Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV03256, Date: 2025-04-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV03256    Hearing Date: April 29, 2025    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           Finci v. Lyft Inc., et al.

CASE NO.:                23SMCV03256

MOTION:                  Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

HEARING DATE:   4/28/2025

Legal Standard

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (CCP, § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in¿Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.”¿(CCP,¿§ 437c(f)(1).)¿If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court¿(1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)¿ “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (CCP,¿§ 437c(t).)¿ 

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿(CCP, §¿437c(c).)¿The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when¿a material fact is the witness’s¿state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (CCP, § 437c(e).)¿ 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here¿is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.”¿(Consumer Cause, Inc. v.¿SmileCare¿(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿ 

¿ 

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to¿frame¿the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co.¿(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability¿as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Ibid.)¿ 

Analysis

Defendant Christian Coop moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication of Plaintiff Lal Finci’s claims.

Issues 1-3: Sudden Incapacitation

As to the first three issues, Defendant argues that he cannot be held liable because Plaintiff’s injuries were the result of his sudden incapacitation due to acute hypoglycemia, i.e., severe low blood sugar. Defendant contends that this negates the elements of duty and breach, as well as provides for a complete defense to the negligence causes of action.

“Actionable negligence consists of three elements: (1) a defendant’s legal duty to use due care; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of plaintiff’s resulting injury.”  (George A. Hormel & Co. v. Maez (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 963, 966.)

A driver generally owes a duty “to use reasonable and ordinary care to prevent increasing the danger of injury to a passenger, or others, from operating or maintaining the automobile.” (Twohig v. Briner (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1106.) A driver “who is suddenly stricken by an illness, which he had no reason to anticipate… which renders it impossible for him to control the car, is not chargeable with negligence.’ ” (Waters v. Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 789, 792, citing Cohen v. Petty (D.C. Cir. 1933) 65 F.2d 820, 821.) “The conduct of an actor during a period of a sudden incapacitation or loss of consciousness resulting from physical illness is negligent only if the sudden incapacitation or loss of conscioiusness was reasonably foreseeable to the actor.” (Rest.3d Torts, § 11; see Hammontree v. Jenner (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 528, 530–531 [loss of consciousness due to unexpected epileptic seizure]; Bashi v. Wodarz (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1318-1320 [doctrine does not extend to incapacity caused by mental illness, as opposed to a physical illness].) In other words, a driver cannot be held liable for negligence if the driver could not reasonably foresee that he or she might become physically incapacitated and thus lose control of the vehicle. (See Mora v. Haul Away Rubbish Serv., Co., (2nd Dist. 2024) 2024 WL 3751218, at *6 [unpublished].)

While the existence of a legal duty to use reasonable care in a particular factual situation is a question of law for the court to decide, “the elements of breach of that duty and causation are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury's determination.” (McGarry v. Sax (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 983, 994.) “ ‘What is ordinary care depends upon the circumstances of each particular case and is to be determined as a fact with reference to the situation and knowledge of the parties.’ ” (J.H. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 123, 140.) “Ordinarily, foreseeability is a question of fact for the jury.” (Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49, 56.) A court may decide the issue of foreseeability on summary judgment only if “under the undisputed facts there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.” (Kumaraperu v. Feldsted (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 60, 69.)

The fact-intensive determination of whether a driver reasonably should have foreseen that they might suddenly become incapacitated and lose control of a vehicle is ordinarily a jury question. (Rest.3d Torts, Phys. & Emot. Harm, Chap. 3, § 11, com. (d).) Where the driver had some known or suspected health issues, “[e]vidence bearing on reasonable foreseeability includes: the number and frequency of episodes of incapacitation in the past; the circumstances of those episodes, insofar as those circumstances bear on the likelihood of a recurrence; the extent to which medical treatment the actor is receiving can be expected to control the underlying medical problem; and whatever advice the actor's physician has provided.” (Id.) The Restatement offers the following on-point example: “If an actor has information indicating that an incident of incapacitation may be imminent or is likely to occur in the immediate future, the actor will obviously be unable to show unforeseeability and hence can be found negligent for the subsequent incident of substandard conduct. For that matter, if such an incident is foreseeable in the immediate future, the actor can be found negligent for proceeding to engage at all in a dangerous activity such as driving. For example, if an actor with a diabetic condition feels a hypoglycemic episode approaching, the actor is guilty of negligence in driving a car—or at least in failing to take medication to prevent the episode.” (Rest.3d Torts, Phys. & Emot. Harm, Chap. 3, § 11, com. (d).)

Defendant presents evidence that he is an insulin-dependent, Type I diabetic, and was first diagnosed in 1995. (UMF, Issue 1, 8.) He requires daily injections of insulin to keep his blood sugar levels from rising too high. (Id.) Before the subject incident, Defendant had never suffered any dizziness, cognitive impairment, or unconsciousness due to a drop in his blood sugar level or any other medical condition. (UMF 1:10.)  Defendant’s treating physician, Dr. Lee, had no reason to believe that Defendant might not be able to safely operate a car because he had a device that would notify him if his sugar levels were dropping. (UMF 1:13.) Dr. Lee believed that Defendant adequately managed his diabetes, that he had good control of his diabetes, that he was technologically advanced, and that Defendant's knowledge of the disease and ability to control his blood sugars was better than most of her patients. (UMF 1:14-16.)

