Judge Mark A. Young, Case 22SMCV00831 2023-04-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 22SMCV00831, Date: 2023-04-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22SMCV00831 Hearing Date: April 5, 2023 Dept: M

CASE NO.: 22SMCV00831

MOTION: Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

HEARING DATE: 3/15/2023

Legal Standard

“Under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c), any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees. The fee-shifting provision was apparently intended to discourage such strategic lawsuits against public participation by imposing the litigation costs on the party seeking to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The fee-shifting provision also encourages private representation in SLAPP cases, including situations when a SLAPP defendant is unable to afford fees or the lack of potential monetary damages precludes a standard contingency fee arrangement.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.)

In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.¿(Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)¿General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Ibid.)

Analysis

Defendant Ilana Yazdi, as the prevailing party on an anti-SLAPP motion, is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees. Defendant requests that the court award fees incurred in the amount of $31,675.00 and costs in the amount of $177.57.

The Court initially noted several problems with the fee request. Counsel’s request was inconsistent with the declaration, did not verify their rates, or why such rates would be reasonable. Thus, the Court gave counsel the opportunity to file a supplemental brief to support their lodestar request. The supplemental declaration provides additional detail regarding the work on this action. Counsel took 3.0 hours preparing the anti-SLAPP motion, 2.5 hours replying, and 1.5 hours in preparing for and attending the hearing. Thus, counsel claims a total time of 7.0 hours. (Supp. Kanani Decl., ¶ 4.) Counsel took 2.5 hours preparing the motion for attorney’s fees, with 1.5 hours preparing and attending the first hearing. (¶5.) Counsel also includes an hour (1.0) reviewing and preparing a response to the appeal. (Id.) Counsel also states that it took 1.5 hours to prepare the supplemental declaration, which was approximately eight paragraphs. (¶ 6.) Thus, Counsel claims a total of 15 hours at a rate of $450.00, for a total request of $6,750.00. Notably, this is substantially reduced from the initial 20 hours claimed.

Counsel also requests a 6x multiplier be added, for a total of $40,500.00. Counsel argues that a multiplier of 6 is reasonable and appropriate in this case given the public benefits conferred, and the results achieved. The Court does not find that a multiplier should be added. There is no evidence that this case was particularly risky or involved novel legal issues. This case was disposed of in a single, brief motion. Thus, counsel was not precluded from obtaining other work. Further, the multiplier was not requested in the moving papers, which robbed Plaintiff of an opportunity to brief the issue. The Court finds the awarded fees based on the time spent defending the action to be a reasonable amount and certainly enough to reasonably compensate counsel.

After reviewing the supplemental declaration, the Court stands by its initial assessment. The supplemental declaration only underscores the inflated and contradictory values given in the initial motion. Given the brief nature of the complaint (a single page form complaint with hand-written allegations), the relatively simple special motion to strike (six pages, including the notice), and the brief supplemental declaration providing information that should have been in the initial briefing, the Court finds that 15 hours of time would be excessive. Moreover, the supplemental declaration did not provide any justification for the $450.00 hourly rate. The Court is also concerned that this supplemental declaration was simply another opportunity to add fees to an otherwise resolved case. Allowing fees in such an instance would not promote the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. The Court is not inclined to add any fees based on the supplemental work, as this time was not reasonably incurred.

The Court will therefore fix fees to the reasonable amount of $1,590.00, which accounts for a reasonable amount of time spent on the motion, at a reasonable rate considering the skill displayed by counsel. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $1,590.00.