Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 22SMCV02161, Date: 2023-02-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22SMCV02161    Hearing Date: February 1, 2023    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           Jones, et al., v. Gentle, et al.

CASE NO.:                22SMCV02161

MOTION:                  Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

HEARING DATE:   2/1/2023

Legal Standard

A defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made after the time to demur has expired and an answer has been filed. (CCP § 438(f).) A motion by a defendant may be made on the grounds that (1) the court “lacks jurisdiction of the subject of one or more of the causes of action alleged” or (2) the complaint or cross-complaint “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (CCP § 438(c).)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. Except as provided by statute, the rules governing demurrers apply. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) “A motion for judgment on the pleadings is akin to a general demurrer; it tests the sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action. The court must assume the truth of all factual allegations in the complaint, along with matters subject to judicial notice.” (Wise v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 725, 738, citations omitted.) Further, like a general demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings “does not lie as to a portion of a cause of action, and if any part of a cause of action is properly pleaded, the [motion] will be overruled.” (Fire Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings, a moving party's counsel must meet and confer, in person or by telephone, with counsel for the party who filed the pleading subject to the judgment on the pleadings motion “for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (CCP § 439(a).) Defendants demonstrate that they complied with this requirement. (Siegel Decl., ¶¶2-3.)

Analysis

Defendants Matthew Scott Gentle and the State of California, by and through the California State Transportation Agency and California Highway Patrol (erroneously sued separately as “State of California,” “California State Transportation Agency,” and “California Highway Patrol”) move for judgment on the pleadings. Defendants argue that the complaint fails to allege the statutory pre-suit filing, and that the complaint does not cite a statute that creates public entity liability for “negligent training,” or a “history” of failing to train.

As to the pre-suit filing requirements, Plaintiffs allege that they complied with the requirements. (Compl., ¶ 6.) However, Plaintiffs recognize that they failed to attached exhibit A in support of that allegation. In opposition, Plaintiffs provide the exhibit. Strictly speaking, Plaintiffs only alleged a bare conclusion of compliance. As such, the motion is granted with leave to amend to allow Plaintiffs to amend and attach the exhibit in support.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED with leave to amend.

The Court will also address the statutory basis for the claims, Government Code section 815 generally provides that “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person” except as provided by statute. (Govt. Code, § 815(a).)  “[D]irect tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.”  (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.) 

Government Code section 815.2 provides that a public entity is vicariously liable for the torts of their employees committed within the scope of employment, if the employee is liable. (Govt. Code § 815.2(a); Chambi v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 822, 827.) To establish vicarious liability against Defendant for negligence, Plaintiff must allege Defendant’s employees are liable for negligence.

Plaintiffs allege that Gentle was employed by the State entities. Specifically, Gentle was an “on duty California Highway Patrol officer” when he negligently turned his vehicle on a red light, causing the crash. (Compl., ¶¶ 12, 15.) Thus, section 815.2 provides for vicarious liability in this matter.

The Court agrees that the conclusory allegations concerning generalized “history of failing to train [defendants’] own-patrol officers” in safety matters and a refusal “to adopt best practices to reduce or eliminate” hazards “and/or proper[ly] monitor and admonish officers for vehicle code violations” do not provide a basis for direct liability against the State entities. (Compl., ¶24.) Critically, there are no allegations that Defendants failed to supervise or train Gentle, among other problems. However, the above allegations state Gentle’s personal negligence in the scope of his employment with the State entities. Plaintiffs have therefore alleged a viable theory against Defendants. Therefore, the motion cannot be granted on the grounds that there is no direct liability.