Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMC02307, Date: 2025-05-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMC02307    Hearing Date: May 28, 2025    Dept: M

CASE NAME:             Mullis, et al., v. Ebudo, et al. 

CASE NO.:                   24SMC02307

MOTION:                     Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint  

HEARING DATE:   5/28/2025

LEGAL STANDARD 

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (CCP §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732, internal citations omitted.) 

A special demurrer for uncertainty is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (CCP § 430.10(f); Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)  

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) 

“Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to show¿in what manner¿plaintiff can amend the complaint, and¿how¿that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿(Id.) 

ANALYSIS 

Defendants Moonraker and Shayne Ebudo demur and move to strike Plaintiff Benjamin Mullis’s First Amended Complaint (FAC).

COA 1 – Breach of Contract

            Ebudo’s Individual Liability

Ebudo argues that he was not a party to the Lease and therefore cannot be held liable for breach of contract. Indeed, he is not alleged to be a party to the Lease. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Ebudo is an alter ego of Moonraker.

In order to establish an alter ego theory, a plaintiff must allege: (1) such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that no separation actually exists, and (2) an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone. (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399.) Whether a party is liable under an alter ego theory is a question of fact.¿(Id. at 418.) In pleading an alter ego theory, one is only required to allege only “ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.” (Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 236, quoting Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) The alter ego test encompasses a host of factors to determine unity of interest, including:

(1) “commingling of funds and other assets, failure to segregate funds of the separate entities, and the unauthorized diversion of corporate funds or assets to other than corporate uses…”; (2) “the treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as his own…”; (3) “the failure to obtain authority to issue stock or to subscribe to or issue the same”; (4) “the holding out by an individual that he is personally liable for the debts of the corporation…”; (5) “the failure to maintain minutes or adequate corporate records…”; (6) “sole ownership of all of the stock in a corporation by one individual or the members of a family…”; (7) “the failure to adequately capitalize a corporation…”; (8) “the total absence of corporate assets, and undercapitalization…”; (9) “the use of a corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or conduit for a single venture or the business of an individual or another corporation…”; (10) “the concealment and misrepresentation of the identity of the responsible ownership, management and financial interest, or concealment of personal business activities…”; (11) “the disregard of legal formalities and the failure to maintain arm's length relationships among related entities…”; (12) “the use of the corporate entity to procure labor, services or merchandise for another person or entity…”; (13) “the diversion of assets from a corporation by or to a stockholder or other person or entity, to the detriment of creditors, or the manipulation of assets and liabilities between entities so as to concentrate the assets in one and the liabilities in another…”; (14) “the contracting with another with intent to avoid performance by use of a corporate entity as a shield against personal liability, or the use of a corporation as a subterfuge of illegal transactions…”; and (15) “the formation and use of a corporation to transfer to it the existing liability of another person or entity.”  

(Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Hancock, Rothert & Bunshoft, LLP (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 223, 249-50.) “This long list of factors is not exhaustive. The enumerated factors may be considered ‘[a]mong’ others ‘under the particular circumstances of each case.’ ” (Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799, 812.) “No single factor is determinative, and instead a court must examine all the circumstances to determine whether to apply the doctrine. [Citation.]” (VirtualMagic Asia, Inc. v. Fil–Cartoons, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 228, 245.) Whether an alter ego relationship exists is an issue of fact. (Id.)

The FAC alleges four factors supporting the allegations of a unity of interest, ownership, and control between Moonraker and Ebudo such that any individuality and separateness between Ebudo and Moonraker does not exist. For instance, the FAC alleges that Defendant Moonraker is the alter ego of Ebudo in that he is the sole owner of Moonraker, exercises exclusive control of it, has co-mingled assets with it, and has treated assets of Moonraker as his own. (FAC ¶ 4,) The FAC also alleges, as a matter of ultimate fact, that “[a]dherence to the fiction of the separate existence of Moonraker as an entity distinct from Ebudo would permit an abuse of the litigious business entity privilege and would sanction fraud or promote injustice.” (Id.) Thus, the FAC alleges sufficient facts to support alter ego liability against Ebudo.

