Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV00108, Date: 2024-08-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV00108    Hearing Date: August 27, 2024    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           Colleen McCaslin v. Hall Ambulance Service, Inc., et al.

CASE NO.:                23SMCV00108                                 

MOTION:                  Motion for Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication

HEARING:                Tuesday, August 27, 2024                 

                                                                BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Colleen McCaslin filed this personal injury action arising from an automobile collision against Defendant Hall Ambulance Service Inc., Pro Safety & Rescue, Inc., and Does 1 to 50. Other than alleging that the defendants leased or rented the vehicle that collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle, the Complaint does not provide any details regarding the accident.  Defendant Pro Safety & Rescue, Inc. filed its Cross-Complaint against Roes 1 through 100, inclusive, alleging (among other things) that in the event it is found to be responsible for the events alleged in the Complaint, it will be entitled to indemnification and/or contribution from the cross-defendants.

LEGAL STANDARD

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (CCP, § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in¿Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.”¿(CCP,¿§ 437c(f)(1).)¿If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court¿(1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)¿ “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (CCP,¿§ 437c(t).)¿ 

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿(CCP, §¿437c(c).)¿The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when¿a material fact is the witness’s¿state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (CCP, § 437c(e).)¿ 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here¿is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.”¿(Consumer Cause, Inc. v.¿SmileCare¿(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿ 

¿ 

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to¿frame¿the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co.¿(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability¿as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Ibid.)¿ 

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

Request for Judicial Notice

In its reply brief, Pro Safety asks the Court to take judicial notice of Defendant’s answer and affirmative defenses. (Reply, filed August 20, 2024, p. 3:6-9.)  Although a Court can take judicial of court records (Evid. Code,  § 452, subd. (d)), Pro Safety did not seek judicial notice with its moving papers to give the opposing parties the opportunity to respond to that issue. Therefore, the request for judicial notice is DENIED.

ANALYSIS

Defendant Pro Safety & Rescue, Inc. (“Pro Safety”) moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative summary adjudication, arguing that the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (“MICRA”) applies to this lawsuit and limits general damages to no more than $250,000. Plaintiff Colleen McCaslin (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion.

            The following facts are undisputed. “Plaintiff contends that Defendant owned, operated, entrusted, and controlled their vehicle in a negligent and reckless manner causing serious injuries and damages to Plaintiff.” (UMF ¶ 2.) Specifically, “Plaintiff … contends … that [an] employee of the Defendant caused the INCIDENT by colliding an ambulance vehicle into a guard rail on the I-405 Southbound Freeway as she was being transported inside said ambulance vehicle to a hospital.” (UMF ¶ 3.) “Plaintiff alleges that defendant negligently caused damage to Plaintiff as a result.” (UMF ¶ 4.)

            Based on those undisputed facts, Pro Safety moves for summary judgment or adjudication, arguing that Plaintiff cannot recover more than $250,000 because (1) the act of operating an ambulance to transport a patient to or from a medical facility is encompassed within the term “professional negligence,” and transporting a patient by ambulance falls within “professional services” under MICRA, and (2) MICRA only allows an injured person to recover a maximum of $250,000 in general damages.

            However, Pro Safety has failed to show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact. (CCP, § 437c(c).) Indeed, the defendant has not argued or demonstrated that Plaintiff’s negligence claims lack merit.  Therefore, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment.

            Defendant is also not entitled to summary adjudication. Granted, it is true (as Pro Safety argues in its reply) that Code of Civil Procedure section 437c “allows the court to adjudicate on summary adjudication, an affirmative defense or a measure of damage.” (Reply, p. 2:8-9.) However, that statute states that “[a] motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”  (CCP, § 437c(f)(1).) Here, Pro Safety is not seeking to completely dispose of Plaintiff’s damages claim or an affirmative defense; the defendant is only seeking to place a cap on noneconomic damages.

            Even if the Court were to consider the cap issue on its merits, as Plaintiff argues in her opposition, the motion is premature and based on the former MICRA statute.  “Civil Code section 3333.2, an essential part of MICRA, limits the size of any award of non-economic damages in an action for injury against a health care provider based on professional negligence. (Mayes v. Bryan (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1099.)  Former Civil Code section 3333.2 stated that “[i]n any action for injury against a health care provider based on professional negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage” (id. at subd. (a)) and limited “the amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000)” (id. at subd. (b)).

            However, in 2022, the California legislature enacted a bill that removed the $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages. (CA LEGIS 17 (2022), 2022 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 17 (A.B. 35) (WEST).)  Civil Code section 3333.2 now states, among other things, that “[i]n any action for injury that does not involve wrongful death against one or more health care providers or health care institutions based on professional negligence, the following limitations shall apply: ¶ (1) Civil liability for damages for noneconomic losses against one or more health care providers, collectively, shall not exceed three hundred fifty thousand dollars ($350,000), regardless of the number of health care providers, which does not include any unaffiliated health care providers that are responsible for noneconomic losses pursuant to paragraph (3).” (Civ. Code, § 3333.2(b) [emphasis added].)

            Here, no damages have been proved or awarded, and Defendant has proven that this case could not end up being a wrongful death action, which is subject to a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages. (Civ. Code, § 3333.2(c).) Moreover, “[t]he MICRA cap has no effect on the jury’s verdict itself or the amount determined to be a plaintiff’s true noneconomic losses.” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 326.) “MICRA ‘limit[s] the recovery rather than the value of noneconomic damages as a means of protecting the insurability of health care providers. This result is consistent with the Legislature’s power to control the measure of damages a plaintiff is entitled to receive [citation] while accomplishing its cost-cutting goal in a “‘reasonable’” manner.”’ [Citation.]” (Ibid. [italics in original].)

            It is more efficient to require Pro Safety to raise the MICRA damages cap issue after a verdict has been rendered.  Thus, Pro Safety’s motion for summary judgment or adjudication is DENIED.