Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV01967, Date: 2024-07-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV01967    Hearing Date: July 18, 2024    Dept: M

CASE NAME:             Osborn v. Maroja, et al. 

CASE NO.:                   23SMCV01967

MOTION:                     Motion to Strike

HEARING DATE:   7/19/2024

LEGAL STANDARD 

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) 

“Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to show¿in what manner¿plaintiff can amend the complaint, and¿how¿that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿(Id.) 

ANALYSIS 

Cross-Defendant Mary Ann Osborn, individually and as Trustee of the Mary Ann Osborn Trust dated April 2, 2007, moves to strike the punitive damage allegations in Cross-Complainant Camila Maroja’s Cross-Complaint. Cross-Defendant seeks to strike the punitive damages allegations related to the seventh cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Cross-Defendant asserts that, at best, the Cross-Complaint only shows that the parties disagreed regarding ownership of the Property, whether monies paid toward the Property were a loan or a gift, and that the parties had verbal altercations on several occasions. Cross-Defendant asserts that the generic allegations of IIED are insufficient to establish malice as a matter of fact.

Cross-Defendant focuses entirely on the generic allegations of the seventh cause of action. However, Cross-Defendant ignores the entirety of the Cross-Complaint, including facts which were expressly incorporated into the seventh cause of action. Punitive damages are available where plaintiff shows that defendant was guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) Section 3294 defines malice as conduct “intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff,” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Despicable is a powerful term used to describe circumstances that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (Coll. Hosp. v. Superior Ct. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 704, 726.) The statute “plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, “malice” requires more than a “willful and conscious” disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of “despicable conduct” must be found.” (Id., emphasis added.)  The Cross-Complaint alleges, as a matter of fact, that Cross-Defendant intended to injure Cross-Complainant with her course of conduct.

The Cross-Complaint alleges the following facts relevant to the allegations of malice. Cross-Defendant purchased the Subject Property for Cross-Complainant and her family (Dustin and Julian Osborn). (CC ¶¶ 9-10.) Cross-Complainant and her family moved into the Property on April 1, 2020, furnished the Property with wallpaper and bookshelves designed especially for the Property, and treated and considered the Property as their own. (Id.) Cross-Defendant obtained a purchase money loan in the amount of $861,750.00 (the “Loan”), secured against the Property by a Deed of Trust recorded on March 27, 2020. (CC ¶ 11.) Upon purchase by Cross-Defendant, the Property was acquired on behalf of and in trust for Cross-Complainant and Dustin Osborn. (CC ¶12.) Cross-Defendant transferred title to the Property by Grant Deed dated May 7, 2020, to “Dustin F. Osborn and Camila Maroja, Husband and Wife as Joint Tenants,” and caused that Grant Deed to be duly recorded on May 27, 2020. (CC ¶ 13.) Dustin Osborn allegedly reimbursed Cross-Defendant. (CC ¶ 14.) Dustin Osborn also rendered management and advising services to Cross-Defendant in exchange for compensation and/or offset of the HOA dues, property taxes, and loan payments. (CC ¶ 15.) Cross-Defendant also made certain lump sum payments as a gift to Cross-Complainant and Dustin Osborn. (¶ 16.)

Dustin Osborn died suddenly and unexpectedly on January 6, 2023, whereby Cross-Complainant became the sole owner of the Property. (CC ¶17.) Cross-Defendant ceased paying the monthly HOA dues, property taxes, and Loan payments for the Property. (CC ¶ 18.) Cross-Defendant advised Cross-Complainant that Cross-Complainant would be financially responsible for all future payments on the Loan, monthly HOA dues, and property taxes. (Id.) Cross-Complainant has made or caused to be made all payments regarding the Property. (CC ¶ 19.)

Cross-Complainant further alleges that Cross-Defendant began to act erratically and aggressively in her interactions with Cross-Complainant. Cross-Defendant told Cross-Complainant that she hopes her son (Cross-Defendant’s grandson) dies “so that you know how I feel.” (CC ¶ 20.) Cross-Defendant claimed that the transfer of the Property was invalid, refused to accept payments on the Loan from Cross-Complainant, claimed that the Loan was in immediate jeopardy of foreclosure if title to the Property was not conveyed back to Cross-Defendant, and threatened to file bankruptcy, among other things, thereby jeopardizing Cross-Complainant’s home. (Id.)  More specifically, on February 14, 2023, Cross-Defendant entered the Property unannounced using a spare key, threatened Cross-Complainant in front of her four-year old son, calling Cross-Complainant a “bitch,” said that she had only verbal agreements with Dustin Osborn and that nobody would believe Cross-Complainant about the agreements concerning the property, said that the death of a son is much more severe than the death of a husband, and threatened to declare bankruptcy so that Cross-Complainant would lose the Property. (CC ¶21.)