            Void Lease Agreement

Defendants contend that the subject lease agreement is void and unenforceable as a matter of law. Generally, an agreement that violates the law is void and unenforceable. (Civ. Code, §§ 1598, 1599.) Defendants rely on the discussion found in Carter v. Cohen, (2010) 188 Cal. App. 4th 1038, 1048–49, to support their position. The full discussion in Carter, however, explains why the instant Lease agreement would not be void for an unlawful purpose.

Rental agreements involving units that were constructed without building permits or lack a certificate of occupancy are ordinarily regarded as unlawful and void. [Citations.] This is because “[t]he object of a contract must be lawful [citation]; i.e., it must not be in conflict either with express statutes or public policy.... [Accordingly, i]f the contract has a single object, and that object is unlawful (whether in whole or in part), the entire contract is void.” [Citation.]

Generally, “the courts ... will not enforce an illegal bargain or lend their assistance to a party who seeks compensation for an illegal act.” [Citations.] Our Supreme Court has explained: “The reason for this refusal is not that the courts are unaware of possible injustice between the parties, and that the defendant may be left in possession of some benefit he should in good conscience turn over to the plaintiff, but that this consideration is outweighed by the importance of deterring illegal conduct. Knowing that they will receive no help from the courts and must trust completely to each other's good faith, the parties are less likely to enter an illegal arrangement in the first place. [Citations.]”

Nonetheless, the rule barring the enforcement of unlawful contracts is not absolute. Because the rationale for the rule is founded on deterrence, the Supreme Court has made clear that courts “ ‘should not ... blindly extend the rule to every case where illegality appears somewhere in the transaction. The fundamental purpose of the rule must always be kept in mind, and the realities of the situation must be considered. Where, by applying the rule, the public cannot be protected because the transaction has been completed, where no serious moral turpitude is involved, where the defendant is the one guilty of the greatest moral fault, and where to apply the rule will be to permit the defendant to be unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff, the rule should not be applied.’ ” [Citation.]

One type of situation in which the rule is inapplicable is described in Lewis & Queen: “[W]hen the Legislature enacts a statute forbidding certain conduct for the purpose of protecting one class of persons from the activities of another, a member of the protected class may maintain an action notwithstanding the fact that he has shared in the illegal transaction. The protective purpose of the legislation is realized by allowing the plaintiff to maintain his action against a defendant within the class primarily to be deterred. In this situation it is said that the plaintiff is not in pari delicto. [Citations.]” [Citation.] Courts have thus permitted parties to obtain benefits under a law enacted for their protection, despite their participation in transactions that contravened the law [Citation]. Similarly, courts have permitted parties to enforce contracts that contravene statutes enacted for the parties' benefit [Citation].

In our view, the principles enunciated by our Supreme Court in Tri–Q and Lewis & Queen encompass Carter's claim for excess rent payments under the RSO. As noted above (see pt. A.1., ante ), the RSO was enacted to “safeguard tenants from excessive rent increases” [Citation]. Although rental agreements regarding units lacking a certificate of occupancy are unlawful, their enforcement by tenants is subject to the principles that we have explained. [Citation.] Here, Carter sought no benefits under the provisions of her lease agreements with Cohen: she relied on the agreements solely to establish that the rent she had paid exceeded the RSO limits. Because “[t]he protective purpose of the legislation [was] realized by allowing [Carter] to maintain [her] action against [her landlord]” [Citation], the trial court properly permitted her to assert her RSO claim.

(Ibid.; see Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 150–151; Tri–Q, Inc. v. Sta–Hi Corp. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 199, 218–219]; see also Espinoza v. Calva, (2008) 169 Cal. App. 4th 1393 [court erred in awarding money judgment for past due rent where absence of certificate of occupancy rendered residential lease illegal].)  The FAC’s facts demonstrate the inapplicability of the rule to these circumstances.

