Judge Mark A. Young, Case Number: 23SMCV02142, Date: 2024-02-02 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV02142, Date: 2024-02-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV02142 Hearing Date: February 2, 2024 Dept: M

CASE NO.: 23SMCV02140 / 23SMCV02142

MOTION: Motion to Deem Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant, Post Bond

HEARING DATE: 2/2/2024

Legal Standard

Vexatious litigant statutes were created to counter the abuse of the court system by “persistent and obsessive litigants.” (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002), 99 Cal. App. 4th 211, 220-21.) Under CCP section 391 et seq., to counter a potential vexatious litigant, “a defendant may stay pending litigation by moving to require a vexatious litigant to furnish security if the court determines ‘there is not a reasonable probability’ the plaintiff will prevail. Failure to produce the ordered security results in dismissal of the litigation in favor of the defendant.” (Id. at 221; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 391.1, 391.4.)

A vexatious litigant means a person who does any of the following:

(1) in the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been (i) finally determined adversely to the person or (ii) unjustifiably permitted to remain pending at least two years without having been brought to trial or hearing;

(2) After a litigation has been finally determined against the person, repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in propria persona, either (i) the validity of the determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined or (ii) the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law, determined or concluded by the final determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined.

(3) In any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.

(4) Has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by any state or federal court of record in any action or proceeding based upon the same or substantially similar facts, transaction, or occurrence.

(5) After being restrained pursuant to a restraining order issued after a hearing pursuant to Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 6300) of Part 4 of Division 10 of the Family Code, and while the restraining order is still in place, they commenced, prosecuted, or maintained one or more litigations against a person protected by the restraining order in this or any other court or jurisdiction that are determined to be meritless and caused the person protected by the order to be harassed or intimidated.

(CCP§391(b).)

A plaintiff is entitled to a hearing for their “right to oral argument and to present evidence” before the court declares them vexatious and imposes security. (Bravo, 99 Cal.App.4th 223.) Any determination that a litigant is vexatious must comport with the intent and spirit of the vexatious litigant statute. (Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 Cal. App. 4th 963, 970-971.) The purpose of which is to address the problem created by the persistent and obsessive litigant who constantly has pending a number of groundless actions and whose conduct causes serious financial results to the unfortunate objects of his or her attacks and places an unreasonable burden on the courts. (Id.) Therefore, to find that a litigant is vexatious, the trial court must conclude that the litigants actions are unreasonably impacting other parties and the Courts as contemplated by the statute. (Id.)

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

Defendants’ requests for judicial notice are GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452(d).)

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is DENIED as to request nos. 1-2 and GRANTED as to the remainder.

Analysis

Defendants Darren Burris (23SMCV02140) and Defendant Sierra Fino (23SMCV02142) separately move to declare Plaintiff James Hunter as a vexatious litigant and require him to post a $25,000.00 security to cover the expected attorneys’ fees. Defendants submit that Plaintiff should be declared a vexatious litigant because he is the named defendant in the restraining order issued in case 22SMR00115, which designates Fino and Burris as protected persons from Hunter. (RJN Exs. 1-2.) Thus, Defendants seek to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant under section 391(b)(5), which pertains to such restraining orders.

Defendants demonstrate that they are protected persons under the order, that Plaintiff is the restrained person, and that while the order was in place, Plaintiff commenced these actions. However, this showing alone is insufficient as a matter of law. Under section 391(b)(5), the instant actions need to have been “determined to be meritless” and “caused the person protected by the order to be harassed or intimidated.” This action has not been determined to be meritless. Additionally, Defendants cite no case filed by plaintiff that was determined to be without merit. At best, Defendants cite a dismissed small claims action against Fino. However, there was no determination on the merits in that action, as it was dismissed without prejudice. (Hunter Decl., ¶ 28.) Thus, the Court cannot infer that the small claims action was frivolous or completely without merit. Furthermore, Defendants submit no declaration showing that they were “harassed or intimidated” by the instant suits. Without this evidence, the Court may not declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant.

Likewise, Defendants cite no litigation where Plaintiff, while acting in propria persona, repeatedly filed unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers that were frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. (CCP § 391(b)(3).)

Defendants contend that the instant actions are without merit, at least as to Fino, because Fino and Plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement which may apply to this action. Defendants reason that this action is meritless because it is embraced by a settlement agreement entered into under case no. 22SMCV01181. (Glasco Decl., Ex. 3.) Indeed, the terms of the release are broad and may pertain to this action. The Release states: "It is the intention of the Parties to settle and dispose of ... any and all claims, potential claims, complaints, demands, and causes of action ... which may have arisen prior to the effective date of this Agreement and Release [signed on October 13, 2022]." (Id.) The instant actions pertain to an incident that occurred on April 22, 2022. Thus, Plaintiff could have brought these claims with the prior complaints, or, at least was aware of the instant claims when the settlement agreement was entered. However, it is not certain from the record that the instant action was validly settled by Hunter and Fino. Plaintiff argues that the settlement was procured by fraud. Aside from his declaration here (Hunter Decl., ¶ 28), Plaintiff filed a verified pleading which attests that the cited settlement agreement was procured by fraud. (See Verified Compl. in case no. 23STCV25071, ¶¶ 2, 9-25.) There has been no determination, here or in any other case, that the settlement agreement was valid, or procured by fraud. The Court is reluctant to litigate this issue for the first time in the context of this vexatious litigant motion, especially when other concurrent actions exist. Moreover, even if the Court were to accept that the settlement is valid as to Plaintiff’s claims against Fino, the settlement does not show that it is valid as to Plaintiff’s claims against Burris. Burris was not a party to the settlement, and thus its application to the action against him is tenuous.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motions are DENIED.