and/or issued judgment on the facts and issues identified hereinbelow. Defendant claims that those Courts have priority and exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of the facts and issues which must necessarily be determined before this Court may enter an interlocutory judgment of partition as to this claim. Specifically, Michael Norris’ dispute with his former wife regarding NFT’s 50% interest in the subject property, located at 1627 Mayfield Avenue, Los Angeles, CA (hereinafter, the “Mayfield Property” or “Subject Property”).
The Family Court will determine the legal characterization Michael Norris’s separate property (SP) interest in the Trust, and thus the 50% in the property, against the community property (CP) claims made by spouse Dewi Norris (“Dewi” or “Dewi Norris”) pursuant to her marital dissolution action filed prior to this action. The Probate Court will determine Michael’s Probation Code section 850 Petition requesting that the Court order Dewi to transfer Michael’s SP interest to his SP trust (the Mayfield Court Trust (“MCT”) as governed by the NFT.
In his motion for a stay, Michael states and his sister (Karen Norris, now Karen Norris Krupp) equally inherited from their mother in 1997 a 10-unit apartment building in Brentwood, California. (M. Norris Decl., pp 1-2, ¶¶ 4-9) They have co-owned and operated the Mayfield Property through the present day. On June 13, 2003, Michael Norris and Dewi Norris, with the assistance of their estate planning attorney, created the Norris Family Trust (NFT). (Id., pp 1-2, ¶¶ 4-9) The NFT expressly referenced the creation of a separate property trust - the MCT - that was specifically created for the sole trustor and trustee Michael Norris’ to hold his 50% separate property interest in the Mayfield Property. (Id.) The beneficiaries of the MCT were Michael Norris and his elderly father James Norris (the latter being entitled to the first $20,000 of income distributions per year) (Id.) At the same time, the estate planning attorney prepared, and Michael Norris executed, a notarized trust transfer deed from himself as an individual, to himself as sole trustee of the MCT. (Id., pp 2-6, ¶¶ 10-26) This trust transfer deed was delivered, but apparently never recorded before James Norris passed away. (Id.) Thereafter, on December 21, 2011, at the same time as the First Amendment to the NFT, since Michael Norris’ original 2003 Mayfield Property trust transfer deed had never been recorded, he instead funded his 50% separate property interest in the Mayfield Property to himself and Dewi Norris, as co-trustees of the NFT. (Id.; Exhibits 3 and 4.) The NFT, as amended, specifically provided that the MCT property was Michael Norris’ separate property, that all contributions of trust property retained their separate property characterization, and that all separate property of the spouse that contributed the separate property to the trust could at any time demand it’s return. (Norris Decl., p. 2, ¶ 13; Exhibit 2, pp. 3-5, ¶ 3., A.- K.; pp. 6-10, ¶¶ 4 – 8.)
In July 2022, Michael Norris filed a Probate Code 850 Petition to have the Court compel Dewi Norris to transfer the property to him as required by the NFT. (Norris Decl., p. 8, ¶ 40). Michael explains that Dewi Norris asserts in the marital dissolution proceedings and this partition action that 25 years into her marriage the mere addition of her name as Co-Trustee of Michael Norris’ inherited SP interest in 50% of the Subject Property. He asserts that the courts will establish his retention of his inherited 50% SP interest. He reasons that a stay is necessary until the separate/community property characterization issues are resolved.
However, such an open ended stay of these proceedings would not be in the interests of justice and would not promote judicial efficiency, especially considering the clear right of partition. The Court concurs that generally, co-owners of real property have a right to partition. Real property partition actions are equitable in nature and governed by statute. (See CCP § 872, et seq.) “A partition action may be commenced and maintained by any of the following persons: (1) A co-owner of personal property. (2) An owner of an estate of inheritance, an estate for life, or an estate for years in real property where such property or estate therein is owned by several persons concurrently or in successive estates.” (CCP § 872.210(a).) “The court shall order that the property be divided among the parties in accordance with their interests in the property as determined in the interlocutory judgment.” (CCP § 872.810.)
Real property may be partitioned in three ways: (1) physical division of the property (CCP §§ 873.210-873.290); (2) sale of the property and division of the proceeds (CCP §§ 873.510-873.850]; or (3) court approved and supervised partition by appraisal. (CCP §§ 873.910-873.980.) There is a presumption that property should be divided if possible, rather than forcing a sale on someone who intended to own the property. (CCP § 872.810; see Butte Creek Island Ranch v. Crim (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 360, 365-366.) To establish an action for partition, a plaintiff must allege: 1) property description (legal description and street address, if any); 2) description of all interests claimed by plaintiff in the property; 3) description of other persons’ claimed interests in the property that plaintiff reasonably believes will be materially affected by the action; 4) the estate for partitioning and a prayer for partitioning those interests; and 5) facts justifying any sought sale of the property. (CCP § 872.230.) A co-owner of property has an absolute right to partition unless barred by valid waiver. (CCP § 872.710(b).) “The only indispensable requirement to its award is that a clear title be shown.’ ” (American Medical International, Inc. v. Feller¿(1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 1008, 1013.)
First, the Court concurs with Department 1 that the Partition Action and the Probate Action/Divorce Proceedings do not arise from the same controversy or transaction. Simply put, the Court can determine this partition action without touching the internal interests of the NFT. Krupp filed this action against Michael Norris and Dewi Norris in their “legal capacities” as “co-trustees” of the Norris Family Trust. This Court will not have to characterize any property as separate or community property. Whether the Trusts’ interest may be characterized as community property or separate property is entirely irrelevant to this Partition Action. Any determination as to Michael’s interest in the NFT itself does not affect whether Plaintiff may partition on its interest. Further, there is a distinction between the Trusts’ interest in the subject Real Property and Michael’s Separate Property interest through his status as a beneficiary/trustee. As such, there is no reason this Court should stay this partition action between Krupp and the Trust in favor of the separate/community property characterization.
The doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not apply. “Exclusive concurrent jurisdiction" provides that when two or more courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute, the court that first asserts jurisdiction assumes it to the exclusion of the others. (Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1175; Dale v. Dale (1998) 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 513, 519-520 [the doctrine of priority jurisdiction, the first superior court to assume and exercise jurisdiction in the case acquires exclusive jurisdiction until the matter is disposed of. The doctrine avoids the risk of simultaneous proceedings or conflicting decisions.].) As noted, there is no risk of inconsistent rulings between the Partition action and the separate/community property characterization issues.
Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.