Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV05350, Date: 2025-01-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23SMCV05350 Hearing Date: January 7, 2025 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Fletes v. American Honda
Motor Co., Inc.
CASE NO.: 23SMCV05350
MOTION: Demurrer to the First Amended
Complaint
HEARING DATE: 1/7/2025
LEGAL STANDARD
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether
the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be
apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the
pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it
lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are
judicially noticed. (CCP §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff
need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the
factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28
Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the
construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore
Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732, internal citations
omitted.)
A special demurrer for uncertainty is
disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that
defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what
issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed
against him/her. (CCP § 430.10(f); Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc.
(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat
vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)
Any party, within the time allowed to
respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole
or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).)
The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it
deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted
in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or
filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of
the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767,
782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage;
probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)
“Liberality in permitting amendment is
the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie
M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of
discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable
possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to show¿in
what manner¿plaintiff can amend the complaint, and¿how¿that
amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿(Id.)
ANALYSIS
Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. demurs to each cause of
action asserted in Plaintiff Noelia Fletes’s First Amended Complaint (FAC), and
moves to strike the requests for punitive damages, civil penalties under Civil
Code §1794, and prejudgment interest.
Statute of Limitations as to 1st-4th
Causes of Action
Defendant argues that each of Plaintiff’s
Song-Beverly claims are barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations
under Cal. Com. Code § 2725(2). To raise¿a statute of
limitations defense on demurrer, “the defect must clearly and affirmatively
appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint
shows¿that the action may be barred.”¿(Committee for Green Foothills v.
Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010)¿48 Cal.¿4th 32, 42, internal
quotation marks omitted.) In general, a statute of limitations begins to run
“when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements,” namely,
wrongdoing, causation, and resulting harm.¿¿(Norgart¿v. Upjohn Co.
(1999)¿21 Cal.4th 383, 397.)
The
four-year statute of limitations of UCC § 2725 applies to claims brought under
the Song-Beverly Act, whether for express or implied warranty. (Krieger v.
Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3rd 205, 213-14; see Mexia
v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306 [four-year
period of Section 2725 applied].) UCC § 2725(2) states:
A cause of action
accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of
knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is
made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of
the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance
the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered.
Thus,
a cause of action for breach of warranty occurs when the breach occurs
“regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach” and at
the time of tender of delivery. (UCC § 2725(2).) The exception discussed in
2725(2) applies only to express warranties, since implied warranties arise
by operation of law rather than an “explicitly” extending the warranty into
future performance. (Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp.¿(2008)
169 Cal.App.4th 116, 134.)
Song-Beverly
provides that the¿duration of the implied warranties “shall be coextensive in
duration with an express warranty which accompanies the consumer goods,
provided the duration of the express warranty is reasonable; but in no event
shall such implied warranty have a duration of less than 60 days nor more than
one year following the sale of new consumer goods to a retail buyer. Where no
duration for an express warranty is stated with respect to consumer goods, or
parts thereof, the duration of the implied warranty shall be the maximum period
prescribed above.”¿(Civ. Code, § 1791.1(c).) The Song-Beverly Act thus extends
the existence of implied warranties “coextensively” with the express warranties
up to one year following the sale.
“To say that a warranty
exists is to say that a cause of action can arise for its breach. Defining the
time period during which the implied warranty exists, therefore, also defines
the time period during which the warranty can be breached. Thus, by giving the
implied warranty a limited prospective existence beyond the time of delivery,
the Legislature created the possibility that the implied warranty could be
breached after delivery… this is a change from the Uniform Commercial Code,
under which the implied warranty could be breached only at the time of
delivery.”
(Mexia, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at
1309.) Accordingly, the implied warranty's co-extensive duration with the
express warranties for up to one year after sale allows for the implied
warranty to be breached up to one year after sale. (Id. at
1309-1311; see also Atkinson v. Elk Corporation of Texas¿(2006) 142
Cal.App.4th 212 [suit barred when filed more than¿five and a half¿years after
the expiration of the one-year co-extensive warranty period].)
Read in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Song Beverly
causes of action are untimely. The subject vehicle, a 2016 Honda Pilot, was
delivered to Plaintiff on June 23, 2016. The express warranty states that
“[y]our vehicle is covered for 3 years or 36,000 miles, whichever comes first.”
