Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV01882, Date: 2023-11-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23SMCV01882 Hearing Date: November 7, 2023 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Irons v. Charter
Communications Inc.
CASE NO.: 23SMCV01882
MOTION: Demurrer
to the Complaint
HEARING DATE: 11/7/2023
Legal
Standard
A
demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.
(Hahn v. Mirda (2007)
147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the
allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects
must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co.
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not
the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the
defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (CCP §§
430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate
facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim
against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie
(1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading,
or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen
(1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732, internal citations omitted.)
A
special demurrer for uncertainty is disfavored and will only be sustained where
the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot
reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or
claims are directed against him/her. (CCP § 430.10(f); Khoury v. Maly’s
of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if
the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern
discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)
“Liberality in permitting amendment
is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie
M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of
discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable
possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to
show in what manner plaintiff can amend the complaint,
and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the
pleading. (Id.)
Analysis
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant’s
request for judicial notice is GRANTED.
Discussion
Defendant Charter Communications,
Inc. (“Charter”) demurs to Plaintiff Shannon Irons’ complaint. Plaintiff
asserts claims under (1) the 14th Amendment, (2) 15 U.S.C. § 45 (FTCA), (3)
California’s Unruh Act, and (4) California Business and Professions Code
section 17200 (California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”)). Plaintiff generally
alleges that Charter discriminated against him by refusing to provide him with
a Charter account based on his lack of a physical address. (Compl. ¶ 5.)
Federal Claims
Defendant argues that the doctrine
of res judicata bars the 14th Amendment and 15 USC § 45 claims. The doctrine of res judicata generally
precludes parties, or their privies, from relitigating a cause of action
determined with finality in a prior proceeding. (Smith v. ExxonMobil Oil
Corp. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1413-14.) The doctrine has two aspects:
it applies to both a previously litigated cause of action, referred to as claim
preclusion, and to an issue necessarily decided in a prior action, referred to
as issue preclusion. (Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th
815, 828.) “[R]es judicata does not merely bar relitigation of identical claims
or causes of action. Instead, in its collateral estoppel aspect, the doctrine
may also preclude a party to prior litigation from redisputing issues therein
decided against him, even when those issues bear on different claims raised in
a later case. Moreover, because the estoppel need not be mutual, it is not
necessary that the earlier and later proceedings involve the identical parties
or their privies. Only the party against whom the doctrine is invoked must be
bound by the prior proceeding. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
“In California the phrase ‘cause of action’ is
often used indiscriminately ... to mean counts which state [according to
different legal theories] the same cause of action....” (Eichler Homes of
San Mateo, Inc. v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 845, 847.) For purposes
of [Control]applying the doctrine of res judicata, the phrase “cause of action”
has a more precise meaning: The cause of action is the right to obtain redress
for a harm suffered, regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal
theory (common law or statutory) advanced. (See Bay Cities Paving &
Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers' Mutual Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 854, 860.) “[T]he
‘cause of action’ is based upon the harm suffered, as opposed to the particular
theory asserted by the litigant. [Citation.] Even where there are multiple
legal theories upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury gives rise
to only one claim for relief. ‘Hence a judgment for the defendant is a bar to a
subsequent action by the plaintiff based on the same injury to the same right,
even though he presents a different legal ground for relief.’ [Citations.]” Under
the primary rights theory, the determinative factor is the harm suffered. When
two actions involving the same parties seek compensation for the same harm,
they generally involve the same primary right. (Boeken
v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 798.) Therefore, claim preclusion
applies if: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with
the one presented in the new action; (2) there was a final judgment on the
merits in the prior action, and (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted
was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. (Id.
at 797.)
Defendant
provides the relevant case history via judicial notice. On February 17, 2023,
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) in federal court alleging discrimination
based on his “Homeless Status of not having a Physical Address or Residence.” (RJN,
Ex. I at 2:2-3.) The FAC replaced Plaintiff’s prior claim for violation of 42
U.S.C. § 2000a (Title II of the Civil Rights Act) with two new federal claims
for discrimination under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Federal Trade
Commission Act)) and retained his claim for violation of California’s Unruh Act
based upon the same grounds as in his original complaint. (RJN Exs. A, I.) On
March 6, 2023, Charter moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal FAC on the grounds
that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (RJN Ex. J.)
