Judge Mark A. Young, Case Number: 22SMCV00677, Date: 2024-12-04 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 22SMCV00677, Date: 2024-12-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22SMCV00677 Hearing Date: December 4, 2024 Dept: M

CASE NO.: 22SMCV00677

MOTION: Referee's Motion for (1) Approval of Distribution Plan, (2) Approval of the Referee's Final Report and Account, (3) Approval of Final Fees and Costs, and (4) Discharge of Referee

HEARING DATE: 12/4/2024

ANALYSIS

Court Appointed Referee Stephen J. Donell (the “Referee”) moves for an order approving the Referee’s counsel Levinson Arshonsky Kurtz & Komsky LLP’s (“Counsel”) Final Fee Application pursuant to the Court’s April 6, 2023, Interlocutory Judgment for Partition by Sale of Property and for Appointment of Stephen J. Donell as the Partition Referee Pursuant to Stipulation of the Parties (the “Appointment Order”). Specifically, the Referee requests the Court approve:

1. Counsel’s interim fees and costs previously paid in the amount of $141,405.94;

2. Fees and Costs incurred for October 2024 but unpaid in the amount of $8,552.89; and

3. Authorization to holdback $20,000 for Counsel to complete this matter.

The motion is substantively unopposed. The Court is inclined to approve the requested fees, costs, and holdback as indicated above.

Defendant Norris provides a limited opposition to the extent that Referee seeks to “surcharge” Norris in the amount of $13,260.00. (Report, ¶¶ 36-38; see Blumenfeld Decl., ¶¶ 20, 26-27, 32, Ex. 3.) Norris’s opposition is untimely, as it was filed less than 9 court days prior to the hearing. Furthermore, the Referee demonstrates that Norris failed to object to any of the interim charges at the time they were incurred and noticed. Thus, the opposition may be disregarded at the Court’s discretion.

Critically, the Court cannot locate any request by the Referee to “surcharge” Norris. The Court can only locate fees incurred by Referee for Counsel which will be paid by the Estate, as described in the moving papers and in the proposed order. Referee and his Counsel reasonably incurred such fees, including those fees responding to Norris/Barton’s email and researching appropriate legal avenues to prevent Norris/Barton from interfering with the sale. Whether or not the Referee incurred these fees because of Norris and Barton is of no importance. Simply put, those fees were reasonably incurred and should be paid by the Estate. As such, the Court does not have to make any determination on any unrequested “surcharge” to Norris.

Accordingly, the Referee’s motion is GRANTED.