Defendants do not cite any judicially noticeable information or allegations of the FAC which supports the illegality defense. The FAC does not allege that the subject unit was “constructed without building permits or lack a certificate of occupancy.” Instead, the FAC alleges that after the lease was executed “a Building Inspector from Malibu informed Ebudo that he could not perform construction of the main house while simultaneously renting out the guesthouse. Specifically, the gas line to the guesthouse had been disconnected, and needed to remain so during construction…. the Building Inspector considered the guesthouse as “uninhabitable” due to the absence of the gas line.” (FAC, ¶ 11, emphasis added.) At best, Defendants cite an allegation that “on May 3, 2024, Malibu posted on the leased premises a ‘red tag’ stating, among other things, that the leased premises were ‘uninhabitable’ due to the absence of a gas line.” (FAC, ¶ 16.) Defendants present no law or argument that the alleged “red tagging” is the equivalent of constructing a unit without building permits or failing to obtain a certificate of occupancy. Defendants cannot because a property deemed “substandard” does not affect a tenant's rights under the tenancy. (See Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1293-1295 [trial court erred in determining that red-tagging of property, due to substandard condition caused by landlord turning off gas, electricity and water, terminated lease]; see also Heal. & Saf. Code §§ 17980.6, 17980.7.) Thus, the record does not support Defendants’ illegality defense.

Even if the record revealed that the property lacked a certificate of occupancy when the parties entered the lease agreement, the FAC alleges facts supporting the exception articulated by Cohen. The lease transaction was completed before the alleged habitability issues arose. The FAC also does not reveal any serious moral turpitude on Plaintiff’s part. If anything, the FAC alleges facts which would support Defendants’ greater moral fault, including Defendants’ intentional and malicious removal of the gas line and septic tank, among other acts allegedly designed to harass Plaintiff into abandoning the lease. (FAC ¶¶ 32-43.) There is no dispute that California’s red-tagging and habitability laws were intended to ensure landlords provide habitable conditions for tenants and protect the public from unscrupulous landlords and not the other way around. (Civ. Code § 1941.) Under Defendants’ proffered construction, every time a landlord renders a rental unit uninhabitable by his own intentional conduct, the underlying lease would become void and illegal. Such a ruling would completely undermine the purpose of California’s habitability laws.

Plaintiff’s Breach

Defendants argue that Plaintiff took possession of the Unit after being told it was uninhabitable and before the lease term commenced. As discussed above, the Unit’s habitability does not affect the validity of the underlying lease agreement. As to the second contention, Defendants cite no authority which would hold that an early possession would preclude recovery under the pled facts. The FAC alleges that the one-year lease term was to commence on March 11, 2024, and terminate on March 10, 2025. (FAC ¶10.) The FAC further states that on February 1, 2024, Plaintiff “with Defendants’ permission” worked at the premises to prepare it for his occupancy, including tree trimming, plus maintenance and renovation of the tennis court. (Id.) Thus, the FAC alleges that Plaintiff had occupied the leased premises since about February 1, 2024, with Defendants’ permission. (FAC ¶¶ 10-12.) In light of the alleged permission, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s early possession of the Unit was a material breach, or that Plaintiff did not substantially fulfil obligations under the Lease.

            Failure to Attach a Copy of the Lease

For the first time in reply, Defendants raise Plaintiff’s failure to attach the Lease as grounds for demurrer/strike any causes dependent on the Lease. While Defendants noted that the FAC lacked exhibits, they did not argue this ground to sustain the demurrer or grant the motion to strike. The Court will not consider these new arguments in reply. Moreover, it would be an idle act. Plaintiff already submitted the Lease attached to the initial complaint. Defendants also show that they have a copy of the subject Lease.

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED to the first cause of action.

