Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 22SMCV01887, Date: 2023-04-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22SMCV01887 Hearing Date: April 13, 2023 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Khoshnood, et
al., v. Salih
CASE NO.: 22SMCV01887
MOTION: Petition/Motion
to Compel Arbitration
HEARING DATE: 4/13/2023
Legal
Standard
Under California and federal law,
public policy favors arbitration as an efficient and less expensive means of
resolving private disputes. (Moncharsh
v. Heily & Blase (1992)
3 Cal.4th 1, 8-9; AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339.) Accordingly, whether an
agreement is governed by the California Arbitration Act (“CAA”) or the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), courts resolve doubts about an arbitration agreement’s
scope in favor of arbitration. (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at 9;
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West
Assocs. (9th Cir. 2009) 553 F.3d 1277, 1284; see also Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc.
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971-972 [“California law incorporates many of the basic
policy objectives contained in the Federal Arbitration Act, including a
presumption in favor of arbitrability [citation] and a requirement that an
arbitration agreement must be enforced on the basis of state law standards that
apply to contracts in general”].) “[U]nder both the FAA and California law,
‘arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ ” (Higgins v. Superior Crout (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.)
“Code of
Civil Procedure section 1281.2 requires a trial court to grant a petition to
compel arbitration if the court determines that an agreement to arbitrate the
controversy exists.” (Avery v.
Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 50, 59,
quotations omitted.) Accordingly, “when presented with a petition to compel
arbitration, the court’s first task is to determine whether the parties have in
fact agreed to arbitrate the dispute.” (Ibid.) A petition to compel arbitration is in essence a suit in equity
to compel specific performance of a contract. (Id. at 71.) As with any other specific performance claim, “a
party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement must show the agreement’s
terms are sufficiently definite to enable the court to know what it is to
enforce.” (Ibid. [internal citations omitted].) “Only
the valid and binding agreement of the parties, including all material terms
well-defined and clearly expressed, may be ordered specifically performed.” (Ibid.) An arbitration agreement “must be so interpreted as to give
effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of
contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.” (Civ. Code, §
1636.) The language of the contract governs its interpretation if it is clear
and explicit. (Civ. Code, § 1368.) If uncertainty exists, “the language of a
contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the
uncertainty to exist.” (Civ. Code, § 1654.)
The party
seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a
valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.) It would then be plaintiff’s burden, in opposing
the motion, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to her
opposition. (See Ibid.) “In these
summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the
affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral
testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Ibid.)
Analysis
Defendant Salih moves to compel
arbitration of Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendant cites an arbitration provision
within the subject Lease Agreement. Under Civil Code section 1953(a), “[a]ny
provision of a lease or rental agreement of a dwelling by which the lessee
agrees to modify or waive any of the following rights shall be void as contrary
to public policy . . .. His procedural rights in litigation in any action
involving his rights and obligations as a tenant.”
Furthermore, Civil Code section 1942.1
requires that any agreement waiving or modifying rights under Civil Code §§
1941 through 1942.1 must “set forth the provisions” of section 1941 and 1492.1,
and provide that any controversy related to a condition of the premises claimed
to make them untenantable may be submitted to arbitration:
Any agreement by a lessee of a
dwelling waiving or modifying his rights under Section 1941.1 or 1942.2 shall
be void as contrary to public policy with respect to any condition which
renders the premises untenantable, except that the lessor and the lessee may
agree that the lessee shall undertake to improve, repair or maintain all or
stipulated portions of the dwelling as part of the consideration for rental.
The lessor and lessee may, if an
agreement is in writing, set forth the provisions of Sections 1941 to 1942.1,
inclusive, and provide that any controversy relating to a condition of the
premises claimed to make them untenantable may by application of either party
be submitted to arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of Title 9 (commencing
with Section 1280), Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the costs
of such arbitration shall be apportioned by the arbitrator between the parties.
(Civil Code § 1942.1 [emphasis added]; see also Jaramillo
v. JH Real Estate Partners, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 394, 404 [“nothing
in section 1953 precludes a tenant of residential premises and the tenant's
landlord from entering into a separate agreement to arbitrate that is entirely
independent of any lease agreement”].)
Here, the arbitration provision is
within the lease agreement itself, and not an entirely independent written
agreement. The lease also does not “set forth the provisions” of Civil Code §§
1941 through 1942.1 or provide that “any controversy related to a condition of
the premises claimed to make them untenantable” may be submitted to arbitration
Civil Code § 1942.1. Therefore, the arbitration agreement is void as a matter
of law.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is
DENIED.