Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV05163, Date: 2024-07-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV05163    Hearing Date: July 25, 2024    Dept: M

CASE NAME:             Serrano v. Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp, et al. 

CASE NO.:                   23SMCV05163

MOTION:                     Petition/Motion to Compel Arbitration 

HEARING DATE:   7/25/2024 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Under California and federal law, public policy favors arbitration as an efficient and less expensive means of resolving private disputes. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 8-9; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339.) Accordingly, whether an agreement is governed by the California Arbitration Act (“CAA”) or the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), courts resolve doubts about an arbitration agreement’s scope in favor of arbitration.  (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at 9; Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs. (9th Cir. 2009) 553 F.3d 1277, 1284; see also Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971-972 [“California law incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the Federal Arbitration Act, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability [citation] and a requirement that an arbitration agreement must be enforced on the basis of state law standards that apply to contracts in general”].) “[U]nder both the FAA and California law, ‘arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ ” (Higgins v. Superior Crout (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.) 

“Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 requires a trial court to grant a petition to compel arbitration if the court determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.” (Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 50, 59, quotations omitted.) Accordingly, “when presented with a petition to compel arbitration, the court’s first task is to determine whether the parties have in fact agreed to arbitrate the dispute.”  (Ibid.) A petition to compel arbitration is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract. (Id. at 71.) As with any other specific performance claim, “a party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement must show the agreement’s terms are sufficiently definite to enable the court to know what it is to enforce.” (Ibid. [internal citations omitted].) “Only the valid and binding agreement of the parties, including all material terms well-defined and clearly expressed, may be ordered specifically performed.” (Ibid.) An arbitration agreement “must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.” (Civ. Code, § 1636.) The language of the contract governs its interpretation if it is clear and explicit. (Civ. Code, § 1368.) If uncertainty exists, “the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist.” (Civ. Code, § 1654.)  

The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.) It would then be plaintiff’s burden, in opposing the motion, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to her opposition. (See Ibid.) “In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Ibid.) 

ANALYSIS 

Defendants Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP (“MSK”), Won Me Park, Colleen Yoshimura, Wendy Chan, and Jennifer Gaines move for an order compelling the arbitration of Plaintiff Natalie Serrano’s claims. Defendants assert that Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement, which covers her claims in this matter.

As with any contract, mutual assent or consent is necessary for the formation of a valid arbitration agreement. (Civ. Code, §§ 1550, 1565.) “Consent is not mutual, unless the parties all agree upon the same thing in the same sense.” (Civ. Code, § 1580.) The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence. (Mitri v. Arnel Mgmt. Co. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1169 [“Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.”].)   

Defendants explain that Plaintiff worked as a legal secretary for MSK for approximately four months from June to October 2023. Upon commencement of her employment with MSK, Serrano signed an arbitration agreement. (Chan Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 2.) The Arbitration Agreement was a standalone document provided to Serrano at the time of her onboarding and set forth that, as a condition of employment, Serrano would “submit any legal or equitable claim that [she] may have against [MSK], whether that claim now exists or arises in the future, to binding arbitration pursuant to the JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures then in effect which are not inconsistent with this Arbitration Agreement or in conflict with Federal or California law.” (Id.) Defendants provide a description of the onboarding process, including the electronic signature process. (Id., ¶¶2-6.) This process was followed with respect to Serrano. (Id., ¶7.) The operative first amended complaint (FAC) includes causes of action for common counts, intentional tort, and fraud against Defendants, including MSK. Such claims are within the scope of the broad arbitration clause. MSK contends that the individual defendants are the agents of MSK and should be included in the arbitration. (Chan Decl., ¶10; see Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams, (1985) 40 Cal.3d 406, 418 [nonsignatory agents may enforce principal’s arbitration provision].)

Defendant meets its burden to demonstrate the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties that covers Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff submits no opposition to the motion. Plaintiff therefore does not meet her burden to show any defense to the arbitration agreement. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims are ordered to arbitration, as discussed above. The entire action is STAYED pending the completion of the arbitration. (CCP § 1281.4.)  

The Court sets a status conference re arbitration for April 10, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.