Judge Mark A. Young, Case Number: 23SMCP00497, Date: 2024-08-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCP00497, Date: 2024-08-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCP00497 Hearing Date: August 5, 2024 Dept: M

CASE NO.: 23SMCP00497

MOTION: Writ of Mandamus

HEARING DATE: 8/5/2024

Legal Standard

A writ of mandate lies “for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer[.]” (CCP, § 1094.5(a).)¿Pertinent questions include “whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.”¿ (CCP, § 1094.5(b).)¿

When not involving a fundamental vested right, the Court’s inquiry into abuse of discretion revolves around whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the light of the entire record.¿(CCP, § 1094.5(c); see Alpha Nu Assn. of Theta XI v. University of Southern California (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 383, 408-409 [“review is limited to examining the administrative record to determine whether the adjudicatory decision and its findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record”].)¿Substantial evidence may be described as relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Board (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 575, 584-85), or evidence of ponderable legal significance which is reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value. (Mohilef v. Janovici (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 267, 305 fn. 28.)¿In other words, the Court “may reverse an agency’s decision only if, based on the evidence before the agency, a reasonable person could not reach the conclusion reached by the agency.”¿ (Sierra Club v. California Coastal Com. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 602, 610.)¿

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The petitioner bears a high burden of proof to demonstrate that the evidence supports their position by citation to the administrative record.¿(Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32; see LASC Local Rule 3.231(i).)¿“A trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are” not supported by substantial evidence. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817; see also Evid. Code, § 664.)

ANALYSIS

Petitioner Pacific 1 LLC claims Respondent Santa Monica Rent Control Board (SMRCB) committed an abuse of discretion by issuing a decision contrary to the “overwhelming” evidence presented at a hearing whether Real Party in Interest Pamela Deliz (“Tenant”) “maintains occupancy of the Apartment as her secondary residence” and thus, was protected by rent control. (Memo Iso Pet., pp. 3, 5.)

The Santa Monica Rent Control Board Regulations, Regulation 3304(a) states:

“In accordance with the purposes of the Rent Control Law to regulate rents for tenants in order to help alleviate the impact of the serious housing shortage on tenants, a landlord may petition for a determination that the unit is not the tenant’s residence. If a rental unit is kept for secondary occupancy, such as a vacation home, or purpose other than the tenant’s residence, the landlord may petition the Board for a determination that the tenant is a ‘tenant not in occupancy.’ If a tenant is determined to be a ‘tenant not in occupancy,’ a one-time increase in the unit's maximum allowable rent shall be awarded , . ..”

Under Regulation 3304 (e): “the landlord has the burden of establishing a prima facie case in the petition and supporting documents that the unit is not the tenant’s residence. If the landlord establishes this prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the tenant to prove that the unit is her or his usual residence of return.” Regulation 3304(g) provides several factors to consider under the totality of the circumstances:

“Occupancy as a tenant’s residence does not require that the tenant be physically present in the unit at all times or continuously but that it is the tenant’s usual residence of return. Evidence that the unit is not the tenant’s residence includes, but is not limited to, the following factors. These factors shall be weighed in light of the totality of the circumstances. [¶] (1) the tenant does not carry-on basic living activities at the unit for extended periods of time; [¶] (2) another property or unit is listed as the tenant’s place of residence on any motor vehicle registration, driver’s license, voter registration, or with any other public agency, including federal, state, and local taxing authorities; [¶] (3) utilities for the unit are billed and mailed to a different residential property; [¶] (4) the tenant’s personal possessions are not located in the unit; [¶] (5) a homeowner’s tax exemption or renter’s credit for the tenant has been filed for a different property or the tenant is owner of record of a different residential property; [¶] (6) the tenant is a corporation or is otherwise not a natural person. This factor shall not apply if the tenant is a trust and the trust’s beneficiary is the unit’s occupant or if a natural person is the subtenant residing at the unit; [¶] (7) the tenant is absent from the unit for extended periods of time, other than for military service, hospitalization, vacation, family or friend emergency or care, Peace Corps service, academic sabbatical, or other reasonable temporary or seasonal periods of absence, such as travel necessitated by employment or education; [¶] (8) the unit is used primarily for storage, entertaining, or as an office; [¶] (9) the tenant rents more than one unit at the property and the number of occupants is less than the number of bedrooms in the combined units.

(Regulation 3304(g).)

Respondent found, as a matter of fact, that Tenant resides in the Santa Monica apartment as her usual residence of return. Petitioner cites no conclusive or “overwhelming” evidence which would require Respondent to find otherwise. In fact, Tenant presented substantial evidence which, if credited, would support Respondent’s conclusion that Tenant maintains occupancy at the apartment as her “residence of return.” In their petition, Petitioner minimizes or ignores Tenant’s evidence in support of this finding, while focusing on other evidence. Petitioner relies upon evidence that that neighbors testified that they only saw Tenant a “few times” during 2020-2022, that Tenant owns three real estate properties outside of California, that she doesn’t have functioning gas at the apartment, and her lack of corroborating evidence. Petitioner deems Tenant’s supporting evidence incredible but does not demonstrate that no reasonable person could believe that evidence.

Here, Tenant presented evidence on all the enumerated factors, including the seven factors which Petitioner left unaddressed. Tenant showed that the apartment was listed as the tenant’s place of residence on her license and voter registration. She regularly received mail for her electricity bill, social security statements, and jury summons at the apartment. (AR 39, 426-437.) She filed state and federal tax returns at the address. (AR 664.) She received healthcare in Los Angeles. (AR 668.) Moreover, Tenant addressed the fact that she would leave California for extended periods of time. Tenant would often travel to Pennsylvania, Ohio and New Jersey to manage investment properties and engage in renovation efforts as part of her business. (AR 710, 715-716, 721, 725.) Despite this travel, Tenant repeatedly returned to her apartment in Santa Monica. (AR 40; Finding No. 79.) She presented evidence that she visits the New Jersey property once a year to maintain it, but the property is not regularly occupied because it requires significant renovations. (AR 39-40.) Respondent’s investigator inspected the unit and found the unit to be fully furnished with Ms. DeLiz’s personal possessions. (AR 39.) Tenant also explained that she would use propane to cook at the Apartment. (AR 773.)

A reasonable fact finder could weigh this evidence in favor of Tenant on all the enumerated factors and determine that the Apartment was Tenant’s usual residence of return. As such, Respondent did not abuse its discretion.

Accordingly, the petition is DENIED.