Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV02310, Date: 2024-04-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23SMCV02310 Hearing Date: April 11, 2024 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Schlosberg v. Alliance
Property Management, et al.
CASE NO.: 23SMCV02310
MOTION: Motion
to Strike
HEARING DATE: 4/11/2024
Legal
Standard
Any party, within the time allowed
to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the
whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule
3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and
upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper
matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any
pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court
rule, or an order of the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a
pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are
surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)
In order to state a prima facie
claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated
in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code Section 3294. (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294
(a).) “In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive
damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled
by a plaintiff. [Citations.] In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a
motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to
strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.
[Citations.] In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in
isolation. [Citation.]” (Clauson v.
Superior Court (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed
is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only
must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be
alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn.
omitted.)
“Liberality in permitting amendment
is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie
M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of
discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable
possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to
show in what manner plaintiff can amend the complaint,
and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the
pleading. (Id.)
Request
for judicial notice/SUR-REPLY
Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the complaint
initially filed in this action, including Exhibit A, which is the alleged lease
at issue. The complaint and its attached exhibits are court records and
judicial notice is properly granted.
(Evid. Code § 452(d).) Therefore, the request is GRANTED.
The Rules of Court contemplate only
moving, opposition, and reply papers. (See Cal. R. of Court, rule 3.1113(d).)
As there are no sur-replies or other pleadings to respond to a reply permitted
by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Rules of Court, the Court strikes Plaintiff’s
sur-reply filed on April 8, 2024.
Counsel’s future failure to comply with these rules will result in
monetary sanctions.
Analysis
Defendants move to strike the request for punitive damages as to each
cause of action. Defendants address each cause of action in turn.
Quiet Enjoyment
Defendants argue that punitive damages are unavailable for breach of
contract claims, including breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.
Generally, punitive damages may not be awarded in an “action for the
breach of an obligation not arising from contract.” (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) While
a tenant is entitled to contract
damages in accordance with Civil Code section 3300, punitive and tort damages
are recoverable only if the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is breached by
a wrongful eviction. (See Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873,
897-901 [courts have allowed tort damages in connection with wrongful eviction
claims]; Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th
261, 293 [a breach of the covenant may take “many forms, including actual or
constructive eviction”]; Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apts.
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1030-1031, 1036 [where landlord wrongfully removed
furniture from apartment and changed locks, punitive damages were
available for “wrongful eviction, trespass, invasion of privacy, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress”]; see also Public Employees' Retirement System v.
Winston (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d
205, 208 [termination or reduction in services due under the lease breaches the
covenant of quiet enjoyment].)
Here, the Complaint is unclear whether Defendants’ alleged interference
with the quiet enjoyment of the premises constituted a wrongful eviction. Plaintiff
alleges Defendants substantially interfered with his quiet enjoyment by: (1) Colluding
against Plaintiff behind his back; (2) Promising to Plaintiff’s roommates that
they could replace Plaintiff in his Lease Agreement of 17 years; (3)
Interfering with Plaintiff’s contracts with his roommates; (4) Treating
Plaintiff in a disparate manner; (5) Intentionally misrepresenting and lying to
Plaintiff; (6) Providing legal advice to Tamme to prevent Plaintiff from
removing her from his home; (7) Forcing Plaintiff to live in the presence of
Tamme, who was no longer welcomed in his home, in furtherance of Defendants’
conspiracy and harassment; (8) Guiding Tamme and providing her support to lock
Plaintiff out of his home for about nearly two months; (9) Telling Tamme to
call the police, to file a complaint with Santa Monica City against Plaintiff,
and that she did not have to move out; (10) Failure to properly repair known
defects causing Plaintiff’s home to be uninhabitable, resulting to injury to
Plaintiff; (11) refusing to provide the same protections to Plaintiff that were
provide to other tenants; (12) providing unsolicited legal advice to
Plaintiff’s roommates and lying to Plaintiff that no contact had been made; and
(13) allowing unauthorized vehicles to be parked in Plaintiff’s parking spot and
disregarding Plaintiff’s complaints. (FAC ¶ 103.) None of these facts support a
claim for wrongful eviction, since Plaintiff was not dispossessed of the
property. Plaintiff does include a fact that he was locked out of the apartment
for “two months,” which could be a substantial interference. The two-month time period, however, is not
alleged to have been a constructive or actual eviction. Thus, further facts are
required to support a claim for punitive damages under this cause of action.
Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. Leave to amend will not be allowed
unless Plaintiff proffers facts demonstrating a reasonable probability of
successful amendment. The Court is concerned
that Plaintiff is unable to succeed on a wrongful eviction claim in light of
Defendants’ successful unlawful detainer action. The issue of the “wrongfulness” of the
eviction was likely adjudicated in that action and would be precluded by res
judicata.
Remaining Causes
of Action
Defendants argue that none of the other causes arise to the level of
intentional, despicable or malicious conduct which warrant punitive damages.
Specifically, Defendants argue that there are no facts which demonstrate that
they intended anyone harm or consciously disregarded anyone’s rights.
Defendants argue that they were simply asserting their rights under the Lease.
Defendants observe that Plaintiff allowed Tamme, Justin Doe and Thibault Doe to
move into the Premises in direct violation of paragraph 11 of the Lease, which
is grounds for termination of the tenancy. (FAC ¶¶ 23, 48.) Defendants followed
the procedures required by law in that they provided notice of the violation in
June 2022 and served a notice to quit in January 2023. (Id.) Defendants assert
that since he was in direct violation of the terms of the Lease, there should
be no punitive damages awarded against Defendants’ lawful enforcement of the
Lease terms.
Generally, the causes of action cited (intentional infliction of
emotional distress, harassment, intentional interference, and fraud) may
support a claim for punitive damages if they meet the standards set by section
3294 for malice, oppression or fraud. (See Spinks, supra, 171
Cal.App.4th at 1030-1031 [punitive damages were available against
landlord for “wrongful eviction, trespass, invasion of privacy, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress”].) For
instance, under California law, a landlord’s failure to repair can support a
claim for punitive damages. (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d
903, 920 [exemplary damages proper where landlord had actual knowledge of
defective conditions in the premises, including unsafe and dangerous
conditions, and landlord intentionally failed to repair the issues]; see also Erlach¿v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC¿(2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 1281, 1299 [alleged facts supported a claim when the
landlord-defendant turned off tenant's utilities to prevent the tenant
from returning to the property].)
Defendants assert that because they lawfully evicted Plaintiff, they
cannot be held liable for punitive damages. However, even if Defendants
lawfully evicted him, Plaintiff alleges other conduct which could be fairly
described as intentional or malicious, and potentially supporting punitive
damages. For instance, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants mislead Plaintiff to
believe that roommates’ applications would be processed and approved once they
were submitted in order to bring Plaintiff out of default, but they never
intended to process the applications, ignored the applications received, lied
about receiving them, and actively prevented Plaintiff from removing Tamme from
the apartment unit. (FAC ¶¶ 152-158, 163-168.) Defendants made such
misrepresentations to prevent him from curing their alleged violations of the
Lease and ultimately have him evicted for such violations. (¶¶ 161, 177-178,
181-182.) Defendants do not address these allegations of fraud, which do not
require the additional “despicable” component to support punitive damages.
Defendants also intentionally neglected the needed mold repairs. (FAC ¶
85.) To that end, Defendants knowingly misrepresented to Plaintiff his apartment
unit was habitable and that the
mold issue discovered in 2020 had been remediated, but Defendants chose not to
remediate the source of the underlying problem. (¶ 148.) Plaintiff relied on
these misrepresentations but continued to experience mold symptoms which caused
long term harms. (¶¶ 149-151.) Among other things, Defendants also allegedly
harassed Plaintiff by messaging him to remind of his duty to provide a
habitable premises to his roommates, while ignoring Plaintiff’s maintenance
requests and intentionally failing to maintain the premises in a habitable
condition. (¶¶ 55-57.) Plaintiff also alleges these acts constitute intentional
harassment in violation of anti-harassment statutes. (¶ 78.) Such conduct could
fairly be considered intended to harm or a misrepresentation with the intent to
deprive Plaintiff of his rights under the Lease.
The FAC further alleges that Defendants' alleged conduct was undertaken
with the intent to injure Plaintiffs or with a willful and conscious disregard
of his rights, and constitutes clear and convincing evidence of despicable,
outrageous, oppressive, and malicious misconduct. (FAC ¶¶ 94, 106, 115, 133.) Such
allegedly intentional, fraudulent and despicable conduct underlies the claims
for IIED, harassment, intentional interference with contractual relations, and
fraud. Thus, punitive damages claims are well-pled as to these causes of action.
Accordingly, the motion is DENIED to the remainder.