(FAC Ex. A, at 9.) The FAC alleges by June 4, 2019, the Subject Vehicle had
approximately 29,883 miles on it and that by August 31, 2021, the Vehicle had
approximately 53,724 miles. (FAC ¶¶ 23-24.) Defects and nonconformities to
warranty manifested themselves within the express warranty period, including
but not limited to, engine defects, sensing defects, electrical defects. (FAC ¶
11.) Based on these allegations, the express warranty period expired on June
23, 2019, and thus breach must have occurred on or before this date. Thus,
Plaintiff had four years from June 23, 2019, to commence this action on express
warranties. The implied warranty extended one year after the tender of
delivery, or June 2017. Plaintiff had until June 2021 to bring this action on
the implied warranties. Plaintiff did not bring this action until November
2023. Plaintiff’s action is therefore barred by the statute of limitations.
In opposition, Plaintiff does not address the statute of
limitations issues.
Accordingly, the demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the first through
fourth causes of action.
Statute of Limitations as to Fraud
CCP
section 338(d) provides a three-year limitations period for actions “on
the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in that case is not deemed
to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake.”
“In
California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations
do not suffice. ‘Thus “ ‘the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings
... will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any
material respect.’ ” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645,
citations omitted.) “The provision tolling operation of the statute until
discovery of the fraud has long been treated as an exception and, accordingly,
this court has held that if an action is brought more than three years after
commission of the fraud, plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving that
he did not make the discovery until within three years prior to the filing of
his complaint.” (Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 412,
437.) Thus, to avoid the application of the statute of limitations here,
Plaintiff must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of
discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite
reasonable diligence. (CAMSI IV v. Hunter Technology Corp. (1991) 230
Cal.App.3d 1525, 1536-37.) “Mere conclusory assertions that delay in discovery
was reasonable are insufficient and will not enable the complaint to withstand
general demurrer.” (Id.)
The
FAC alleges that at the time of the sale or prior thereto,
“Defendant committed fraud by allowing the Subject Vehicle to be sold to
Plaintiff without disclosing that the Subject Vehicle and its sensing system
was defective and susceptible to malfunction of the computerized
driver-assisting safety system.” (FAC ¶ 81.) Plaintiff alleges that he had “no
way of uncovering Defendant’s deception with respect to the defects given that
Defendant performed various diagnostics and/or undertook repairs and claimed
that nothing was wrong with the Subject Vehicle or that the Vehicle had been
repaired.” (¶¶27, 33.) Plaintiff discovered Defendant’s
wrongful conduct “shortly before filing this Complaint as the Subject Vehicle
continued to exhibit symptoms of the defects following Defendant’s unsuccessful
attempts to repair them.” (¶ 28.) “Plaintiff could not have discovered through
the exercise of reasonable diligence that Defendant were concealing the Defect
and conduct complained of herein and concealing the companies’ true position
with respect to the defects.” (¶ 34.) Plaintiff did not discover, and did not
know of, facts that would have caused a reasonable person to suspect that
Defendants had concealed information about the defects in Defendant’s Vehicles
prior to and at the time of sale and thereafter, which was discovered by Plaintiff
“shortly prior” to the filing of the Complaint. (¶ 36.)
Generally, the statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s
fraudulent concealment claim would begin to
run when Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle on June 23, 2016. Thus, under
the general rule, the cause of action expired three years later on June 23,
2019. Further, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts to show delayed
discovery or any other tolling theory. The above statements do not aver
specific facts which show the time and manner of Plaintiff’s
discovery of the truth of Defendants’ fraud. Plaintiff only alleges mere
conclusions on his inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable
diligence. Further, only generic and conclusory allegations are given as to the
other pled theories of tolling, including class action tolling, the repair
doctrine, or estoppel. (See Falk v. Children's Hosp. Los Angeles, (2015)
237 Cal. App. 4th 1454, 1464 [class action tolling]; see Cardinal Health
301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp., (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 116, 133–134
[repair doctrine equitable tolling]; see Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003)
31 Cal.4th 363, 383 [equitable estoppel applies only to circumstances where a
defendant’s affirmative conduct induced a plaintiff into forbearing a known suit
within the applicable limitations period].) Plaintiff provides
no facts supporting the generic tolling allegations. Thus, further facts would
be required.
Accordingly, the demurrer is SUSTAINED. Plaintiff must
demonstrate a reasonable probability of successful amendment before leave to
amend will be granted. The motion to strike is moot per the ruling on
demurrer