In 2021, Defendant earned a living as a ride share driver for the Lyft and Uber platforms. (UMF 1:9.)  On July 16, 2021, Defendant suffered from a hypoglycemic episode while transporting Plaintiff in his car, rendering him unable to drive and completely unconscious. (UMF 1:17.) On the date of the incident, Plaintiff hailed a ride from Defendant. (UMF 4:1.) While on their way, Defendant began to feel the “peculiar” sensations associated with low blood sugar. (UMF 1:22.) He asked Plaintiff’s permission to stop at a 7-Eleven store to get something to eat to raise his blood sugar. (UMF 1:22-23.) With his years of experience, his blood sugar level of 79 did not concern him, but he still wanted to alleviate the low blood sugar sensations. (SUMF 1: 23.) Defendant has no memory of anything that happened after he left the 7-Eleven until he was being treated by ambulance workers and police officers. (UMF 1:24.) Plaintiff has testified that after he returned and re-entered the car, he started acting “very scary and creepy.” (UMF 4:1.) Defendant began driving erratically, weaving about, speeding up and slowing down, and even driving on the sidewalk. (UMF 4:2-3.) Plaintiff yelled at him several times to stop the car to let her out, but he did not respond, which compounded her fears of being kidnapped and sense of desperation. (Id.) As they drove along Wilshire Blvd, Defendant fell unconscious while the car was still moving: his hands dropped from the steering wheel and his head bent down. (UMF 4:4.) She tried to wake him up to no avail. (Id.) She decided to remove her seatbelt, roll down the window, and jump out of the moving car. (UMF 4:6-7.) She at first hung her head and body out the window and then slowly dropped to the asphalt, injuring her body. (SUMF 4:6, 7.) She later went to a nearby police station to report that she had been kidnapped by someone who may be a "psychopath." (SUMF 4:10.)

Dr. Lee believes that Defendant acted reasonably before the incident in light of his medical history, his blood sugar levels at the time, and the fact that he ingested carbohydrates to raise his blood sugar levels. (UMF 1:18-21.) Prior to the incident, he had only once before in his life experienced the sensations of low blood sugar, which were not debilitating in any way. (UMF 1:22.) The digital reading on his blood sugar monitor indicated his blood sugar was at a safe level, but he nonetheless decided to stop at a 7-Eleven to get carbohydrates in order to raise his blood sugar, as instructed by various physicians should he sense a drop in blood sugar. (UMF 1:23-24, 26.) Further, Plaintiff lacks evidence that, prior to the incident, Defendant suffered from unconsciousness or a similar debilitating event. (UMF 1:25.)

Making all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, Defendant’s evidence fails to demonstrate that he could not reasonably foresee that he would become incapacitated due to hypoglycemia. A trier of fact could determine that it was reasonably foreseeable that Defendant would become incapacitated or otherwise be unable to drive within the standard of care once he began to feel the “peculiar” effects of hypoglycemia. (UMF 1:22.) Defendant apparently understood that he was suffering from hypoglycemia, and that he knew his driving could become impaired if he did nothing about it. In fact, he chose to go to 7-Eleven to pick up drinks to raise his blood sugar, demonstrating an awareness of the risk hypoglycemia poses to his driving. He chose to continue to drive despite his low blood sugar levels, apparently believing that the Red Bull(s) would be sufficient to raise his blood sugar to a more acceptable level.

Here, a jury must decide, in light of all the circumstances, whether his decision to continue driving was reasonable. He also apparently had some level of consciousness while he drove erratically, ignored Plaintiff’s pleas to leave, and gave Plaintiff a “scary” and “creepy” face—all before losing consciousness. (UMF 4:4-10.) A juror must determine at which time Defendant was merely cognitively impaired, which is not covered by the sudden incapacitation doctrine, and when he lost consciousness. (UMF 3:1-2; see Bashi, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at 1318-1320 [re: mental illness and sudden incapacitation].) Thus, there are conflicting inferences and facts for a jury to determine. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that Defendant was not negligent or that he unforeseeably incapacitated.

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as to issue nos. 1-3.

Issue 4: Causation

Defendant argues that he did not cause Plaintiff’s injuries because the damages were “self-inflicted.” Causation includes both actual cause and proximate cause. (Tribeca Companies, LLC v. First American Title Insurance Company (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1102-03.) A defendant’s negligence is the actual cause of the plaintiff’s injury if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. (Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1052-53.) Thus, a plaintiff meets the causation element by showing that (1) the defendant's breach of its duty to exercise ordinary care was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff's harm, and (2) there is no rule of law relieving the defendant of liability. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp., (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 1200, 1205.)

The Complaint alleges that Defendant’s negligent driving caused Plaintiff’s harm. (Compl., ¶ 35.) Defendant states that Plaintiff caused her own injuries when she exited his vehicle. Defendant further contends that the evidence “persuasively” shows that had she not jumped out the window she would not have been injured. Defendant implies that it would be unreasonable under the circumstances for Plaintiff to leave the moving vehicle. However, the record leaves multiple conflicting inferences to be made on this issue. Critically, Defendant does not negate but-for causation. The allegations and evidence demonstrates that but for Defendant’s negligent driving, Plaintiff would not have been injured. Defendant adduces no authority which shows Plaintiff cannot recover physical injuries caused by her escape from Defendant’s uncontrolled vehicle. Defendant therefore has not negated proximate causation. Whether Plaintiff leaving the vehicle under the circumstances was reasonable would therefore be a question of fact for a jury.

Defendant also only targets part of the sought after recovery, specifically, Plaintiff’s claim for bodily injuries, her related medical bills, and her general damages for physical pain and suffering. At the same time, Defendant concedes that Plaintiff alleges she suffered emotional distress caused by Defendant. Defendant does not attempt to negate those damages. Thus, this issue would adjudicate only a portion of the damage claimed.

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

Based upon the Court’s analysis, the Court would not need to consider Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion.  Therefore, the ex parte application for permission to file a late opposition is take off calendar as moot.