Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV03967, Date: 2024-04-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23SMCV03967 Hearing Date: April 2, 2024 Dept: M
CASE NAME: 1239 23rd
Street Homeowners Assoc. v. Kurtzer
CASE NO.: 23SMCV03967
MOTION: Anti-SLAPP
HEARING DATE: 4/2/2024
Legal
Standard
Code
of Civil Procedure section 425.16 permits the Court to strike causes of action
arising from an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of free speech or
petition, unless the plaintiff establishes that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim. “The
anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a defendant’s constitutionally
protected conduct from the undue
burden of frivolous litigation.” (Baral
v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393.) “The anti-SLAPP statute does
not insulate defendants from any
liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech.
It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected
activity.” (Id. at 384.)
“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion
involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged
claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. If the defendant makes
the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the
merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 384, citation omitted.) The California Supreme Court
has “described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ The
court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its
inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient
claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable
judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the
defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a
matter of law. ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’” (Id. at 384-385 [citations omitted].)
Analysis
On January 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed
a special motion to strike the cross-complaint filed by Defendant Kurtzer. On
February 20, 2024, Kurtzer dismissed the cross-complaint. The motion is
therefore substantively moot, and taken off calendar. The dismissal, however,
does not moot the issue of mandatory attorneys’ fees under the anti-SLAPP
statute. Plaintiff may file a noticed fee motion to recover any appropriate fees.
(Law Offices of Andrew L. Ellis v. Yang (2009) 178 Cal. App. 4th 869,
878~879.)