Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV04803, Date: 2024-08-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV04803    Hearing Date: August 2, 2024    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           McGlothenon, et al., v. Mercedes-Benz USA LLC, et al.

CASE NO.:                23SMCV04803

MOTION:                  Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

HEARING DATE:   8/2/2024

 

Legal Standard

 

A defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made after the time to demur has expired and an answer has been filed. (CCP § 438(f).) A motion by a defendant may be made on the grounds that (1) the court “lacks jurisdiction of the subject of one or more of the causes of action alleged” or (2) the complaint or cross-complaint “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (CCP § 438(c).) 

 

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. Except as provided by statute, the rules governing demurrers apply. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) “A motion for judgment on the pleadings is akin to a general demurrer; it tests the sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action. The court must assume the truth of all factual allegations in the complaint, along with matters subject to judicial notice.” (Wise v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 725, 738, citations omitted.) Further, like a general demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings “does not lie as to a portion of a cause of action, and if any part of a cause of action is properly pleaded, the [motion] will be overruled.” (Fire Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.)  

  

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

 

Defendant request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452(d).)

 

ANALYSIS

 

Defendant LAD-MB, LLC (dba Mercedes-Benz of Los Angeles) moves for judgment on the pleadings against Plaintiffs Caitlyn McGlthen and Cardiaz McGlothen on behalf of Dezniworld LLC’s operative complaint’s second cause of action for negligent repair. Defendant argues that the claim is barred by the economic loss rule.

 

The economic loss rule posits that a purchaser of a product that does not live up to the buyer’s expectations can only recover in contract and not tort, “unless [the purchaser] can demonstrate harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise.” (Food Safety Net Services v. Eco Safe Systems USA, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1130, quoting Robinson Helicopter Company, Inc. v. Dana Corporation (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 988.) “Economic loss consists of ‘damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product or consequent loss of profits—without any claim of personal injury or damages to other property.’” (Ibid.) A party must plead the existence of a duty that arises independent of any contractual duty and independent injury, other than economic loss, that arises from the breach of that duty. (Id. at 988-991.) For example, the Robinson court recognized fraudulent inducement of a contract which exposed a plaintiff to potential liability, as sufficiently independent to avoid the economic loss rule. (Id. at 993.)

The Court concurs that the allegations only amount to economic loss and do not state any duty independent of the contractual warranties. Plaintiff alleges that on November 8, 2020, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Defendant regarding a 2021 Mercedes A Class, VIN: W1K3G4EB2MJ270007 ("the Subject Vehicle”), which Plaintiff(s) leased and purchased for a total price of approximately $43,859.25. (Compl., ¶ 17.) Defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period and substantially impaired the use, value and/or safety of the Subject Vehicle. (¶ 18.) Plaintiff(s) delivered the vehicle to an authorized Defendant repair facility for repair of the nonconformities. (¶ 19.) Defendant was unable to conform the Subject Vehicle to the applicable express warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts. (¶ 20.) Defendant failed to promptly make restitution in accordance with the Song-Beverly Act. (¶ 21.) Defendant failed to remedy the defects and nonconformities or to promptly issue restitution. (¶22.) Defendant acted willfully in its failure to comply with the Song-Beverly Act. (¶ 23.)

 

The Complaint further alleges that Plaintiffs delivered the Subject Vehicle to Defendant for repair during the express warranty period for a warranted defect in the Subject Vehicle. (Compl., ¶ 29.) Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff to use ordinary care and skill in storage, preparation and repair of the Subject Vehicle in accordance with industry standards. (¶ 30.) Defendant breached its duty by failing to properly store, prepare and repair of the Subject Vehicle in accordance with industry standards. (¶ 31.)

 

Plaintiff argues that the alleged damages arise from the independent negligence of Defendant in the storage, preparation and repair of the Subject Vehicle. Plaintiff posits that such damages “may include further injury to the vehicle above and beyond the inherent defect.” (Opp. at 5.) However, Plaintiff cites no allegations of damages to the vehicle or other damages independent of the economic loss from the alleged inadequate repairs. Further facts would be required to establish this independent duty.

 

Accordingly, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED with 10 days leave to amend.