Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV02460, Date: 2024-08-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV02460    Hearing Date: August 1, 2024    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           Cheatham v. Honda of Santa Monica, et al.

CASE NO.:                23SMCV02460

MOTION:                  Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

HEARING DATE:   8/1/2024

Legal Standard

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (CCP, § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in¿Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.”¿(CCP,¿§ 437c(f)(1).)¿If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court¿(1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)¿ “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (CCP,¿§ 437c(t).)¿ 

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿(CCP, §¿437c(c).)¿The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when¿a material fact is the witness’s¿state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (CCP, § 437c(e).)¿ 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here¿is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.”¿(Consumer Cause, Inc. v.¿SmileCare¿(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿ 

¿ 

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to¿frame¿the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co.¿(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability¿as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Ibid.)¿ 

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

Defendant’s objections are SUSTAINED.

Analysis

Defendant Honda of Santa Monica moves for summary judgment or adjudication. The complaint purports to state three causes of action for fraud, recission and violation of trust. The Court interprets the allegations as a single cause of action for fraud (intentional, negligent, concealment and promise without an intent to perform), as recission and constructive trust are remedies not causes of action.

The elements of fraud are: “(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 170, 184.)

The Complaint alleges that on May 9, 2023, Plaintiff entered into a contract with Defendant Honda of Santa Monica to purchase a new 2023 Honda Accord Hybrid vehicle (VIN # 1HGCY2F54PA022366) (“the Subject Vehicle”) for $48,243.50. (Compl., “Bill for Recission”, ¶ I.) Plaintiff provided a down payment of $500.00 and financed the balance of $47,743.50. (Id.) Honda Santa Monica allegedly failed to “fully disclose to [Plaintiff] the asset which is the promissory note had actual cash value of $48,243.50 and went on to sell or assign my promissory note to HONDA FINACIAL and HONDA FINACIAL is fraudulently misrepresenting the promissory note to be a contract to pay back an alleged loan in the amount of $47,743.50. When [in] fact HONDA FINACIAL never loaned [Plaintiff] any money and cannot prove there was a loan during the transaction to purchase the vehicle.” (Id.) Plaintiff then alleges that there was a “misapplied down payment of $500” when Honda Santa Monica stated a “required downpayment” in order to be approved for financing by the finance company Honda Financial. (Id., ¶II.) However, Honda Financial stated that the down payment was not required. (Id.) The complaint alleges again that Honda Santa Monica allegedly represented that 1) the alleged down payment of $500 was required during the credit transaction; and 2) the credit transaction was a loan. The complaint alleges that the representations were false when made.

            Honda of Santa Monica presents evidence that it made no misrepresentations regarding the down payment or nature of the loan. The pertinent documents reveal that Plaintiff was applying for a loan for the purchase of the Subject Vehicle. (UMF 9; Waites Decl., Exs. A, C.) Plaintiff was never told he needed to include a down payment with the purchase. Plaintiff voluntarily made a nominal down payment of $500.00 and financed the balance of $47,743.50. (UMF 11.) Plaintiff was informed that the sales contract, including the loan, would be assigned to American Honda Finance Corp. (UMF 12, 18.) Plaintiff was aware American Honda Finance Corp. was the lender/lienholder on the Subject Vehicle. (UMF 13.) Honda of Santa Monica had no knowledge of Plaintiff’s misconception that he believed a down payment was required by Honda Finance Corp. (UMF 15-16.) The undisputed evidence thus establishes that nothing was misrepresented to the Plaintiff. (UMF 14.)  

Plaintiff does not submit an opposing separate statement. Thus, Plaintiff cannot meet his burden. Even if the court considers the opposition as a responsive separate statement, Plaintiff submits no evidence in support of his burden to demonstrate that Honda of Santa Monica, in fact, misrepresented the nature of loan or the necessity of the down payment. At best, Plaintiff confusingly cites to American Honda Finance Corporation's articles of incorporation, which has no bearing on the nature of the loan or the downpayment. Plaintiff therefore does not meet his burden to show a dispute of material fact.