Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23SMCV05904, Date: 2025-02-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV05904    Hearing Date: February 25, 2025    Dept: M

CASE NAME:             Cronin, v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority 

CASE NO.:                   23SMCV05904

MOTION:                     Motion to Strike

HEARING DATE:   2/25/2025

LEGAL STANDARD 

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) 

“Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to show¿in what manner¿plaintiff can amend the complaint, and¿how¿that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿(Id.) 

ANALYSIS 

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“LACMTA”) moves to strike a single charging allegation of negligence against them in Plaintiff Patrick Ryan Cronin’s operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Specifically, Defendant seeks to strike page 4, GN-1: “At the same time and place, Defendants and each of them, negligently,

carelessly and recklessly drove, operated, owned, controlled, maintained, inspected,

repaired, and entrusted their motor vehicle so as to cause a collision with Plaintiff.”

LACMTA argues that the sole cause of action for common law negligence is improper, because there is no statutory basis for allegations of direct negligence against Defendant. Government Code section 815 provides that “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person” except as provided by statute. (Govt. Code, § 815(a); Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932.)  “[D]irect tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.)

Plaintiff, however, cites a statutory basis in the SAC: “all Causes of Action against Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority [are brought] pursuant to California Vehicle Code Section 17001 and Government Code Section 815.2.” (SAC ¶ GN-1.) The Act provides that public employees are liable for their acts and omissions “to the same extent as a private person” (Gov. Code, § 820(a)), and public entity employers are vicariously liable for employees’ negligent acts within the scope of their employment to the same extent as private employers (Gov. Code, § 815.2(a).) The SAC alleges that LACMTA’s driver was acting within the scope of their employment. Government Code section 815.2 provides statutory liability in such a case.

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.