Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV0557, Date: 2025-06-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV0557    Hearing Date: June 10, 2025    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           Gray-Faulkner v. Cedars-Sinai Accountable Care LLC, et al.

CASE NO.:                23SMCV0557

MOTION:                  Motion for Summary Judgment

HEARING DATE:   6/10/2025

Defendant Cedar-Sinai Medical Center moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff Shanelle Gray-Faulkner’s complaint for premises liability and general negligence.

Legal Standard

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (CCP, § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in¿Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.”¿(CCP,¿§ 437c(f)(1).)¿If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court¿(1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)¿ “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (CCP,¿§ 437c(t).)¿ 

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿(CCP, §¿437c(c).)¿The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when¿a material fact is the witness’s¿state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (CCP, § 437c(e).)¿ 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here¿is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.”¿(Consumer Cause, Inc. v.¿SmileCare¿(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿ 

¿ 

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to¿frame¿the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co.¿(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability¿as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Ibid.)¿ 

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

Defendant submits evidence under seal. Defendant has not moved to seal the records. Defendant must follow the procedure found in California Rules of Court (CRC) rules 2.550-2.551. Pleadings, motions, discovery documents, and other papers may not be filed under seal merely by stipulation of the parties. A prior court order must be obtained. (CRC, Rule 2.551(a); see H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 888.)  The Court must continue the motion to allow Defendant to an opportunity to bring a motion to seal the records. Alternatively, if the moving party permits unsealing, the lodged record may be unsealed and considered. (CRC Rule 2.551(b)(6).)

To seal a record, the following requirements are imposed: (1) the party must file a motion or application for an order sealing the record, which must be accompanied by a memorandum and a declaration containing facts sufficient to justify the sealing; (2) the party must serve a copy of the motion on all parties who have appeared in the case; and (3) the party requesting that a record be filed under seal must lodge it with the court when the motion or application is made unless the record has previously been lodged. (CRC, Rule 2.551(b).)  The Court must make the following express factual findings in order to seal records: (1) an overriding interest exists that overcomes the right of public access to the record; (2) the overriding interest supports sealing the records; (3) a substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; (4) the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. (CRC, Rule 2.550(d).) These findings embody constitutional requirements for a request to seal court records, protecting the First Amendment right of public access to civil trials. (NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1217-1218.)

Here, the proposed sealing could be more narrowly tailored. Not all information regarding Momoy or the hiring process would be protected. Momoy might have an overriding interest in hiding his DUI conviction in the 90s, which has limited evidentiary value to this case. (UMF 4.) No overriding interest is being served by redacting other topics. For example, the fact that Momoy is not a registered sex offender is non-prejudicial. (UMF 5.) Momoy’s employment history should probably be on the public record, especially since Cedars believe the allegations to be unfounded. (UMF 7-12.)

I must also note Defendant did not properly redact all the information. Most of the redactions on the memo and UMFs were not destructive.

Analysis

The Complaint states two causes of action for premises liability and general negligence on the same set of facts. Both causes pertain to the negligent hiring, retention, or supervision of an employee.

“[A]n employer can be liable to a third person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee.” (Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054.) Negligent hiring, retention, or supervision is a form of direct negligence. (Id.) A cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of employee requires the following elements: (1) employer hired employee; (2) the employee was/became unfit or incompetent to perform the work for which he was hired; (3) employer knew or should have known the employee was/became unfit or incompetent and that this unfitness or incompetence created a particular risk to others; (4) employee’s unfitness or incompetence harmed plaintiff; and (5) employer’s negligence in hiring/supervising/retaining employee was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. (CACI 426.)

A plaintiff must show that the employer knew or should have known that hiring or retaining the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm occurs. (Z.V. v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 889, 902.) “[I]f an enterprise hires individuals with characteristics which might pose a danger to customers or other employees, the enterprise should bear the loss caused by the wrongdoing of its incompetent or unfit employees.” (Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339–1340.) Summary judgment is therefore proper where there is no evidence that the employer had, or reasonably should have had, knowledge of unfitness. (See e.g. Z.V., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at 902–903 [county did not have any prior knowledge of a propensity on the part of county social worker to sexually assault children]; Margaret W. v. Kelley R.¿(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 141, 156–157 [no negligent supervision claim where mother who hosted sleepover of daughter's friends did not know of crime against daughter's friend by third parties];¿Romero v. Superior Court¿(2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1080 [“there is no evidence from which the trier of fact could find that the Romeros had prior actual knowledge of Joseph's propensity to sexually assault female minors.”];¿Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc.¿(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 395 [rejecting claim against Boy Scouts of negligent supervision and retention of scoutmaster where “there was no information accessible to the Scouts that would cause them to suspect ...” that the scoutmaster “had a propensity to molest children”].) 