COA 9 – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants further argue that the FAC fails to allege sufficient facts supporting the element of outrageous conduct. The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct (2) directed to the plaintiff by defendant, (3) with the intention of (4) causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, (5) severe or extreme emotional distress. (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.)  For conduct to be outrageous it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. (Ess v. Eskaton Properties, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 120, 130.) The question of whether the conduct is in fact outrageous is generally a question of fact to be determined beyond the pleading stage. (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652.) “While those cases say that it is ‘usually’ a question of fact, several cases have dismissed intentional infliction of emotional distress claims on demurrer, concluding that the facts alleged did not amount to outrageous conduct as a matter of law.” (Barker v. Fox & Associates (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 333, 355-356.)

In the habitability context, courts have held that a tenant's emotional distress caused by landlord's alleged “knowing, intentional, and willful” failure to correct defective conditions of the premises can form the basis of an IIED claim. (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921.) The Stoiber court held: 

[I]t is clear that the availability of a remedy for breach of implied warranty of habitability does not preclude a tenant from suing his landlord for intentional infliction of mental distress if the landlord's acts are extreme and outrageous and result in severe mental distress. Whether this is so under the present allegations, presents a factual question it cannot be said as a matter of law that appellant has not stated a cause of action. 

(Id. at 922; see also Erlach, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at 1299 [outrageous conduct alleged where the landlord turned off tenant's utilities and prevented the tenant from returning to the property].)

The FAC alleges that Defendants engaged in outrageous conduct as a matter of fact. On March 18, 2024, Mullis and Ebudo communicated by telephone, at which time Ebudo made various threats to Mullis to compel him to vacate the property including, but not limited to, that Ebudo would report Mullis to immigration authorities, would destroy his reputation, and would negatively impact Mullis’ occupation as a tennis professional. (¶ 14.) Ebudo made a complaint to the City of Malibu and, as a result, on May 3, 2024, Malibu red-tagged the premises, finding that the leased premises were “uninhabitable” due to the absence of a gas line. (¶ 16.) On May 6, 2024, with the intent to interfere with Plaintiff’s occupancy of the leased premises, Ebudo called people listed on Mullis’ rent application and made false and defamatory statements about him for the purpose of forcing Mullis to vacate the leased premises and to harm his business reputation. (¶ 17.)  On August 20, 2024, Ebudo entered the leased premises, without notice, with a locksmith and a sheriff, and proceeded to change the locks of the leased premises to prevent Plaintiff from gaining reasonable access to the property. (¶ 19.) On September 23, 2024, Ebudo again entered the leased premises, without notice, with a sheriff and put a padlock on the tennis court, removed the net from the tennis court, removed Plaintiff’s personal possessions, placed them on the driveway of the leased premises, and urinated on Plaintiff’s property. (Id.) On June 25, 2024, Ebudo disconnected the sewage service to the leased premises with the intent to interfere with Plaintiff’s rights under the lease. (¶ 20.) The FAC alleges that such conduct was outrageous. (¶ 79.) A reasonable person could find that the above conduct was outrageous, extreme, and exceeded all bounds usually tolerated in a civilized community. Indeed, Defendants’ intentional disconnection of utility services, among other malicious acts, constitute outrageous conduct under Erlach.

Accordingly, the demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

COA 10 - Declaratory Relief

Defendants argue that the declaratory relief cause of action fails because it only engages past wrongs. Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 states: “Any person interested under a written instrument, excluding a will or a trust, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property, or with respect to the location of the natural channel of a watercourse, may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract. He or she may ask for a declaration of rights or duties, either alone or with other relief; and the court may make a binding declaration of these rights or duties, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed at the time. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and the declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. The declaration may be had before there has been any breach of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is sought.”

To state a declaratory relief claim, the plaintiff must allege a proper subject of declaratory relief and an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the party’s rights or obligations. (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909.) The FAC alleges a justiciable controversy. The facts state that an actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and Defendants regarding the validity of the Lease agreement. (FAC ¶¶83-85.) Plaintiff contends that the lease is valid and enforceable. (¶84.) Defendants contend that they have the right to rescind the written lease, exclude Plaintiff from the leased premises, and have no duty to render the leased premises habitable. (¶ 85.) On the face of section 1060, the validity of a contract is a proper subject of declaratory relief. (CCP § 1060.) The fact that the declaratory relief procedure operates prospectively does not conflict with the principle that redress for past wrongs may be had in a proper action for declaratory relief. (Travers v. Louden, (1967) 254 Cal. App. 2d 926, 931-932.)

