Judge Mark A. Young, Case 23SMCV00292 2023-04-04 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV00292, Date: 2023-04-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV00292 Hearing Date: April 4, 2023 Dept: M

CASE NAME: Sakian v. Belanger, et al.

CASE NO.: 23SMCV00292

MOTION: Motion to Strike

HEARING DATE: 4/4/2023

Legal Standard

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code Section 3294. (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294 (a).)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. [Citations.] In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. [Citations.] In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. [Citation.]” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. omitted.)

“Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to show in what manner plaintiff can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (Id.)

Analysis

Defendant Christopher G. Belanger moves to strike allegations supporting Plaintiff Shawn Sakian’s punitive damages claim. Defendant argues that the complaint has failed to state sufficient facts to support the allegations of malice or oppression.

The Complaint alleges that this case arises from a vehicle collision. Defendant made an unsafe movement causing Defendant’s vehicle to collide directly and proximately with Plaintiff’s parked vehicle. (Compl., ¶ 5.) At the time of the collision, Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. (¶ 23.) Defendant also exhibited signs of intoxication, including red & watery eyes, odor of alcohol emitting from his breath and person, and slow & slurred speech. (¶ 24.) Defendant was prosecuted for driving under the influence of alcohol. (Id.) Defendant knowingly drove his vehicle while impaired and under the influence of alcohol and that he knew that such conduct was highly likely and probable to result in a collision resulting in serious injury or death to other persons on the public highways. (¶ 25.) As such, Plaintiff contends that Defendant willfully and intentionally operated his motor vehicle in a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of Plaintiff. (Id.)

Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 890 (“Taylor”) is instructive with respect to this set of facts. In Taylor, the Court concluded that punitive damages are not always appropriate in cases involving driving while intoxicated. “[W]e have concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under §3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” (Id. at 892.) Notably, courts in subsequent decisions have held that driving while intoxicated does not always give rise to a claim for punitive damages. (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 89.) “[W]e do not agree that the risk created generally by one who becomes intoxicated and decides nevertheless to drive a vehicle on the public streets is the same as the risk created by an intoxicated driver’s decision to zigzag in and out of traffic at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area at 1:30 in the afternoon on a Sunday in June. The risk of injury to others from ordinary driving while intoxicated is certainly foreseeable, but it is not necessarily probable.” (Ibid.; see Sumpter v. Matteson¿(2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 928, 936 [defendant “knew he was under the influence when he got into his car, and [the defendant] knew the light was red for over a quarter mile before he entered the intersection, yet he never braked, choosing instead to take the risk and run the red light. Such conduct reflects a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others and would have supported the imposition of punitive damages in this case.”].)

Notably, the standard for punitive damages has only become more stringent since Taylor, which was decided prior to 1987 when the Legislature added the requirement to Civil Code Section 3294 that conduct be “despicable” in order to support imposition of punitive damages. “[T]he statute's reference to ‘despicable’ conduct seems to represent a new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.¿Used in its ordinary sense, the adjective ‘despicable’ is a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ (4 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 529.)¿As amended to include this word,¿the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (Coll. Hosp., supra, 8 Cal. 4th at 725 [emphasis added].) There has been no subsequent decision holding that drinking and driving, without exacerbating circumstances that make injury probable, gives rise to a claim for punitive damages.

The allegations only state Defendant was intoxicated in general terms, and are insufficient to support the imposition of punitive damages. As discussed in Taylor and Dawes, specific factual circumstances must be plead which show that the risk of injury was probable, e.g., weaving through lanes of traffic, a previous conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, driving while simultaneously drinking alcohol, etc. The fact that an accident occurred, and Defendant was intoxicated, without more, has the character of negligent driving and does not show circumstances warranting punitive damages.

Therefore, the factual allegations of the complaint are not sufficient to rise to the level of despicable conduct and malice to support a claim for punitive damages. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED with 10 days leave to amend.