The complaint provides the following pertinent allegations. “Plaintiff was sexually assaulted and battered at Cedars-Sinai Emergency located at 8700 Beverly Blvd., #5725, Los Angeles, CA 90048 by an individual acting within the scope of his employment, agency, and/or management with the remaining Defendants, and all of them. On information and belief, the individual employee, was unfit or incompetent to perform the work for which he was hired, the remaining Defendants knew or should have known of that employee's unfitness or incompetence, that employee's unfitness or incompetence harmed Plaintiff, and the remaining Defendants hiring/supervising/retaining that employee was a substantial factor in harm to Plaintiff.” (Compl., ¶ Prem.L-1.)

“Plaintiff was a patient at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center Emergency Room, located at 8700 Beverly Blvd., #5725, Los Angeles, CA 90048. While Plaintiff was seeking medical aid, an individual who on information and belief is named ‘Jose Momoy’ caused harm to Plaintiff by committing lewd and lascivious acts, including but not limited to, the following: (1) making sexual comments; (2) making sexually suggestive statements; (3) inappropriate touching of Plaintiffs breasts; and (4) inappropriate touching of Plaintiffs mammary papilla. On information and belief ‘Jose Momoy’ was and/or is an employee of Defendants. On information and belief, ‘Jose Momoy’ was or became unfit or incompetent to perform the work for which he was hired by committing lewd and lascivious acts, including but not limited to, the following: (1) making sexual comments; (2) making sexually suggestive statements; (3) inappropriate touching of Plaintiffs breasts; and (4) inappropriate touching of Plaintiffs mammary papilla.” (Compl., ¶ GN-1.)

“Defendants knew or should have known of ‘Jose Momoy's’ unfitness or incompetence… that created particular risks to others, including Plaintiff. ‘Jose Momoy's’ unfitness and/or incompetence harmed Plaintiff. Defendants' negligence in hiring, and/or supervising, and/or retaining ‘Jose Momoy’ was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs harm.” (Id.)

Defendant presents evidence which, if believed, shows that it did not have actual knowledge or reason to know that Momoy was unfit, despite its reasonable efforts to discover Momoy’s unfitness prior to the alleged assault. Defendant submits the declarations of Richard Vita, a business analyst at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center; Bryan Hickey, Executive Director of Talent Management at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center; and Courtney Looper, Associate Director of Human Resources at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center. (UMF 1-3.) As part of its employee hiring process, Defendants required Momoy to complete an employment application. (UMF 4.) Momoy’s application did not reveal any propensity to commit the alleged lewd and lascivious acts. (Id.) Defendant also conducted a background check performed by an outside vendor, including a search of criminal databases (e.g., Inspector General, National Sex Offender, Patriot Act databases) which showed no such criminal records for Momoy. (UMF 5.) As part of its ongoing employment process, Defendant performs regular competency evaluations of its healthcare employees verifying that they demonstrated knowledge, skill, and ability in various areas. (UMF 6-7.) Defendant requires employees to participate in ongoing training. (Id.) Defendant requires each licensed employee to maintain his or her certification(s), which Momoy maintained. (UMF 8-9.) Defendant also performed annual performance reviews with Momoy. (UMF 10.) The annual performance reviews from 2020-2022 did not reveal any sexual proclivities. (Id.) Critically, before the allegations raised by Plaintiff, the hospital was not aware of any claims or accusations against Monroy by any patient at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center of any improper sexual conduct or comments by Monroy. (UMF 11.) Defendant had no information that Monroy had ever been arrested or charged with any sexual conduct or allegation of sexual conduct. (Id.)

Defendant’s meets its initial burden on summary judgment. The above evidence demonstrates that it did not know or should have known that hiring or retaining Momoy created a risk of the alleged sexual assault. Plaintiff has failed to oppose the motion and therefore fails to carry her responsive burden.

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.