Judge Mark A. Young, Case Number: 23SMCV04299, Date: 2024-12-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV04299, Date: 2024-12-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV04299 Hearing Date: December 10, 2024 Dept: M

CASE NAME: Purnell, et al., v. Public Storage, et al.

CASE NO.: 23SMCV04299

MOTION: Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

HEARING DATE: 12/10/2024

Legal Standard

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (CCP, § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in¿Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.”¿(CCP,¿§ 437c(f)(1).)¿If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court¿(1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)¿ “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (CCP,¿§ 437c(t).)¿

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿(CCP, §¿437c(c).)¿The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when¿a material fact is the witness’s¿state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (CCP, § 437c(e).)¿

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here¿is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.”¿(Consumer Cause, Inc. v.¿SmileCare¿(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to¿frame¿the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co.¿(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability¿as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Ibid.)¿

Analysis

Defendant Public Storage moves for summary judgment against Plaintiff Deborah Purnell’s complaint, or alternatively, summary adjudication on the following issues:

1. First cause of action (labeled as “fraud” in the caption, but contains allegations of violation of Civil Code section 1942.4);

2. Second cause of action for “tortious breach of warranty of habitability;”

3. Third cause of action for “breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment;”

4. Fourth cause of action for “nuisance;”

5. Fifth cause of action for “Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq;”

6. Sixth cause of action for “negligence and breach of contract;”

7. Seventh cause of action for “fraud and malice;” and

8. Eighth cause of action for “intentional negligence.”

Plaintiff filed an untimely opposition to the motion on December 4, 2024, which is only four court days from the December 10, 2024, hearing date. (See CCP § 1005(b) [providing for at least a nine court-day period from service of opposition to the hearing date] At the December 3, 2024, ex parte hearing, the Court agreed to exercise its discretion and consider the opposition despite its effect on Defendant’s ability to respond in reply.

In its motion, Defendant argues that each cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. In general, a statute of limitations begins to run “when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements,” namely, wrongdoing, causation, and resulting harm.¿ (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397.)

The statute of limitations on all of plaintiff’s claims are, at most, three or four years. Claims for damage to personal property generally have a three-year statute of limitations period. (CCP § 338(3).) Civil Code section 1942.4 has either a one-year statute (per CCP § 340(a)) or a three-year statute for statutory violations (CCP § 338). The nuisance claimed here is also covered by the three-year statute of limitations. (CCP§338(b); cf. Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 937 [applying “continuing wrong” theory; where the nuisance is “continuing in nature, every repetition of the wrong may create further liability”].) The statute of limitations for fraud is three years, and states that the cause of action is not deemed to have accrued “until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (CCP § 338(d).) A claim accrues upon discovery of the facts constituting the deceit. (CCP § 338(d); see Fox v. Ethicon Endo- Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807 [inquiry notice].) The statute of limitations for a claim arising from a breach of written contract is four years. (CCP §337(1).) The statute of limitations for a UCL violation is also four years. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17208.)

The complaint alleges Defendant Public Storage led Plaintiff into believing that certain vehicle(s) would be stored on its premises in a fenced and/or housed manner that would preserve the integrity of the vehicles. (Compl., ¶ 7.) Public Storage allegedly promised to make the necessary changes and/or repairs to correct and/or alleviate compromises to the premises’ security but refused to fulfill that promise. (Id.) Plaintiff timely paid rents for the space. (¶¶ 8, 13, 14.) However, Public Storage repeatedly allowed vandals to occupy and/or destroy the vehicles and property of tenants over the span of ten years. (¶ 8.)

The complaint alleges that for more than ten years Public Storage knew of vandals damaging and/or destroying the Vehicles parked at the Public Storage facility. (¶ 10.) Public Storage watched vandals destroy Plaintiff’s “church truck” for over a span of more than ten years, which facilitated and/or granted permission for the vandals to destroy the church truck on a daily basis. (¶ 11.) Public Storage did absolutely nothing to prevent and/or deter vandalism, theft and/or countless forms of destructive behavior onto numerous vehicles over the years. (¶ 12.) Public Storage allowed a large portion of the chain link fence which surrounded the storage property to remain broken and/or knocked down so that vandals could return to the lot on a daily basis and spray paint, live in and/or vandalize vehicles. (¶ 12.) By the time Plaintiff first visited “the truck” a year or two after leasing the space, “it had already been vandalized to such an extent that the insurance company would not renew the coverage and the vandals ransacked the inside of the truck, had already started taking parts of the truck and flattened the tires for good measure.” (¶ 16, see Exs. 3-25 [damage to church truck].)

Public Storage claimed to have no duty to provide a safe, habitable environment for the vehicles and that it was the sole duty of the renter to make repairs to the premises and/or their vehicles which were damaged while on Defendant’s property. (¶¶ 9-35.) The complaint further alleges that Public Storage refused to provide the “habitable premises” that is required “under all landlord/tenant leases.” (¶ 10.) Public Storage stated that it had no obligation to care for the premises that it was leasing to do so in such a way as to monitor, repair, replace, deter and/or supervise the spaces in the yard where vehicles were located. (¶ 12.) Public Storage used an “insurance clause” to justify bever repairing the Vehicles and the yard. (¶ 14.) Defendant also refused to repair the points of entry onto the lot where vandals entered. (¶ 11.) In fact, it took “literally ten years” just for Defendant to repair the fence. (¶ 14.) Plaintiff allegedly took photos in 2019 showing “Plaintiff’s vehicle” and other vandalized vehicles. (¶ 14.) Public Storage refused to pay for the damages and refused to prevent the vandals from destroying the church vehicle from 2011 to the present date.

In conjunction with the above allegations, Defendant presents sufficient evidence demonstrating that there is no dispute of material fact concerning its statute of limitations defense. As alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff noticed that the fencing was down and that the vehicle was damaged at the latest in 2013. (UMF 8-12.) Plaintiff first encountered the harm and identified its likely cause in 2013. Any such claims would therefore expire in 2016 or 2017. By the time the Complaint was filed on September 14, 2023, each of the claims had expired.

Plaintiff fails to submit any dispute of material fact as to the limitations defense. (UMF 8-12.) Plaintiff can only “confirm” that she did not “identify it as a legal binding crime at the time”, that she “saw a lot of things but the fact that she continued to pay rents to Public Storage . . ..” (UMF 10.) This response confirms the material fact that Plaintiff had actual notice of the alleged damage to the truck in 2013. (Id.) Plaintiff also attempts to dispute the first through sixth UMFs, which do not apply to the defense. (See UMF 1-6.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s cited evidence does not contradict any of the material facts asserted. (Id.)

Furthermore, the Court does not find any support for tolling the statute of limitations. The “delayed discovery rule” may be invoked where a plaintiff establishes facts showing that a reasonable person under the circumstances would not have had information sufficient to be put on inquiry concerning defendant's negligence.¿(Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807-809.) The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action. (Id. at 807–808, citing Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, 896–897.) As such, when a potential plaintiff suspects an injury has been wrongfully caused, she must conduct a reasonable investigation of all potential causes of that injury. If such an investigation would have disclosed a factual basis for a cause of action, the statute of limitations begins to run on that cause of action when the investigation would have brought such information to light. Here, there are no undisputed material facts supporting the delayed discovery rule.

Defendant meets its initial burden to show no dispute of material fact exists as to its statute of limitations defense against each claim. Plaintiff, in turn, fails to identify any dispute of material fact on the record. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Defendant to prepare a proposed judgment.