Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV03096, Date: 2024-05-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV03096    Hearing Date: May 22, 2024    Dept: M

CASE NAME:             Cann v. Reed, et al. 

CASE NO.:                   23SMCV03096

MOTION:                     Demurrer to the Third Amended Complaint  

HEARING DATE:   5/22/2024

 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (CCP §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732, internal citations omitted.) 

 

A special demurrer for uncertainty is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (CCP § 430.10(f); Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)  

  

“Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to show¿in what manner¿plaintiff can amend the complaint, and¿how¿that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿(Id.)  

 

ANALYSIS 

 

Defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Rickey Reed demur to the entire complaint based upon the statute of limitations, and as to second cause of action for negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention.


Statute of Limitations

 

Defendants assert that the entire complaint is barred by the statute of limitations. For a statute of limitations to bar a claim on demurrer, “the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.”  (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42, internal quotation marks omitted.)  In general, a statute of limitations begins to run “when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements,” namely, wrongdoing, causation, and resulting harm.  (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397.)

 

Under the Government Claims Act, the general rule is that any party with a claim for money or damages against a public entity must first file a claim directly with that entity; only if that claim is denied or rejected may the claimant file a lawsuit. (Gov. Code §§ 905, 945.4; City of Ontario v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 894.) This provides the public entity with an opportunity to evaluate the claim and decide as to whether it will pay on the claim. (Roberts v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 474.)

 

Upon presentation of the claim, the entity may: (1) approve the claim, (2) reject the claim, (3) give notice the claim is insufficient, or (4) do nothing. (Gov. Code § 912.6.) Section 915.4 (a)(2) requires that the denial notice be personally delivered, mailed, or emailed. If mailed, the entity must address the notice “to the address, if any, stated in the claim or application as the address to which the person presenting the claim or making the application desires notices to be sent or, if no such address is stated in the claim or application, by mailing the notice to the address, if any, of the claimant as stated in the claim or application.” If the public entity sends proper written notice of the rejection, plaintiff has six months thereafter to file suit against the entity. (Gov. Code § 945.6(a); see Gov. Code §§ 912.6, 912.8.) Otherwise, a plaintiff has two years from the date of injury to file suit. (Id.)  

 

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was injured in an auto accident on September 22, 2022, involving a bus owned by Defendant Metro. (Compl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff timely presented a claim for damages on September 28, 2022. (Compl., ¶ 14.) Metro rejected the claim on November 22, 2022. (Id.) Based on that date, the deadline to file his lawsuit would be May 23, 2023. Plaintiff filed his lawsuit on July 7, 2023.

 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant did not properly address the denial notice, and counsel did not receive it until 8 months after its mailing date. Defendant contends that the fact that counsel did not receive the rejection because it was sent to the incorrect address goes beyond the four corners of the complaint. However, this fact does not go beyond the complaint. The complaint attaches, as exhibits, the relevant claim and denial letter. On the claim, Mr. Ruszecki is listed as the attorney, with an address of 10200 Culver Blvd Culver City, CA 90232. Plaintiff is listed as the claimant, along with his street address. Pursuant to Government Code section 915.4, the denial notice should have been mailed to one of these addresses. The proof of service of the denial notice instead shows that Metro served counsel at 1900 Avenue of the Stars, Los Angeles CA, 90067. Defendant thereby failed to properly address the denial to any address stated in the claim. Therefore, the two-year period from the date of injury would apply, rather than the six-month period from the date of the denial. As such, the claims are timely.

 

Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED based upon the statute of limitations.

 

Second Cause of Action

 

Plaintiff does not oppose the demurrer and offers to stipulate as to the dismissal of this cause of action. Accordingly, the demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave as to the second cause of action.

 

Defendant is ordered to file an answer within 10 days.