Accordingly, the demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

COA 11 - Malicious Prosecution

Defendants argue that the FAC does not establish that the unlawful detainer (UD) action was either brought without probable cause or that it concluded in his favor.

“ ‘To establish a cause of action for the malicious prosecution of a civil proceeding, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff’s, favor [citations]; (2) was brought without probable cause [citations]; and (3) was initiated with malice [citations].’ ” (Lanz v. Goldstone (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 441, 458.)

Defendants contend that the UD action was brought with probable cause. The FAC alleges the opposite: Defendants “acted without probable cause in bringing the UD action, in that they did not honestly and reasonably believe that there were grounds for the action because they knew that the lease was enforceable, and that they had no grounds to pursue a UD action against Plaintiff based upon the grounds alleged in their Complaint.” (FAC ¶91.) Thus, Defendants’ lack of probable cause is alleged as a matter of fact.

Defendants also contend that the UD action did not conclude in Plaintiff’s favor. The FAC again alleges quite the opposite. “The UD action was terminated in favor of Plaintiff when Landlord voluntarily dismissed it on October 9, 2024. This occurred after Plaintiff made it clear to the Court, the Landlord, and the Defendant Attorneys, that the lease was enforceable, that Landlord had no grounds to rescind it, and that Plaintiff had the right to occupy leased premises in accordance with the lease. Further, the Defendant Attorneys dismissed the UD action after the judge in that case set the matter for a jury trial on a date certain.” (FAC ¶90.) A voluntary dismissal may be presumed to be a termination favorable to the dismissed party, unless proved otherwise. (Oviedo v. Windsor Twelve Properties, LLC (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 97, 112.) At a minimum, the allegations demonstrate a conflict as to the circumstances of the termination, the determination of which “is a question of fact.” (Id. at 113.)

Defendants’ cited minute orders, for which they did not request judicial notice, also do not support their position. The Court did not determine that the UD action was “moot” or that possession was not at issue. The Court set an OSC Re: Dismissal after Defendants represented that possession was no longer at issue. At that OSC, and after determining there was a dispute as to possession, the Court set the UD action for trial.

Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED as to the malicious prosecution cause of action.

COA 13 – Quantum Meruit

A common count of quantum meruit attempts to recover the reasonable value of services rendered which directly benefit the defendant. (Producers Cotton Oil Co. v. Amstar Corp. (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 638, 659.) A claim for quantum meruit must allege: 1) performance of services, work or labor; 2) at defendant’s request; and 3) circumstances inferring defendant’s promise to pay a reasonable value. (Maglica v. Maglica (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 442, 449-450.) “The underlying idea behind quantum meruit is the law’s distaste for unjust enrichment.”(Id., at 449.) “If one has received a benefit which one may not justly retain, one should restore the aggrieved party to his [or her] former position by return of the thing or its equivalent in money.” (E.J. Franks Construction, Inc. v. Sahota (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1128.) “The measure of recovery in quantum meruit is the reasonable value of the services rendered provided they were of direct benefit to the defendant. In other words, quantum meruit is equitable payment for services already rendered.” (Id.)

The FAC alleges a claim for quantum meruit. From February 1, 2024, through March 6, 2024, with Defendants’ knowledge and consent, Plaintiff performed services at the leased premises to prepare them for his occupancy, including, but not limited to, tree trimming, and work related to the renovation of the tennis court. (FAC ¶105.) When Defendants failed to make the premises habitable, Plaintiff paid to have a hot water heater and a wall heater to be installed in the premises. (Id.) Defendants thereby received valuable consideration and benefits from Plaintiff’s time and labor, while preventing Plaintiff’s agreed-upon use of the Property. (¶ 106.) The FAC thereby alleges circumstances which equitably imply that Defendants would pay reasonable value for these services.

