Judge Mark A. Young, Case Number: 23STCV25071, Date: 2024-12-18 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 23STCV25071, Date: 2024-12-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV25071 Hearing Date: December 18, 2024 Dept: M

CASE NO.: 23STCV25071

MOTION: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

HEARING DATE: 12/18/2024

Legal Standard

A defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made after the time to demur has expired and an answer has been filed. (CCP § 438(f).) A motion by a defendant may be made on the grounds that (1) the court “lacks jurisdiction of the subject of one or more of the causes of action alleged” or (2) the complaint or cross-complaint “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (CCP § 438(c).)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. Except as provided by statute, the rules governing demurrers apply. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) “A motion for judgment on the pleadings is akin to a general demurrer; it tests the sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action. The court must assume the truth of all factual allegations in the complaint, along with matters subject to judicial notice.” (Wise v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 725, 738, citations omitted.) Further, like a general demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings “does not lie as to a portion of a cause of action, and if any part of a cause of action is properly pleaded, the [motion] will be overruled.” (Fire Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings, a moving party's counsel must meet and confer, in person or by telephone, with counsel for the party who filed the pleading subject to the judgment on the pleadings motion “for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (CCP § 439(a).) Here, there was no meet and confer declaration submitted to the Court.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant Todd Krauss requests that the Court take judicial notice of the initial complaint filed in this action, and his response to Plaintiff’s State Bar complaint. The request is GRANTED as to the complaint and DENIED as to Defendant’s State Bar response. Defendant’s response is irrelevant to the outcome of this motion for judgment on the pleadings.

ANALYSIS

Defendant Todd Krauss moves for judgment on the pleadings to Plaintiff James Hunter’s First Amended Complaint (FAC). Defendant asserts that the legal malpractice cause of action is not well-pled because there was no malpractice committed in fact, and Plaintiff relies on false information.

To prevail on legal malpractice a party must prove four elements: “(1) the duty of the attorney to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as members of his or her profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the attorney's negligence.”¿¿(Namikas¿v. Miller¿(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1574, 1581.)

The FAC provides sufficient facts to state a claim for malpractice. The FAC alleges that Plaintiff hired Defendant Krauss to file a lawsuit against Defendant Fino for breach of contract and emotional distress. (FAC ¶¶ 8-15.) As such, the parties were in an attorney-client relationship. Krauss allegedly breached his duties to Plaintiff by: a) systematically over-billing Plaintiff (¶17); b) conspiring with opposing counsel to defeat Plaintiff’s claim against Fino (¶¶ 18-20); c) threatening to terminate his representation if Plaintiff did not settle (¶¶ 21, 25); d) refusing to keep Plaintiff informed of all correspondence, including refusing to provide email communications between Glasco and Krauss (¶ 22); e) misleading Plaintiff about the contents of the settlement agreement and release (¶¶ 29-33, 45-46); f) refusing to sign the substitution of attorney form (¶¶ 40-44); g) dismissing Plaintiff’s case against Fino after being instructed not to dismiss the action (¶¶ 37, 42); and h) providing attorney-client privileged information to opposing counsel (¶¶ 47-48). As a result, Plaintiff was allegedly damaged in an amount over $50,000.00, including overbilling and loss of Plaintiff’s claims against Fino. (FAC ¶¶ 51-52.)

Defendant principally relies on extrinsic evidence and arguments that go beyond the four corners of the complaint or judicially noticeable documents. Defendant argues that there is no damage from the underlying case, and that Plaintiff lacks evidence of damages. This contention ignores the express allegations of damages. Plaintiff alleges that he was damaged by Defendant’s unauthorized dismissal of the underlying action, as he lost his claim for damages against defendant Fino for breach of the actor employment agreement and for money lent. (FAC ¶ 45.) Plaintiff was also damaged when Defendant provided attorney-client confidential information to opposing counsel to help defeat Plaintiff’s cases. (FAC ¶¶ 47-48.)

Defendant further contends that this was Plaintiff’s fault for not reading the settlement agreement and that Plaintiff is “making up” the fact that Defendant misrepresented aspects of the agreement. In essence, Defendant believes that there is no evidence to support Plaintiff’s claims. However, Defendant’s extrinsic contentions cannot support dismissal at the pleading stage.

Defendant also contends that Plaintiff made inconsistent allegations between complaints. Reviewing the complaints, there is no inconsistency that would trigger the sham pleading doctrine. Plaintiff does not admit to reading the settlement agreement prior to signing it. (Compl., ¶¶ 17, 18, 22, 30.) Even if this were apparent, there are other pled breaches that support the malpractice action, including Defendant’s unauthorized dismissal of the case and giving attorney-client privileged information to opposing counsel.

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.