On February 16, 2023, Cross-Defendant again entered the Property unannounced, this time threatening to take Cross-Complainant’s four-year old son to New York, without Cross-Complainant’s consent, while Cross-Complainant was on a scheduled business trip the following month. (CC ¶ 22.) In response to Cross-Complainant’s objection, Cross-Defendant said “you will be away, what can you do?” thereby frightening Cross-Complainant, and subjecting Cross-Complainant to fear loss of control of her four-year old son, and again calling Cross-Complainant, among other inappropriate things, a “bitch” and "crazy" in front of the four-year old child, causing the four-year old to start crying. (Id.)

On February 20, 2023, after learning that Cross-Complainant changed the lock on the door to the Property, Cross-Defendant texted Cross-Complainant, stating, among other things, “Dustin’s salary was never written anywhere. It was only verbal between him and me. There is no proof that we had a contract at all. The loan is all in my name. I have the liability only. I am calling the bank tomorrow to refinance the loan which means payments will be much higher at 7% for y[o]ur mother.” (CC ¶23.) Cross-Complainant felt unsafe staying in the Property and no longer comfortable living across the hall from Cross-Defendant Mary Ann Osborn. (CC ¶ 24.) Accordingly, Cross-Complainant accepted out-of-state employment, and began staying elsewhere. (Id.) In March, 2023, Cross-Complainant commenced efforts to sell the Property in order the pay off the Loan and thereby terminate the ongoing monthly payments to maintain the Property. (Id.) On April 21, 2023, Cross-Defendant advised Cross-Complainant that she was going to call the bank on April 27, 2023 and tell the bank to foreclose on the Property. (Id.) Cross-Defendant also interfered with efforts to sell the Property by accosting an interested buyer on May 2, 2023. (CC ¶ 25.)

The seventh cause of action incorporates the allegations of conversion and invasion of privacy. On May 30, 2023, without the knowledge or consent of Cross-Complainant, Cross-Defendant entered the Property and removed various personal property belonging to Cross-Complainant. The Personal Property included cherished keepsakes and reminders of Cross-Complainant’s life with her now-deceased husband, Dustin Osborn, including but not limited to the following: · 3 large framed photographs of a solar eclipse; · Dustin Osborn’s framed UCLA and Yale diplomas; · A framed certificate from the Court of Appeal with a letter on the back; · Several family pictures including Dustin and Camila’s wedding pictures, postcards of Julian Osborn (then 4 years old), polaroid pictures of Julian Osborn, and other family photos; · 2 frames photographs of Dustin Osborn; · A lithograph of a girl and a deer; · A framed picture of Julian Osborn wearing a mushroom t-shirt and red jacket. (CC ¶43.) Cross-Complainant demanded the return of the Personal Property, but Cross-Defendant refused to return the items. (CC ¶44.) Cross-Defendant acted with malice and oppression by taking and thereby converting the Personal Property. (CC ¶45.) Cross-Defendant “intended her conversion of the Personal Property to cause Cross-Complainant to suffer harm and emotional distress.” (Id.)

On February 14, 2023, and again on February 16, 2023, Cross-Defendant Mary Ann Osborn intentionally intruded on Cross-Complainant’s privacy by entering the Property unannounced and without permission, and in the presence of both Cross-Complainant and Julian Osborn, screamed at, belittled and insulted Cross-Complainant. (CC ¶49.) As a result of this invasion, Cross-Complainant moved out of state, did not share her new address with Cross-Defendant, and took precautions to preserve the confidentiality of her new residential address. (CC ¶ 50.) Despite these efforts, on November 7, 2023, Cross-Defendant entered the mailroom of the condominium complex in which the Property is located, found a package addressed to Cross-Complainant and/or her son, opened the package, examined the contents, and discovered Cross-Complainant’s new residential address. (CC ¶51.) Cross-Defendant’s intrusions into the Property and her unauthorized opening of Cross-Complainant’s mail would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and were in fact highly offensive to Cross-Complainant. (CC ¶ 52.)

According to the seventh cause of action itself, Cross-Defendant’s alleged conduct was “outrageous.” (CC ¶56.) Cross-Defendant “intended to cause Cross-Complainant emotional distress and/or acted with reckless disregard for the probability that Cross-Complainant would suffer emotional distress.” (CC ¶57.) As a result, Cross-Complainant suffered severe emotional distress. (CC ¶¶58-59.)

Throughout the Cross-Complaint, Cross-Complainant establishes as a matter of fact that Cross-Defendant’s conduct was intended to cause Cross-Complainant injury. Conversion may subject a defendant to punitive damages when performed with the requisite malice, oppression or fraud. (Krieger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 137, 148.) Cross-Defendant does not explain how the above factual allegations are insufficient to support the pled intentional harm. Taken as a whole, a reasonable person could conclude that the above course of conduct was intended to cause injury and/or emotional distress. Further, these acts are independent of the alleged breach of contract claim. As such, the Cross-Complaint establishes sufficient facts in support of the allegations of malice for pleading purposes.

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.