Defendants contend, without support, that the claim for quantum meruit runs afoul of the Lease terms. Defendants cite no terms within the Lease which would preclude recovery for Plaintiff’s services, work or labor under the circumstances. Defendants notably had the statutory obligation to maintain the habitability of the premises. (Civ. Code §§ 1940, et seq.)

Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED as to the quantum meruit cause of action.

Remaining Causes of Action

As to the remaining causes of action, Defendants reiterate their arguments regarding the validity of the lease and Plaintiff’s early occupancy. Defendants reason that they could not have interfered with Plaintiff’s tenancy after he knowingly elected to reside in an uninhabitable residence with no legal right to do so. Such arguments are rejected for the same reasons discussed as to the breach of contract.  

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED.

Motion to Strike

            In their motion to strike, Defendants replicate their contentions in the demurrer, such as that Ebudo is not a party to the lease. Such contentions are rejected for the same reasons discussed in the demurrer. The Court will address any further challenges brought by the motion to strike below.

MTS- Non-Economic Damages

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot recover noneconomic for his claims of statutory violations, habitability, and nuisance. Defendants assert that noneconomic are not recoverable for these claims which sound in breach of contract. Defendants posit no authority that the statutory claims under Civil Code sections 789.3 and 1940.2 cannot support recovery for non-economic damages. In a section § 1942.4 action, a tenant may recover their “actual damages” including damages for emotional distress. (Civ. Code § 1942.4(b)(1); McNairy v. C.K. Realty (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1506.) Likewise, under section 789.3(c)(1), a tenant may recover “Actual damages.”  Furthermore, Erlach, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at 1298, supports recovery of non-economic damages where the breach of the implied covenants was tortious.

A nuisance plaintiff may recover for all personal injury and property damage caused by defendant's unlawful acts or omissions. (Civ. Code §§ 3281-3283.) Plaintiff may recover damages for mental anguish and emotional distress without proof of physical injury. (Hensley v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1337, 1348-1351.) Accordingly, the motion to strike non-economic damages is DENIED.

MTS- Punitive Damages

Defendants argue that punitive damages are not well-stated. In order to state a claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code Section 3294. (Coll. Hosp. v. Superior Ct. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 704, 721.) The complaint must allege that defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294 (a).) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. omitted.) Section 3294 defines malice as conduct “intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff,” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Despicable is a powerful term used to describe circumstances that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (Coll. Hosp., supra, 9 Cal.4th at 726.) The statute “plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, “malice” requires more than a “willful and conscious” disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of “despicable conduct” must be found.” (Id.)

The FAC alleges specific facts showing Defendants’ malice towards Plaintiff. This includes the allegations that Ebudo, as the sole owner of Moonraker, harassed Plaintiff, threatened Plaintiff, failed to provided/disabled utilities to the Unit, locked Plaintiff out of the premises, and removed and urinated on Plaintiff’s possessions. A reasonable fact finder could find that these acts were intended to harm Plaintiff, or were despicable acts done with a willful and conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights.

Accordingly, the motion to strike punitive damages is DENIED.

MTS- FAC, ¶ 89, pp. 18:23 – 19:1

Defendants argue that Plaintiff incorrectly and falsely alleges that the UD action filed by Moonraker asserted that he occupied the lease premises on March 6, 2024. Strictly speaking, Defendants are correct. Defendants did not allege in the UD Complaint that Plaintiff occupied the premises on March 6, 2024. Aside from the date, the allegations correctly summarize the UD complaint. Thus, the Court will strike the date “March 6, 2024” only as a false matter/statement.

Accordingly, the motion to strike is GRANTED in part. The Court will strike the date “March 6, 2024,” found at FAC p. 18 ln. 28 only. Otherwise, the motion to strike is DENIED.