Judge Mark A. Young, Case 22SMCV00831 2023-03-15 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 22SMCV00831, Date: 2023-03-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22SMCV00831 Hearing Date: March 15, 2023 Dept: M

CASE NO.: 22SMCV00831

MOTION: Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

HEARING DATE: 3/15/2023

Legal Standard

“Under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c), any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees. The fee-shifting provision was apparently intended to discourage such strategic lawsuits against public participation by imposing the litigation costs on the party seeking to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The fee-shifting provision also encourages private representation in SLAPP cases, including situations when a SLAPP defendant is unable to afford fees or the lack of potential monetary damages precludes a standard contingency fee arrangement.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.)

In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.¿(Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)¿General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Ibid.)

Analysis

Defendant Ilana Yazdi, as the prevailing party on an anti-SLAPP motion, is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees. Defendant requests that the court award fees incurred in the amount of $31,675.00 and costs in the amount of $177.57.

However, this request contradicts the attached declaration supporting fees. Counsel declares that they devoted approximately 20 hours in defense of this matter. (Kanani Decl., ¶ 3.) Further, counsel declares:

“The attorneys' fees paid to my firm to date in defense of this action amounts to approximately $5,300.00. This amount does not include any payment for fees in connection with the preparation drafting, and filing of this motion. The total amount of costs incurred and paid by drafting this motion for attorney’s fees. I expect to spend an additional one and half (1.5) hours appearing at the hearing on the motion. The filing fee for this motion is sixty dollars ($60.00).”

(Id. ¶ 4.) However, counsel does not provide for their rates, let alone for why those rates would be reasonable. Thus, the Court is unable to perform an informed lodestar analysis based on counsel’s expertise. Counsel also does not provide the amount of costs in the declaration. Based upon this lack of evidence, and the prior billing, the Court concludes that counsel’s rate is $265 an hour. Given the state of the complaint (a single page form complaint with hand-written allegations), and the relative simplicity of the special motion to strike (six pages, including the notice), the Court finds that 20 hours of time would be excessive. The Court will therefore fix fees to the reasonable amount of $1,590.00, which accounts for a reasonable amount of time spent on the motion – six hours – and a reasonable rate of $265 considering the skill displayed by counsel.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $1,590.00.