Judge Mark A. Young, Case Number: 23SMCV03493, Date: 2024-07-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV03493, Date: 2024-07-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV03493 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: M

CASE NAME: Southern California Injured Workers LLC, v. Amigo Management

CASE NO.: 23SMCV03493

MOTION: OSC Re: Preliminary Injunction

HEARING DATE: 7/26/2024

Legal Standard

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 526(a), a preliminary injunction may be issued in the following cases:

1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually.

2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action.

3) When it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

4) When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief.

5) Where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief.

6) Where the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.

7) Where the obligation arises from a trust.

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the trial court considers two factors: 1) the reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial (CCP §526(a)(1)); and 2) a balancing of the “irreparable harm” that the moving party is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied compared to the harm that the non-moving party is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. (CCP §526(a)(2); 14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1402.) “A preliminary injunction is an interim remedy designed to maintain the status quo pending a decision on the merits.” (MaJor v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 623.) “[A] cause of action must exist before injunctive relief may be granted.” (Id. (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Richter (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 164, 168).)

The court’s ruling on a preliminary injunction is not an adjudication of the merits, is not a trial, and does not require a statement of decision. (Cohen v. Board of Supervisors, (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286.) The judge is not required to state her reasons for granting or denying a preliminary injunction; a cursory statement is sufficient. (City of Los Altos v. Barnes, (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1198.) A proposed order must be presented to the judge for signature, with any required undertaking, within one day after the preliminary injunction is granted, or other time ordered by the judge. (CRC 3.1150(f).)

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

Cross-Defendants’ objections to the Marchant declaration are GRANTED as to nos. 17-24 (foundation, personal knowledge and legal conclusion). The remainder of objections are OVERRULED.

Cross-Complainant’s request for judicial notice is granted. (Evid. Code § 452(d).)

Cross-Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted. (Evid. Code § 452(d).)

Analysis

Cross-Complainant Funding4Doctors LLC ("Funding") moves for a preliminary injunction, enjoining Cross-Defendants Injured Worker Medical Group, LLC ("IWMG") and Dr. Vrijesh S. Tantuwaya from disbursing and/or otherwise dissipating funds collected and being collected on behalf of Funding pursuant to 30 Masters Receivables Advance Agreements ("Agreements 1-30"). Specifically, they request the following order:

(1) Cross-Defendants are ENJOINED from taking any action whatsoever that will dissipate the funds collected on account of the thirty (30) Masters Receivables Advance Agreements (“Agreements 1-30”) as set for in the Verified Cross-Complaint filed by Funding, as well as the Cross-Complaint filed by IWMG, including, but not limited to, paying, disbursing, distributing, or otherwise dissipating funds collected and being collected by IWMG;

(2) Cross-Defendants are ORDERED to provide Funding with an accounting of all funds collected on account of Agreements 1-30 within fourteen (14) days of this Order, and to identify all banks and/or financial institutions at which such funds are being held; and

(3) Cross-Defendants are ORDERED to provide a copy of this Order by Certified Mail to any and all banks and financial institutions at which such funds are being held.

Funding reasons that it will succeed on the merits of their contract claims because the Agreements are admitted by IWMG and personally guaranteed by Dr. Tantuwaya. Further, Funding will suffer “great and irreparable injury” because Cross-Defendants may use and/or distribute the amounts that are due under the Agreements, and by the time the case is over, there may be no money left. (See Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. Svcs., Inc. v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414 [an injunction may be granted when a party to the action is doing or threatens an act in violation of another party's rights and tending to render the judgment ineffectual].)

Funding does not meet its burden to show its “irreparable harm,” such that the balance of equities favors an injunction. Funding cites no substantive evidence that IWMG or Dr. Tantuwaya are dissipating the disputed funds rendering ineffectual any resulting judgment. Funding merely asserts in conclusory terms that the “funds are at risk of dissipation by Cross-Defendants IWMG and Dr. Tantuwaya as they are attempting to use the funds due to Funding for their own benefit to pay restitution to IWMG and Dr. Tantuwaya's victims in the open and ongoing criminal investigation against Dr. Tantuwaya.” (Marchant Decl., ¶ 18.) Cross-Defendants deny this assertion. (Krieger Decl., ¶¶ 4-6.) Indeed, restitution could not be owed in an “open and ongoing” criminal investigation. IWMG and Dr. Tantuwaya also present evidence that they continue to generate funds and receivables through their ongoing medical practices. (Tantuwaya Decl., ¶ 122.) Any judgment against them would therefore not be “ineffectual.” Funding therefore fails to demonstrate irreparable harm.

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.