Plaintiff opposed Charter’s motion and again filed an opposition to Charter’s
reply in support of the motion to dismiss. (RJN Exs. K, L.) On April 12, 2023,
the federal court issued a tentative ruling granting Charter’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC. (RJN Ex. M.) On April 25, 2023, the federal court
dismissed Plaintiff’s federal causes of action without leave to amend and
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act
claim. (RJN Ex. N.)
The parties fully litigated the
federal claims Plaintiff now re-asserted in this matter. As shown by the above
record, Plaintiff bases the instant action on the same causes of action he
presented federal court—that Charter discriminated against him based on his
homeless status. In total, Plaintiff filed five briefs supporting his claims,
the court held two hearings at which the parties discussed the merits of
Plaintiff’s claims, and the court issued four rulings finding Plaintiff’s federal
claims lacked merit. The dismissal acts as a final judgment on the merits of
those claims. Therefore, res judicata bars re-litigation of those claims here.
Accordingly, the demurrer is
SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the 14th Amendment and 15 USC § 45
claims.
Unruh Act Claim
“All persons within the jurisdiction of
this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color,
religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic
information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language,
or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments
of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51(b), emphasis added.) “No
business establishment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate against . . .
any person in this state on account of any characteristic listed or defined in
subdivision (b) or (e) of Section 51 . . . because the person is perceived to
have one or more of those characteristics, or because the person is associated
with a person who has, or is perceived to have, any of those
characteristics.” (Civ. Code § 51.5(a).)
Plaintiff alleges that Charter /
Spectrum provides business TV Cable, Telephone Internet and wireless internet
services, commercial cable television, internet, telephone, broadband, digital
cable, digital telephone HDTV, home security, internet security, mobile phone
and VoIP phone. (Compl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges that if “a person does not
have a Residence or Physical Location [] that person cannot get an [] account
with Charter / Spectrum.” (¶ 9.) Plaintiff was a Charter/Spectrum customer at
some point in the past, but Defendant now denies their services to him because
he does not have a physical address. (¶¶ 20-30.)
Plaintiff cannot state a cause of
action under Civil Code § 51 because a lack of a physical address is not a
protected class under this statute. Plaintiff argues that the Court should
ignore the plain language of the statute to conclude that homeless status
should be included as an unmentioned class. However, such a construction would
be impermissibly vague.
Accordingly, the demurrer is
SUSTAINED without leave to amend.
Business and Professions Code section 17200
To successfully plead a UCL claim, a plaintiff must plead and prove that
the defendant engaged in a business practice that was either unlawful (i.e., is
forbidden by law), unfair (i.e., harm to victim outweighs any benefit) or
fraudulent (i.e., is likely to deceive members of the public). (Albillo v. Intermodal Container Services,
Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 190, 206.)
For a plaintiff to have standing under the UCL, plaintiff must have
“suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the
unfair competition” to pursue a claim. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204.) “To
satisfy the narrower standing requirements imposed by Proposition 64, a party
must now (1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to
qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that that
economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business
practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 322.) “There are
innumerable ways in which economic injury from unfair competition may be shown.
A plaintiff may (1) surrender in a transaction more, or acquire in a
transaction less, than he or she otherwise would have; (2) have a present or
future property interest diminished; (3) be deprived of money or property to
which he or she has a cognizable claim; or (4) be required to enter into a
transaction, costing money or property, that would otherwise have been
unnecessary.” (Id. at 323.)
Plaintiff does not make any
allegation that he has lost any money or property. The complaint alleges that
the Plaintiff suffered damages when Charter denied him an account
because he did not have a physical address. (Compl., ¶ 27.) Plaintiff does not
allege that he gave any money or property as a part of this transaction.
Without such an allegation, Plaintiff cannot claim an “injury in fact” under
the UCL. Therefore, Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue a UCL claim.
Accordingly, the demurrer is
SUSTAINED without leave to amend.
Defendant to prepare a proposed
judgment.